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[T]here is nothing more tentative, nothing more empirical (superficially, at least) than the process of 
establishing an order among things[.] 
Michel Foucault, 1966 
1 Introduction and Overview 
Consider a health dossier in a weekly news magazine on vaccinations, which 
aims at persuading readers to get their children vaccinated. In 2012, 53% of Germans 
who got vaccinated within the previous five years stated their impulse to get vaccinated 
in the past was that they had heard about a vaccination through some media channel  
(e.g., radio, television, newspaper) (Reckendrees, Mertens, Wortberg, Gaczkowska, & 
Stander, 2013). Public health administrators and NGOs try to raise awareness through 
campaigns and positioning informative material in mass media programming. Other 
public health topics like safer sex, blood donation, or post-mortem organ donation have 
in common that they are (a) subject to persuasive public campaigns, but more 
importantly, (b) the behaviors advertised by these campaigns have ramifications for the 
actors as well as their environment and thus obviously exist in contradistinction of 
individual feasibilities and personal goal as well as societal goals.  
The present work investigates the individual media user’s understanding of these 
health messages as important factor of their educational and persuasive success. The 
processing of mediated information has gained substantial empirical attention and is 
rather well understood. First, the readers perceive the dossier visually. They read the 
letters and then translate them into a so-called mental representation of the article’s 
content (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Mental representations are models of objects, persons, 
as well as related processes in our minds. Mental models represent things that are 
outside our direct experience—that includes everything that is not physically present at 
a given moment or that is transcendental. They are not objective representations of the 
truth but sensitive to how we perceive and experience them. This makes all information 
processing a constructive effort, which can be biased. These mental representations are 
then stored in the readers’ memory. The new mental representation about vaccination 
gets integrated and connected with the readers’ existing knowledge about vaccinations, 
medicine, health, their personal experiences, for instance with needles, but also with 
less central information (i.e., how vaccinations work). This way the new information 
becomes part of the individual’s larger knowledge structure. The new mental model 
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stays in memory until it is retrieved at a later point, for instance, when the reader is 
asked by a doctor to get vaccinated. 
Yet, not all readers react the same way to health information. One reader might 
interpret the information about vaccination focusing on the act of getting a needle pinch 
or see it as complicated task that demands personal sacrifices. This reader might 
associate the suggested behavior with its feasibilities and the involved costs, for 
example, the monetary cost of getting to the doctor, the time investment involved, or 
simply the unpleasantness of being pined by a needle. This reader has processed the 
health message at a concrete level. Another reader might understand vaccination as 
public health matter, concentrating on the normative values, and seeing it as the civic 
responsibility of an individual. For him or her getting vaccinated is a desirable action 
with a strong goal focus on condemning spreadable diseases. This focus is equivalent to 
an abstract message processing. As a result of an abstract or concrete information 
translation process, the mental models of a given thing can vary markedly along a 
continuum of abstract versus concrete representations.  
Hence, the leading question for the present work is: How does abstract and 
concrete thinking about health messages impact the mental representation about a 
public health issue and the consequent attitude and knowledge? The mental 
representation, its genesis, and its importance for health communication research are the 
central research object. In the center of the theoretical exploration stands the idea that 
individuals can adopt a more abstract thinking style (i.e., abstract encoding of 
information) in contrast to a concrete thinking style (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Förster 
& Dannenberg, 2010). The process of abstract thinking or abstraction is complicated to 
define unambiguously, but various explanations agree that abstraction entails 
categorizing and classifying something by its central characteristics (Burgoon, 
Henderson, & Markman, 2013). Accordingly, abstract thinking refers to thinking in 
central, general characteristics and categories. Concrete thinking, in contrast, includes 
thinking in exclusive characteristics. The more concrete the thinking style, the more 
concrete the formed mental representations are, and the more connections with equally 
concrete knowledge structures are activated. Research in the area of cognitive and 
social psychology addressed the impact of mental abstractions in object and person 
perception and found the level of abstraction to affect social judgments (e.g., Williams 
& Bargh, 2008; Henderson & Wakslak, 2010; Henderson, 2013) and behavior 
regulations (e.g., Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Agrawal & Wan, 2009; 
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Fujita & Sasota, 2011). The underlying processes of attitude formation are relevant, 
because classic research on health behavior changes has demonstrated that attitudes and 
behavioral intentions are crucial in determining actual health behavior (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991). 
How individuals think about and represent information at different levels of 
abstraction affects their attitudes and social judgments. Particularly, for public health 
problems making judgments based on normative values and general information stands 
in competition to judgments based on individualizing, personally relevant information. 
In two studies I investigate how the differences between abstract or concrete processing 
of persuasive health messages, specifically on a public health issue, changes a persons’ 
associations and evaluation with this topic.  
In the next section, I will briefly discuss examples of how abstract and concrete 
thinking was relevant in media and communication studies thus far. The following 
section (cp. Section 1.2) then outlines four central research objectives of the work in 
detail that will extend on the hitherto understanding.  
1.1 On the Relevance of Abstract Thinking in Media and Communication 
Research 
Abstract (versus concrete) categories—other than abstract processing—have 
sparked some interest in media and communication research already. Traditionally, this 
research has focused on abstract or concrete presentations in the media. Presentation is 
distinct from representation, although they are often used synonymously. Media or 
individuals present information, referring to a performance or display of information, 
while representation signifies the mental model of said presented idea (Abbott, 2008).  
The existing theorizing usually uses more specific and theoretically narrower 
terminology, concentrating on specific domains of abstract presentation. Stereotypes 
and exemplars are two cases of abstract versus concrete presentation in media that have 
gained attention in media and communication research.  
Stereotypical presentation of characters and their impact on the media user’s 
attitudes are a classic topic for media and communication scholars. In the original sense 
of the term, as it was coined by Lippmann (1922), stereotypes aid humans—who are 
cognitive processors with a limited processing capacity—as mental short cuts. 
Stereotypes about individuals are abstract concepts, because they summarize many 
different individuals (e.g., from different cultures, different sexes) based on some 
inclusive characteristics that all individuals allegedly have in common (e.g., their skin 
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color). As such, the media’s usage of stereotypical portrayals is a prototypical example 
of abstract media presentation. Content analyses show that the media often relies on 
stereotypical portrayals and reproduces the stereotypical assumptions of their society. 
Typical examples are the reproduction of mainstream beauty assumptions in children 
cartoons or the overrepresentation of white, male doctors in medical dramas (Rossmann, 
2003; Klein & Shiffman, 2006). It has to be noted that this is a reasonable attempt, 
because the media try to communicate to a variety of individuals, who have different 
cognitive and social predispositions. From this perspective, stereotypes are one of many 
cognitive categories that organize information and, thus, are not only inevitable but 
quite functional, because they are a very inclusive and abstract category (Seiter, 1986).  
For exemplars the mechanism is similar. An exemplar is specific example of a 
larger concept that stands in lieu of abstract information (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). 
Exemplars represent the opposite end of an abstraction hierarchy, because they are very 
concrete agents of a category. Following Zillmann (2006b, p. S221), exemplars, “come 
to represent, impartially or in distorted ways, the whole of the respective phenomena 
and issues”. While exemplifications themselves are a specific and concrete form of 
presentation in mass media, the implicit conclusions drawn from them are abstract. 
Their characteristics are often overgeneralized to the associated members of the 
category, which the exemplar stands for.  
Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, and Shanahan (2002) argued that 
repeatedly presenting biased information such as stereotypes or exemplars in the mass 
media influences the socialization of believes about reality (cultivation paradigm). 
Exemplars play an important role particularly in so-called first-order judgments of the 
prevalence of events depicted in the media. The ease with which information is recalled 
is often interpreted as a signal of its importance and centrality. This so-called 
accessibility bias affects media users’ knowledge and related judgments (Srull & Wyer, 
1979). Exemplars are often used to make such first-order judgments, for example, how 
often crimes happen or how often CPR (Cardiopulmonary resuscitation) is administered 
on average (Van den Bulck, 2002). It is further assumed that the frequent contact with 
such biased representations has the effect that the category and the related attitudes 
come to mind more easily in a judgment situation (second-order effects, Fazio, Powell, 
& Williams, 1989; Shrum, 1995). Particularly, if no direct experiences are available, 
media experiences, such as exemplars, function as stand-in (Brosius & Bathelt, 1994; 
Zillmann, 2006b; Peter, Rossmann, & Keyling, 2014). 
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These dominant theoretical perspectives suggest that the repeated exposure to 
stereotypes or exemplars in media portrayals activates mental representations in media 
users, which are easy to recall when needed. Media and communication studies have 
not embraced a more general perspective on the construction and activation of biased 
mental representations. Research from neighboring disciplines, particularly social 
psychology, begs the question how a broader thinking style, compared to a more 
concrete thinking style, influences the processing of persuasive messages, what mental 
representations and association it fosters and their effects. In technical terms, this would 
shift the assumption of a transmission of media presentation to mental representation to 
the exploration of how the individual’s processing mind-set works as a filter in this 
transmission. It is this processing style that should be in the midst of this investigation, 
intentionally stepping from and application-oriented media effects perspective, to a 
theory-focused exploration of the cognitive thinking style. 
1.2 Research Objectives of the Present Work 
Media effects research has seen a turn towards a processing perspective in the 
past decades (Lang, 2013). Yet, only little empirical attention was given to the 
processes related to the level of abstraction on the recipient’s side, namely the media 
user’s individual cognitive encoding effort and resulting mental representation. In the 
journals of media and communication research questions of abstract versus concrete 
thinking styles have found only few notable applications thus far (Nan, 2007; Lutchyn 
& Yzer, 2011; Katz & Byrne, 2013; Ellithorpe, Brookes, & Ewoldsen, 2015; Kazakova, 
Cauberghe, Pandelaere, & De Pelsmacker, 2015; Young, 2015) and social psychologists 
have not shown an invested interest in questions associated with mediated message 
processing, but a few noteworthy exceptions (e.g., Menegatti & Rubini, 2013). To 
investigate how the momentary abstract or concrete thinking style of media users affects 
the impact health messages can have on their attitudes and behavioral intentions, four 
research objectives of this work can be mapped out. 
Firstly, in this work I want to advance media and communication studies’ 
existing theorizing of abstract and concrete categories, by introducing the theoretical 
understanding of mental abstraction as a generally broader thinking style, or mind-set, 
instead of partial mental representations like stereotyping or exemplification.  
Secondly, Schwarz (2009) points out that individuals respond not to an 
objectively true representation of a situation, but rather to the situation as they see and 
represent it. By adding a situated cognition perspective to the research of mediated 
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message processing, I want to assess less studied determinants of knowledge formation 
and attitude judgments from persuasive media. According to the situated cognition 
perspective, the human perception is highly sensitive to the situation (for a review of 
situational influences, Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Abstract (versus concrete) thinking, 
according to this line of work, can be triggered by numerous context factors. For 
example, an individual’s mood can influence the thinking style. Previous research 
showed, happy individuals tend to rely on their abstract knowledge structures more than 
individuals in a sad mood, because for them, positive mood implies that a situation is 
unproblematic, and the use of abstract knowledge structures is sufficient (Bless, Clore, 
et al., 1996). Abstract categories suffice in benign situations, whereas problematic 
situations are best mastered utilizing more detailed knowledge (Bless, 2001).  
Similarly, priming effects make up a central paradigm in the research literature 
investigating abstract and concrete thinking styles from a situated cognition perspective. 
Primes are stimuli that activate concepts in the individuals’ mind that in turn then 
influence the processing of a following stimulus. The concepts primed come to mind 
more easily when new information needs to be evaluated or integrated into the existing 
knowledge. Visual and conceptual primes can achieve that the following information is 
approached with an abstract or concrete mind-set. For example, research has repeatedly 
shown that distance is a central factor, which influences abstract or concrete thinking. 
Information about objects and people that are far away, for example temporally or 
locally, is processed more abstractly, whereas close things are processed with more 
detail (Liberman & Trope, 1998). Visual primes as well as conceptual primes can 
convey distance to an object. Previous research has placed focal object in the 
background of a picture versus the foreground, or simply told participants that the focal 
object they had to judge or evaluate is far away versus close to them (Trope & 
Liberman, 2000; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Amit, Algom, & Trope, 2009). That way the 
investigators primed the concept of distance. Procedural primes, on the other hand, train 
the logic of a certain thinking style with the individual, so they approach the following 
tasks in much the same way (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; Freitas, Gollwitzer, 
& Trope, 2004; Updegraff & Suh, 2007). For example, individuals are asked to find an 
overarching and thus abstract category for an object. By repeating this task with every 
given answer, individuals get more abstract with every answer (i.e., A puddle is an 
example of a dog; dog is an example of a mammal, a mammal is an example of an 
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animal). Individuals get used to this way of thinking for a short time and approach the 
next task with the same mind-set (Liberman et al., 2002). 
In the context of processing mediated information, priming effects can stem 
from the activation of an abstract or concrete thinking style by previous communication 
(mass media and interpersonal alike). Such priming effects are a well-known research 
topic in media and communication studies. Traditionally, agenda-setting and priming 
effects share the same underlying social psychological assumptions. The classic study 
of agenda-setting effects showed that the issue frequency in the mass media coverage of 
presidential candidates correlated significantly with the frequency with which the issues 
were cited by voters (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Likewise, television news (Iyengar, 
1987) and even entertainment can exert priming effects (Holbert et al., 2003). In 
summary, the work at hand focuses on arbitrary situational sources that can activate not 
only concepts, but also thinking styles—referring to the way individuals approach an 
information-processing task. As argued above, these sources do not have to be media 
sources. An argument with another person about morals and ideologies, which are 
abstract categories, could lead to a person judging a news article he or she reads later on, 
by applying more general, moral standards in their judgment. While conceptual priming 
has had much room in media effects theorizing, the transfer of a thinking style—as a 
way of rationalizing, encoding, interpreting—has not received as much attention in the 
media effects community. 
A third research objective lies in acknowledging cultural and individual 
differences as determinants of information processing and putting those in relation to an 
abstract or concrete mind-set. Individual and cultural factors ought to be kept in mind, 
when assessing factors outside the media stimulus, which impact how media users think 
about a stimulus. Psychology has learned much about the role of individual factors in 
information processing. The dual-process approach to information processing, for 
example, posits that information are processed with more cognitive effort when they are 
relevant to the receiver (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981), 
especially if the receiver has a higher disposition to scrutinize new information with 
cognitive effort (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, 
& Heier, 1996). But also abstract or concrete thinking is influenced by individual 
tendencies that are relevant for my research. Individuals show a difference in their 
tendency to mentally represent actions abstract and goal-oriented (i.e., living healthy) or 
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concrete and behavior-oriented (i.e., going to the fitness center once a week, shopping 
fresh produce at the farmer’s market, Vallacher & Wegner, 1987).  
In addition, the cultural background of a person influences their information 
processing, because culturally based believes and schools of thought socialize the way 
individuals make inferences and categorizations (Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, 
& Uskul, 2009). Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan (2001) argue that culture has an 
impact on the extent of a holistic thinking style that differs from an analytical style, 
because it applies broader concept focus and assumes complex associations between 
entities involved. Individuals from individualistic cultures tend to attribute the behavior 
of others on trait rather than situational factors, hence making more stereotypical and 
schematic inferences (for a full review see Kühnen, Hannover, Pöhlmann, & Roeder, 
2013). Cultures with a stronger collectivistic tradition very much acknowledge 
interdependencies between individuals and circumstances. Therefore, those cultures 
also attribute the behavior of others to a myriad of possible factors.  
Finally, measuring abstract or concrete mental representations has proven a 
complicated task in the past and has been omitted due to the existing literature 
suggesting the manipulations work (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006; 
Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008). Especially when considering abstract thinking to be 
broad and applying it to complex ideas, people, objects, and actions no go-to measure 
exists (Burgoon et al., 2013). Established measures are domain specific, often 
concentrating on the presentation of action (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Semin, 1994). 
Thus this study will try in a fourth step to actually measure how individuals perceive 
and process information to investigate the underlying effects of abstract and concrete 
thinking on attitude and knowledge changes.  
1.3 Summary 
The present research looks at the role of abstract and concrete thinking styles in 
the processing of mediated health messages. Attitudes and knowledge are based on the 
mental representations formed of reality; consequently, the level of abstraction of 
mental representations matters. The processing of information is highly susceptible to 
incidental factors, which are often ignored in message-centered research. Besides 
concentrating on situational factors, also individual and cultural differences will be 
explored. The presented work investigates how situational, individual, and cultural 
differences in abstract and concrete thinking affect attitudes and knowledge through 
message construal. 
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The literature review will approach the theoretical basis for these research 
objectives systematically from the broader understanding of abstraction in social 
cognition and move towards highly specialized theories that allow making predictions 
about the effects of abstract or concrete thinking and their determinants. The literature 
review starts by introducing the conceptualizations of abstract thinking in psychology 
(Chapter 2) and I will map out the specific information processing mechanism on which 
the subsequent ideas are based on. Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical modeling of 
abstraction as a processing mind-set. I review two central theoretical frameworks, 
Action Identification Theory (cp. Section 3.1) and Construal Level Theory (cp. Section 
3.2) that have produced a broad data basis on the influence of mental abstraction on 
social judgments (cp. Section 3.3). Chapter 4 follows the introduction and identifies 
research on situational factors (cp. Section 4.1), individual differences (cp. Section 4.2), 
and cultural differences (cp. Section 4.3), which impact how individuals construe 
information. Next, in Chapter 5 I will synthesize the literature review to a number of 
research hypotheses exploring this basic theorizing in the subject of mediated health 
message in mass media. The first study investigates the impact of the processing mind-
set on representation of an audiovisual target health message about organ donation and 
on the consequent attitudes and social judgments (cp. Chapter 6). The second study 
investigates the impact of mood on the processing mind-set and consequent attitudes 
and social judgments (cp. Chapter 7). Finally, Chapter 8 concludes with the theoretical 
implications of the investigations and offers an outlook on possible application within 
the area of media and communication studies. 
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2 The Phenomenon of Abstract Thinking in the Context of Information 
Processing 
The German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel asked in his essay1, 
“Who thinks abstractly?” and answers the question with, “The uneducated, not the 
educated. Good society does not think abstractly, because it is too easy, because it is too 
lowly” (Hegel, 1807/1966, p. 114).2 However, that is not Hegel’s opinion, it is his ironic 
response to his critics, who have accused him of abstract reasoning in his philosophic 
writings. In fact, Hegel did use much “abstract” language in his writings, which made 
them bloated and hard to understand or as Schopenhauer called it obscure 
(Schopenhauer, n.d./1975).3 Unlike Hegel, his critics understood abstraction as the mere 
random reduction of complex ideas to a universal fact. The basic question remaining, 
however, is whether the abstract terms are actually random or not, whether it is easy or 
not, which systematic underlies abstract thinking and what is its function.  
The debate about abstract thought goes back to ancient philosophy and the 
problem of universals. Like Aristotle or Kant, Hegel assumed that universal 
characteristics existed. A typical illustration of a universal characteristic is color. 
Assume an apple and a chair both have the universal characteristic of being green. 
“Greenness” thus is a universal attribute. The conflicting philosophical view held that 
universals—abstract ideas that cannot be experienced directly—do not exist (MacLeod 
& Rubenstein, 2007).  
Philosophy, as later on psychology, has come to conclude that abstraction or 
universal ideas are not an easier or a lower form of thought. The ability to extract the 
primary information of a thing or things is what enables humans to transcend the 
immediacy of a situation. Everything individuals learn and experience is subject to 
some level of abstraction (Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 
2012; Burgoon et al., 2013). Both psychology and sociology have adopted the idea that 
human perception is egocentric, in that direct experiences offer more information and 
are thus more concrete, whereas indirect experiences, for example through the media, 
                                                
1 The original publishing format and place of the essay remains unclear, the date is estimated by 
Hegel scholars, but is not undisputed (Kaufmann, 1966). 
2 Original German text: “Wer denkt abstrakt? Der ungebildete Mensch, nicht der gebildete. Die 
gute Gesellschaft denkt darum nicht abstrakt, weil es zu leicht ist, weil es zu niedrig ist (…)” (Hegel, 
1807/1986). 
3 Schopenhauer has accused Hegel of copying Kant’s “obscure” writing style, to confuse the 
readers (Schopenhauer, 1859/1977). Obscure was the word of choice to relate Hegel and Kant to 
obscurantism. Obscurantism refers to a deliberate vagueness in style and language to withhold the truth 
("obscurantism," 2015). This vagueness is conceptually related to the idea of abstract or universal 
concepts.  
  
11 
are more abstract (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Adoni & Mane, 1984; Liberman, Trope, 
& Stephan, 2007). The concrete extreme of the abstraction continuum is based within 
the individual; everything beyond the self is to some degree abstract. 
The concept of abstraction has long been ill defined in psychology. As Burgoon 
et al. (2013) illustrate the term abstract has many synonyms: holistic, general, 
informative, essential, or universal. Burgoon et al. (2013) build upon these terms and 
define abstraction as, “a process of identifying a set of invariant central characteristics 
of a thing” (p. 502). The present work will make use of this definition of abstraction as 
the process of identifying universal features as well as keeping the suggested 
terminology that refers to the abstraction of things. The definition is useful, because it 
(a) introduces abstraction as a process and not just as a characteristic of an object. The 
identification of central characteristics is a prerequisite for both categorization and 
associations. Furthermore, (b) the term things 4 —although uncommon to social 
sciences—is quite elegant, as it includes a variety of objects, such as, “inanimate or 
animate objects, events, actions, and ideas” (Burgoon et al., 2013, p 503). Thus, abstract 
thought is a mode of thought concentrating on more abstract and universal features, 
while concrete thought, at the other end of the continuum, has immediate and detailed 
experiences as subject. 
In the remainder of this chapter I want to accomplish two things: First, I want to 
base the concept of abstract thinking within the information-processing paradigm. 
Therefore I start by briefly introducing the general model of information processing on 
which all further considerations are based on (cp. Section 2.1). Secondly, I will specify 
what abstract thinking entails. Therefore, in the following Section (2.2), I summarize 
the extensive theoretical and empirical work investigating how information are ordered 
and categorized in our hierarchically organized mind. Next (in Section 2.3), I review 
historical theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that the perception and 
processing of new information can attend to either the direct experience or the abstract 
features. The chapter ends with a summary of the function that mental abstraction 
serves in human cognition (cp. Section 2.4).  
2.1 Abstraction in Mediated Information Processing  
According to the classical approach to information processing, three—
sometimes co-occurring—processes can be distinguished, which allow individuals to 
                                                
4 Foucault (1966/2012) also used the term things in his work „The Order of Things“, that follows 
the history of science by retracing how knowledge categorization changed. 
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make sense of the world, including the media: encoding, storage, and retrieval of 
information (Lachman & Lachman, 1986; Lang, 2000). In all of those stages automatic 
and controlled processes occur.  
Information processing starts with a sensory perception, involving all human 
senses (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). For mediated message processing this specifically 
means visual and/or auditory perception (Lang, 2000). The stage of information 
encoding, as Lang (2000) puts it, “involves getting the message out of the environment 
(…) and into a person’s brain” (p. 47). Once sensory perception of the stimulus 
happened, it is selected for further processing or dismissed. This selection is rapid and 
can happen intentionally as well as unintentionally. Selected information is converted 
into an activated mental representation (Lang, 2000; Fiske & Taylor, 2013). As 
introduced earlier, a mental representation is a cognitive image of things (animate or 
inanimate) and ideas (universals). It is active when it is formed and used. It can remain 
in the post-perceptive working memory and then be dismissed or it can move from there 
on to long-term memory storage. The translation of information from perception to 
mental representation involves a myriad of inferences and interpretations, which are 
also referred to as construals. Etymological this relates to the Latin base for “to 
construct”, construere. The term construal characterizes the constructive effort of 
making sense of the incoming information and signifies the construction of the mental 
model that occurs between encoding and storage. The resulting mental representations 
are not perfect models of reality, they are, “idiosyncratic representations of the message” 
constructed by the (media) user (Lang, 2000, p. 49).  
These mental representations are then stored. There are several theories about 
what is stored how in working memory, short-term memory, or long-term memory. The 
present work builds upon theories about the organization of our mind and memory as an 
associative network of knowledge structures (Bower, 1981; Anderson, 1983). Like a 
semantic network, where basic concepts are related (e.g., medicine to health and 
needles), in this theoretical perspective knowledge and memory are organized in 
networks, where any piece of information has several nodes connecting it to related 
information.5 For example, healthy living could be related to buying fruit or working out 
regularly, but also to workout is demanding and boring. Some of these links are more 
essential than others. In an associative network a newly formed mental representation 
establishes connecting nodes to other existing knowledge entities. The more such 
                                                
5 An example for a semantic association is roses are red, fire trucks are also red, fire trucks put 
out fires, fires are dangerous, red can mean danger. 
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relations can be established, the better the mental representation is stored and the easier 
it can be found through different retrieval pathways in the retrieval process.  
The basic associative network theory has been extended and updated with 
findings especially concerning activation and retrieval pathways (e.g., of semantic 
memory, Collins & Loftus, 1975). Information retrieval proceeds along the nodes of the 
network (E. R. Smith & Queller, 2001; Fiske & Taylor, 2013). A search in memory on a 
particular idea proceeds along the first-order nodes to all related concepts and then to 
the second-order nodes related to these concepts. Essential connections will come to 
mind more easily (Collins & Loftus, 1975). In this third stage of information processing 
the stored mental representations are initially activated, but activation needs renewing. 
Stored information can be activated by use. However, activation of long-term memories 
is not accurate, rather, the search process and the nodes that connect any mental 
representation with related mental representations activate a whole network of related 
information (Lang, 2000). Associative network models of memory refer to the currently 
activated information as the so-called short-term or working memory. The long-term 
memory, in comparison, holds all memory nodes that can be potentially activated and 
thus remembered, but are not currently activated. 
Existing mental representations are also critical in this process. Stored 
information can be used frequently and activated again to integrate new information 
into the network. They are intertwined in an associative network and can potentially be 
retrieved with every new instance of information processing, to understand newly 
perceived information and organize it into the existing network (Lang, 2000).  
2.2 Abstract Concepts in the Organization of Knowledge 
The following sections take a specific look at semantic categorization as well as 
research on general knowledge structures and their hierarchical organization. In order to 
manage the myriad of information in everyday life, abstract representatives of 
categories help individuals to identify and categorize new information quickly.  
2.2.1 Semantic information categorization. 
Abstract mental representations are best explained and scientifically 
understood—at their most general level—by considering research on semantic 
categories of natural things and common objects (Kay, 1971; Rosch, 1975; Rosch, 
Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Semantic categories are the basic entity 
of classification in the organization of our mind. Depending on the abstract or concrete 
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categorization of a thing, it should become clear that evaluations of the thing naturally 
vary. Imagine you are asked to rate how much you like a thing (e.g., an orange). 
Evaluations will differ depending on the concreteness the semantic category prompted 
to you (e.g., citrus fruit vs. orange) and the consequent differences in the mental 
representations of these semantic categories. While someone might like oranges, lemons 
might not be so well liked, but both are citrus fruits. Extensive research was conducted 
on how individuals form categories and exemplars and the central question of this line 
of inquiry is how these existing semantic categories are used in the identification and 
categorization of new information. This research constituted that the process of forming 
categories is universal in that, “[o]n the most general level, categories form so as to be 
maximally differentiable from each other” (Rosch et al., 1976, p 435) and basic 
exemplars from those categories are those, that allow the perceiver to gain the most 
information about an object he or she has to identify with the least cognitive effort. 
When arranging new information in the human mind, for example, seeing a public 
health campaign poster urging condom use to prevent HIV contraction, the information 
can be either sorted within larger categories (e.g., health) that hold many other 
exemplars of similar nature, or it is categorized at a very detailed level (e.g., sexually 
transmitted disease). This arranging of new information is referred to as high and low 
level abstraction. Higher abstraction was defined by a higher inclusiveness (of objects) 
into the category (Rosch et al., 1976) and lower abstraction was defined as, “[the] finest 
available set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive taxonomic categories for 
classifying an individual” (Kay, 1971, p. 877). Semantic categories are, of course, 
culturally relative, however, adults across previous studies shared, for example, what 
constitutes a good exemplar of a natural category (i.e., fruit or trees). Similarly, pictures 
of objects constituted very concrete exemplars of object categories compared to words 
(Rosch, 1975).  
2.2.2 Abstract and concrete knowledge structures. 
Cognitive and social psychology identified various knowledge structures that are 
central in the organization of our mind. Their theoretical backgrounds are diverse. This 
introduction focuses on the level of abstraction in knowledge structures (rather then on 
which memory processes they are involved in). Prototypes and exemplars are two 
central categories and are rather concrete representations of a category. Both are mental 
representations that aid categorizing new information in different ways, as proxies of an 
object category. A prototype, according to Fiske and Taylor (2013), is an average agent 
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of a category, summarizing all the important features how they most typically occur. It 
is a concrete representation of the possible manifestations of an object representation. 
An exemplar, on the other hand, is a typical case of a category against which new 
information can be compared. Its concrete representation is informed by direct 
experience (E. R. Smith & Queller, 2001).  
Beyond categorization, reacting to new information also utilizes abstract 
knowledge in the form of schemata and scripts. Both concepts describe the knowledge 
about what events/actions/associations typically co-occur, like paying the check follows 
having dinner at a restaurant. Abelson (1981) distinguishes a script as a very simple 
form of a schema and as, “[embodied] knowledge of stereotyped event sequences“ (p. 
715). Schemata, on the other side, have a long history in psychological research. Fiske 
and Taylor (2013) define schemata as abstract or generalized knowledge about a 
concept or object and the related concepts. Piaget (1962) used schemata in his work on 
children’s learning. According to him, motion is based on early schemata. They hold the 
information that a specific motion, such as grabbing for something, leads to a goal, like 
getting food. New information can be assimilated or the schema has to be 
accommodated to the new information. The motion grabbing also brings other things 
closer, such as hands, hair, or toys. The new information is assimilated. In contrast, new 
information that does not fit an existing schema leads to the accommodation of the 
schema, an alteration. Remember that grabbing for smaller items has worked well for 
the child, but grabbing for newer, bigger toys does require other motions. Here a 
schema has to be changed to accommodate a new situation.  
Stereotypes are a final example of commonly studied abstract mental categories 
(but only in people perception). Typically, social categories like race, gender, age, 
sexual orientation, and social class are studied. Although this work is not specifically 
considering people perception, a general thinking style would also include the abstract 
or concrete representation of people.  
These briefly introduced representations constitute different abstract and 
concrete forms of knowledge structures. They are not competing theories of 
representation, but can and have been theorized as complementary types of mental 
representation (E. R. Smith & Queller, 2001). As such, stereotypes, schemata, 
exemplars, and prototypes can be part of an associative network. For example, a schema 
can be conceptualized as a set of units or nodes that have strong associations and when 
one is activated the associated units are also activated. From research in people 
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perception not only the mental representation is considered, the process of stereotyping 
refers to automatic activation of category information and is a form of category-driven 
thinking (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). The upcoming section explores theorizing which goes 
beyond a specific knowledge structure assumes a general abstract or concrete thinking 
style.  
2.3 Abstract Thinking as Processing Style 
2.3.1 Abstraction as global focus.  
Early thoughts about abstract processing are based on the Gestalt-debate in the 
early 1900s. Assuming that our physical and psychological world is most often 
composed of a number of layers, the principle question in this research community was 
whether individuals perceive the whole before they perceive the components that make 
up the whole (Runes, 1972). Theoretically, the structuralists’ view held that the 
individual functional parts are perceived first and then arranged as a whole. The 
Gestaltists, in contrast, assumed the primacy of the whole, meaning that the parts 
receive their significance only from the whole. The Gestalt debate therefore endures as 
discussion about how individuals generate sense from their surroundings. Kimchi 
(1992) argues, what has withstood from this debate is the acknowledgment that the 
whole is qualitative distinct from the sum of its parts.  
In visual perception research, Navon (1977) introduced the metaphor of the 
forest and its trees to express this theoretical idea. Will an onlooker first notice the 
forest as a whole or will he or she first notice the trees-the parts that make up the forest? 
A focus on the whole is called global focus, whereas the other end is called a local focus 
on the particulars. With a unique set of visual identification tasks Navon (1977) 
supported this hypothesis that individuals will first notice the whole before the parts in 
visual perception (global-precedence hypothesis). The task consisted of a number of 
small letters (e.g., all Es), which were arranged in the shape of the large letter (e.g., 
either congruent as an E or incongruent as H, cp. Figure 1). In the process of forming a 
mental representation the first percept is most often the global structure (large letter),6 
which is not to say that the global structure makes up the final mental representation 
(Kimchi, 1992).  
This research laid the ground for differentiating between global and local visual 
perception. The question that remained unclear from this line of research is whether the 
                                                
6 This does not necessarily imply serial processing. According to Kimchi (1992), also parallel 
processing is possible, in which case global information is processed faster than local processing.  
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dominance of global features over local features exists beyond visual perception. The 
next section therefore reviews theory and evidence about the encoding of concepts in 
contrast to visual perception. 
 
Figure 1  
Exemplary Navon letters, cited from Watson (2013, p. 3)  
2.3.2 Abstract concept encoding. 
Cognitive psychologists have argued that the mechanisms of visual perception, 
namely global and local visual focus have equivalent mechanisms in the perception of 
concepts. Local (narrow) visual attention allows to focus the perception on an object, 
while ignoring its periphery (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994). Global (broad) visual 
attention concentrates on the whole, or on what Navon (1977) called the forest. Broad 
versus narrow activation patterns in semantic networks are associated with global 
versus local conceptual attention respectively. A concept prime, such as mountain, 
would spread narrowly to concrete associations (i.e., stone or goat). In a broad 
conceptual attention situation the associations should be more abstract and more remote 
(i.e., nature or polar bear) (Förster & Dannenberg, 2010). Given the reasoning above, a 
narrow visual attention task, as explained in the Navon letter task, then should lead to a 
narrow conceptual attention. Supporting evidence shows visual priming of global 
attention (using a computerized adapted version of Navon’s original letter composition) 
led to conceptual changes in social and local distance judgments, such as how far the 
next train station is from the participants (Liberman & Förster, 2009). The global 
attention priming led to higher distance judgments and distance is conceptually linked 
to abstractness (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Additional evidence comes from a series of 
experiments on creative thinking. Creativity benefits from a global mind-set, because it 
allows for more untypical examples to be included in a category. Different versions of 
visual global (versus local) focus primes repeatedly led participants in the experiments 
to come up with more creative exemplars and uses for target concepts (Friedman, 
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Fishbach, Förster, & Werth, 2003) and better scores in creative problem solving 
measures (Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004), which require a global conceptual 
focus.  
The relation between perceptual focus and conceptual focus is also subject to 
research investigating the impact of affective cues on attention. Derryberry and Tucker 
(1994) argue that conceptual and perceptual scope relate through attentional 
mechanisms that trace back to very primitive neurological changes due to various 
arousal states (for a compact review of the neurological basis for the motivated changes 
in attentional scope see Derryberry & Tucker, 1994). The underlying argument in this 
research area can be summarized as the idea that during benign situations, individuals 
adopt a broad attentional state to detect novelties in their environment. These situations 
are calm and emotionally not arousing. During threatening situations, which posit high 
arousal emotional states, individuals need to focus their attention on the task at hand 
and thus narrow the scope (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994; Friedman & Förster, 2010). 
This so-called attentional tuning assumption (cp. further Section 4.1.3) was empirically 
tested for conceptual (attention-) focus as well as for perceptual (attention-) focus. Isen 
and Daubman (1984), for example, varied the mood of their participants using presents 
and videos, showing that individuals in a happy mood include more poor exemplars into 
a category than participants in neutral or sad mood conditions. Both perceptual and 
conceptual attention displayed the same narrowing and broadening pattern during high 
and low arousal states (for a research review of attentional tuning see Friedman & 
Förster, 2010) thus implying that they are related.  
2.4 Functionality of Abstraction 
Abstraction serves many masters in social cognition, but a few central points to 
its functionality should be mentioned. For one thing, abstraction serves individuals by 
allowing them to represent things that lie outside their direct sensory perception. Things, 
which cannot be experienced in one’s own here-and-now realm, have to be represented 
with a mental image that is abstracted from reality to some degree (Liberman & Trope, 
2008). Having a range of abstract and concrete construals available enables humans to 
go beyond their immediate experience, and integrate abstract information for which no 
direct or concrete information exists. Secondly, extracting the central and relevant 
themes from new information also constitutes a strategy of complexity reduction (Rosch 
et al., 1976). In line with this function, generalized knowledge structures (i.e., 
stereotypes, inclusive categories) can be associated with higher abstraction levels 
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(McCrea, Wieber, & Myers, 2012). From that perspective, stereotyping, as a cognitive 
process, is nothing else than encoding new information into memory at the most 
functional level of abstraction. By attributing behaviors to individual dispositions, 
participants can rely on schematic models of behavior when judging other’s behaviors. 
Compared to factoring in circumstance and environmental causes, disposition-based 
judgments are much easier (Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman, 2003). Abstraction as a 
form of complexity reduction has also been investigated, for example, in consumer 
research. Consumer choice tests show abstraction aids making everyday choices (Xu, 
Jiang, & Dhar, 2013). Consumers were tasked with making a choice from a large 
assortment of similar articles. Consumers who represented the assortment more 
abstractly rated the article more similar than consumers with a more concrete mental 
representation of the assortment and in turn reported it was easier for them to make a 
choice.  
Finally, from the perspective of semantic network theory, the grouping of new 
information in larger categories like every green produce is a vegetable aids not only 
complexity reduction, but also learning. Such overgeneralizations are not always true  
(e.g., green tomatoes or apples are not vegetables), but they are very often true. When 
new information is categorized with existing information, the existing nodes of an 
overarching concept, like vegetables are healthy and vegetables don’t taste good can 
help the learner to assess the properties of the newly acquired information. With that 
being said, the functional role of abstraction in the cognitive development of children is 
to learn categories and relationships (Brown, 1958). Contradicting research exists on the 
question whether abstract categories precede or follow detailed categories in learning 
(Burgoon et al., 2013). Brown (1958) was the first to note that the level of abstraction of 
any one thing is first-of-all due to the experience the child has had so far with a thing. 
Most likely, hierarchical relationships form both ways (concretizing and abstracting) 
from a medium level of abstraction.  
2.5 Summary 
Assessing abstract thinking in the context of information processing is important 
to the present research, to understand what it means think abstractly. This chapter first 
explained how the task of information processing is understood for this work. 
Following the classical approach to information processing, three—sometimes co-
occurring—processes can be distinguished, which allow individuals to make sense of 
the world, including the media: encoding, storage, and retrieval of information 
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(Lachman & Lachman, 1986; Lang, 2000).  I defined construal as the combined tasks 
between perception of a stimulus and the resulting mental representation. It refers to the 
construction effort of making a mental image of the subjective reality. The construal of 
information is the central mechanism this investigation concentrates on.  
Abstraction in mental representations is best explained and scientifically 
understood when looking hierarchical organization of knowledge. Abstract mental 
representations, such as abstract categories (furniture vs. kitchen table), were first 
investigated under the premises of semantic information organization. The 
understanding of abstraction has to be widened, however, from object categorization to 
the organization of people information and concepts (i.e., events, ideas). Well-
established forms of abstract knowledge categories are schemata and stereotypes. The 
organization of old and newly represented information in the human mind is understood 
as associated network (Collins & Loftus, 1975).  
The chapter closes by reviewing initial ideas about abstraction as mind-set 
during the encoding stage. Research on a perceptual focus (Navon, 1977) provides 
intriguing evidence that abstraction is not only a category of mental representation, but 
constitutes a processing mind-set that affects how individuals take on a processing task. 
The question that remained unclear from this line of research is whether the dominance 
of global features over local features exists the same way in concept perception. Closing 
the link between abstract perceptual and conceptual focus, the chapter reviewed some 
representative literature that shows how an abstract perceptual focus has individuals 
attend to more abstract concepts. The literature suggests that abstract thinking already 
starts with the attentional focus during the first stage of information processing 
(encoding). Furthermore, empirical evidence allows linking the attentional focus to the 
resulting mental representations. The reviewed aspects of abstract thinking permit 
individuals to mentally represent things outside their direct experience and ease the 
processing of new information by reducing the complexity of various specific 
characteristics to a few global categories.  
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3 Theorizing the Effects of Abstract Thinking on Knowledge and Attitudes 
The previous chapter detailed the mechanism of abstract thinking. This chapter 
will go on and discuss the effects of abstract construal (vs. concrete construal) in 
different social judgment domains. Cognitive psychology and social cognition do not 
offer a unified theory of abstraction, but rather several theories that have described an 
abstract thinking style and its effects. Two of these theories will be in the center of this 
literature review, Action Identification Theory and Construal Level Theory of 
psychological distance. Both theories are conceptually close and Construal Level 
Theory builds on assumptions of Action Identification Theory. Together these theories 
have produced large research frameworks on a cognitive processing mind-set guiding 
how abstractly or concretely individuals approach a processing task. Research results 
from those two theoretical frameworks help modeling the influence of abstract construal 
of health messages on both evaluation and retention. After briefly introducing the two 
theories, a literature review will systematically collect relevant research on the question: 
How does abstract construal of information manifest in mental representations (cp. 
Section 3.3.1) and social evaluation (cp. Section 3.3.2). The chapter will close by 
summarizing the central ideas from the contemporary literature and discuss how present 
research can apply these concepts. 
3.1 Action Identification Theory 
Action Identification Theory emerged in social psychology as a comprehensive 
theory of how individuals think about what they are doing (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). 
The theory is central to social psychology and social cognition, because it integrates the 
relationship between mental representations and actions. The theory posits a reciprocal 
connection between mind and action (for a recent theory review see Vallacher & 
Wegner, 2012), specifically, how individuals act and what greater meaning they 
attribute to their actions. The central assumption is that individuals identify their actions 
along a cognitive hierarchy—a continuum from abstract (high) to concrete (low) action 
identification (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). The mental representation of an action aids 
individuals in performing molecular actions successfully and gaining sufficient meaning 
from their actions on a molar basis (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). The action 
identification is a central reference point for initiation of an action and for the 
evaluation of the action performance (Vallacher & Wegner, 2012), because it resembles 
the mental representation of the action. Take for example the action of buying apples 
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and oranges. The abstract identification of this action could be getting food to eat or 
living healthy. It could be identified with increasing concreteness as going to the fruit 
isle of the supermarket to buy apples and oranges or reaching for three apples and 
moving on to reach for four oranges. These representations increase the details about 
the action. Based on how the action is represented cognitively its performance is guided 
and evaluated.  
According to Action Identification Theory and in agreement with the objective 
of the presented work, the more abstractly an action is identified, the more it links to an 
individual’s morals and ideals, the more individuals think about an action with regard to 
causalities and goals, and the more relevant the action is for this person's identity 
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). In comparison to more concrete action identifications, 
higher and more abstract levels of action identification go along with an increasing 
attribution of meaning to the action. On the one hand, abstract representations help 
individuals to make sense of their actions at a greater scale. Hence, individuals thrive to 
a coherent and comprehensive understanding of the world and therefore, if both abstract 
and concrete identifications of an action are available and suitable, individuals tend to 
adopt a the more abstract identification (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). On the other hand, 
abstract action identifications are not always suited to regulate actions, especially if the 
matter is unfamiliar. If we return to the example of living healthy, one recognizes that 
this abstract identification does not provide what has to be done in order to reach the 
goal of a healthy status—a problem for individuals lacking the knowledge of what 
constitutes healthy living. Thus, the theory holds that for the purpose of regulating their 
actions, individuals move down in the action identification hierarchy to a reasonable 
and achievable action identification level, which allows them to successfully perform 
actions in their goal pursuit. This representation of an action is the optimal action 
identification given the circumstance (optimal hypothesis, Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; 
Vallacher & Wegner, 2012). Thus at first, more concrete action identification could be 
buying healthy food at the supermarket and increase physical exercise. Assuming this 
action identification would not lead to the desired outcome other concrete action 
identifications will emerge (join the gym) to move along with the goal pursuit 
(Vallacher & Wegner, 2012). Similarly, obstacles during action performance lead to 
more manageable definitions of the act, i.e., lower and more concrete action 
identifications. In summary, lower action identification levels are also activated if an 
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action is difficult, unfamiliar, complex, or fails (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Action 
identification can meet situational demands and is flexible. 
3.2 Construal Level Theory 
The largest body of contemporary research on cognitive, attitudinal, and 
behavioral manifestations of mental abstraction is inspired by Construal Level Theory 
of psychological distance (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2012). The 
theory predicts how the psychological distance to a thing determines the abstraction of 
it. Psychological distance refers to the subjective experience of objects and events that 
are outside of our direct present experience. As such the concept is highly egocentric, 
because what is psychologically close to me, is not necessarily psychologically close to 
someone else (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007). Our direct experience is thus limited 
to the self (vs. the other) and to what is here, now, and possible rather than impossible 
(Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007; Liberman & Trope, 2008). Based on this, 
Liberman and Trope suggested that things that are distant on any of the alternate levels 
of psychological distance require a higher level of construal, referring to the 
constructive and interpretative efforts involved in gaining a mental representation of a 
thing. It is central to Construal Level Theory that with an increase in psychological 
distance the available information decreases, which leads to more abstract construals. 
Examples of this relationship are very plausible. Think about a graduation party 
that you are about to plan, but you have six more months to complete your degree. Your 
mental representation of the party in six months’ time could include a location or a 
theme, but at the forefront of your mind will be that you want to have fun and enjoy 
your newly found freedom from paper deadlines and committee feedback. Then, 
throughout the final stretch of your degree you have forgotten about the party and the 
thought returns to you just two weeks prior the event. Your mental representation, 
according to the assumptions of the Construal Level Theory, will differ somewhat from 
your previous picture. You might notice, with a glance in your checking account, what 
you can afford in terms of the decoration, drinks, and snacks. You will decide on a 
theme and make plans how you can decorate your apartment accordingly and on budget. 
Maybe you start to think of specific tasks where you might need help from a friend.  
Starting from local distance perceptions (Fujita, Henderson, et al., 2006) and 
temporal distance (Liberman et al., 2002), to social distance (Liviatan, Trope, & 
Liberman, 2008) and probability as distance (in earlier publications also 'hypothecality', 
Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006), data-driven evidence suggests that the 
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following association holds true: the further away a thing is perceived to be at any 
psychological distance dimension, the more abstract become the mental representation 
of that thing. Initial research looked at the construal of actions, largely integrating the 
concept of psychological distance with Action Identification Theory and showing that 
temporally distant actions are identified at a higher level (abstract) (Liberman & Trope, 
1998, study 1 and 2). Yet, the terminology thing in this context should signify that the 
scope of Construal Level Theory goes beyond actions. Choice options and the construal 
of task planning (Liberman & Trope, 1998) were investigated as well as preferences 
(Trope & Liberman, 2000) and later the construal of objects and complex events rather 
than single actions (Liberman et al., 2002).  
Abstractness thus exists on various levels. For example, Section 2.2.1 did 
discuss abstractness in mental categorization, while Action Identification Theory 
systematizes a hierarchy of abstractness specifically among actions. Research inspired 
by the theoretical premises of Construal Level Theory of psychological distance 
systematically extended the definition of abstract ideas. Due to universality of the effect 
on all four distance-dimensions (local, temporal, social, and probability) and on a 
variety of cognitive domains and judgment, the understanding of abstract and concrete 
construal level in scientific research has shifted in recent years towards the concept of 
mental processing mind-set (Freitas et al., 2004). In this conceptualization, abstract 
mental construal refers to a global processing approach during the encoding of new 
information. An abstract construal level during information encoding involves the 
primary interpretation and organizing of new information into abstract rather than 
concrete categories (Liberman et al., 2002) and the use of abstract evaluative categories 
(Eyal et al., 2008). Additionally, an abstract mind-set indicates a primary focus on 
abstract knowledge structures and abstract categories, when retrieving information from 
memory. Central to the conceptualization of a mind-set is that it assumes “an accessible 
set of cognitive operations that influences how subsequent information is organized and 
interpreted” (Burgoon et al., 2013, p. 505). While the terminology of abstract and 
concrete mind-sets wrongfully suggests a variation of kind, in the action identification 
and construal level frameworks abstraction is always considered a variation of degree. 
This becomes most obvious in the denomination of high and low construal levels that 
Trope and Liberman use. For a uniform terminology and to better reflect the inherent 
properties across concepts, namely the classification of things in inclusive and abstract 
categories, I adopted abstract versus concrete construal and abstract versus concrete 
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action identification instead in this work. I use those terms with the explicit assumption 
of continuum between the two extremes. There are, however, also newer, contradicting 
approaches. Förster and Dannenberg (2010) suggest two systems, namely the global- 
and local-focused system, operating based on the affordances of the situation. Novel, 
distant, and non-threatening experiences are processed by the global system, to integrate 
them in our knowledge structure and make sense of them. Similarly to the accounts of 
Construal Level Theory and Action Identification Theory, familiar and threatening 
experiences are subject to the local, more concrete system. While the influencing factors 
and processes outlined for this approach allow an integration of different theoretical 
lines and terminologies under one umbrella, it resembles a dichotomy. The systems 
approach yet has to define the properties, which decide whether the global or local 
system is activated, specifically their less extreme ends, and if and how both systems 
interact. Therefore, this aspect is not considered further in this work. 
There is considerable work supporting the claim that the relationship of 
psychological distance and mental construal is of general quality. For a generalized 
association of psychological distance and abstract representation, the reverse also has to 
be true: Things that are mentally represented in an abstract manner are perceived to be 
farther away on any psychological distance dimension (Liberman, Trope, McCrea, & 
Sherman, 2007; Rim, Hansen, & Trope, 2012). Returning to the initial example, 
imagine you are invited to a graduation party. Celebrating my graduation—save the 
date is a very general message that lacks detailed information of where the party takes 
place or how formal the festivities will be. Most individuals will not expect the party to 
be within the upcoming week. According to the studies by Liberman, Trope, McCrea, et 
al. (2007) abstract language will cause an increased temporal distance perception in its 
receivers. A very specific message with date, location, information on dress code or 
theme should, according to this logic, achieve a much more prompt perception of when 
and where the party is going to be like. Semin and Smith (1999) showed that the 
retrieval of distant past events was linked to the linguistic abstractness of the events. In 
turn, abstract retrieval cues lead participants to come up with more distant events from 
memory. Liberman and Förster (2009) argue that understanding an abstract construct 
requires individuals to distance themselves from their current experience. They add 
evidence to the general quality of the relationship between construal level and 
psychological distance by using a perceptual priming task to induce abstract construal 
instead of the common semantic priming task. The prime is an adaptation of the 
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previously described letter task (Navon, 1977). In a series of studies, participants with 
global perceptual priming judged unrelated concepts to be more distant in time and 
space (e.g., distance estimates between two cities, time until they see a doctor) (e.g., 
distance estimates between two cities, time until they see a doctor, Liberman & Förster, 
2009). Supporting evidence illustrates further, that individuals, who imagine actions 
that are described in abstract (vs. concrete) terms also pictured those action to be 
psychologically more distant (vs. close) (Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009, Experiments 
1a and 1b). Finally, even implicit associations between the construal levels and 
psychological distance could be established in the past research (Bar-Anan, Liberman, 
& Trope, 2006).  
3.3 Effects of Abstract Thinking on Mental Representation and Judgment 
This section’s purpose is to present the current state of research that helps 
linking the idea of abstract thinking (i.e., abstract construal level mind-sets or abstract 
action identification) to abstract mental representations and evaluations. The empirical 
evidence reviewed is mostly fueled by the relationship of mental construal level and 
psychological distance. In the past three decades researchers achieved a parsimonious 
framework of how abstraction can be present in mental construal. The idea that our 
minds are organized as associative networks in which knowledge and judgment rely on 
the same mental representation is central to the association of evaluations, judgments, 
and abstract construal. With the activation of a representation the activation level of 
connected nodes of the associative network is also increased (E. R. Smith & Queller, 
2001). The literature review strongly suggests that concrete mental representations are 
most likely related to different evaluative nodes than abstract representations. Research 
shows that judgments for abstractly construed actions relied on ideological, normative, 
and de-contextualized categories, whereas concrete moral judgments take 
contextualized and individualized information into account (e.g., social, cultural 
background information of the actor). In other words, abstract mental categories most 
likely have more and stronger nodes relating them to normative, ideological, and 
higher-order attitude domains than the concrete representations of the same thing.  
Furthermore, the accessibility principle claims that attitudes are not only based 
on new, relevant, or stored information about the attitude object, but also on information 
that comes to mind most easily (Srull & Wyer, 1979; E. R. Smith & Queller, 2001; 
Schwarz, 2009). The accessibility of attitudes has been central in persuasion research, 
because it influences what types of information individuals attend to. Together with this 
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line of thought, the construal level and the consequent mental representations are 
assumed to have an influence on our attitudes and judgment. Therefore, I present 
research supporting the basic associations of construal level mind-sets and 
corresponding mental representations in Section 3.3.1. The section is structured along a 
number of indicators that convey abstraction or concreteness in mental representations, 
namely category breadth, action identification, and linguistic representation. In Section 
3.3.2 I introduce numerous accounts of the relationship of abstract representations and 
evaluations.  
3.3.1 Effects of abstract construal on mental representations. 
Category breadth. The associative network model of memory holds that new 
information can be categorized into larger and more inclusive categories, which 
constitute the high-level abstraction, or in lower, i.e., narrower categories, similar to the 
abstraction hierarchy in semantic networks (cp. Section 2.2.1). The fundamental claim 
of Construal Level Theory is that distance fosters mental abstraction. Experimental 
research on the influence of psychological distance on categorization of information 
supports this claim. Distant future events are represented in broader categories and are 
described by individuals more schematic (Liberman et al., 2002, Studies 1 and 2). 
Correspondingly, individuals’ preferences in the near future are based on more complex 
structures than preferences in the distant future. This is in line with Construal Level 
Theory, because with less distance the schematic representations decrease as well. 
Lastly, for near future preferences individuals rely more on detailed information and 
circumstantial information (Liberman et al., 2002, Study 4). This fundamental series of 
studies lends strong support to the claim that abstract construal does result in the use of 
more abstract categories.  
Action identification. Like object categorization, the categorization of actions 
was also found to relate to psychological distance and therefore to be part of the abstract 
mental construal construct. The categorizations of actions in higher or lower terms is 
mostly research using the Action Identification Theory, basing most research on the 
behavior identification form (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). All dimensions of 
psychological distance had the same effect on the construal of actions. Distant future 
actions (e.g., making a list) were dominantly described in high level terms (getting 
organized), whereas close future action were identified at a lower level (writing 
something down) (Liberman & Trope, 1998, Study 1). Similarly, these results on the 
behavior identification form were replicated for spatially distant actions (Fujita, 
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Henderson, et al., 2006, Study 1), social distance (Liviatan et al., 2008, Experiment 1), 
as well as likely and unlikely actions (Wakslak et al., 2006, Study 7).  
Linguistic representation. Social psychology has long been aware of the 
fundamental meaning of language for social interaction and cognition, as language 
reflects mental representations. Language affects cognition as much as cognitions affect 
language. Semin and Fiedler (1988) criticized that this assumption was lacking a 
systematic investigation as far as the language goes. They established the linguistic 
category model to advance the investigation in this regard. The model’s logic is that 
words are categorized into groups according to their distinct linguistic features (Semin, 
1994). The usage of words from the different groups allows making assumptions about 
the cognitive processes of the speaker.  
Semin and Fiedler (1988) first established four categories of words, which also 
represent various levels of cognitive abstraction. Their linguistic category model (LCM) 
is based on the conceptual hierarchies in semantic networks. It is important to note how 
the LCM goes beyond semantically broad (i.e., tables) and narrow (i.e., kitchen table) 
categories, by concentrating on interpersonal language. The categories of the LCM 
summarize various verbs and adjectives by their attributed functions, which I will 
introduce hereafter. The most concrete verbs describe actions without interpreting the 
action. The mother is holding a baby or I visit you are behaviors that are distinct and can 
be verified easily (desciptive action verb, Semin & Fiedler, 1988). With increasing 
interpretation of the behaviors, the level of cognitive abstraction rises. The second 
category, interpretative action verbs, goes beyond describing and classifies the action 
(i.e., I am helping you, It mislead me). Although these behaviors are also easily verified, 
they do not comprise a single visible action. Helping can include a number of concrete 
actions and behaviors that all can be interpreted in their context as helping (e.g., 
watering the flowers to help grandma, cutting the bread to help grandma). State verbs, 
the third category, go on to describe a person A in a situation with person B (i.e., A 
hates B). State verbs do not refer to an action and a cognitive or emotional state is not 
visible and even harder to verify by an observer. The most abstract category in this 
systematization is adjectives. They are mainly descriptive references that serve to 
distinguish individuals from others. For example, the adjectives help to distinguish a 
friendly and open person from a reserved and introverted person (Semin & Fiedler, 
1988).  
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Under the construal level framework, Semin and Smith (1999) showed that 
events that occurred in the distant past (at least one year ago) were construed more 
abstractly than events that happened in the recent past (not more than two weeks ago), 
by showing how the language use changed. This finding also supports that mental 
representations of events become more abstract with removal from time and are stable 
across different valences, levels of memory importance, emotionality, or vividness of 
the memory. Abstract language categories further play a major role in intergroup 
relations. Abstract knowledge structures (i.e., stereotypes) are harder to disconfirm than 
concrete information, because they are general and globally in their frame of reference. 
Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, and Semin (1989) first utilized the linguistic category model to 
demonstrate how intergroup biases are present in language that is used for describing 
in- and out-groups. Individuals describe behaviors of out-groups in more abstract terms 
than those of in-groups (Maass et al., 1989; Maass, Milesi, Zabbini, & Stahlberg, 1995). 
The main area of application for the LCM is communication in the interpersonal 
domain or, in other words, how people communicate about other’s behavior and traits 
as well as ourselves and our behavior. However, applications to more broadly defined 
speech acts are also known. Menegatti and Rubini (2013) used language abstraction 
scores based on the linguistic category model in their research on political speeches. 
They investigated the language politicians used when facing either similar or dissimilar 
audiences. In political speeches, the speech act of interest does include more than just 
terms describing people and their behavior, they are in other words more complex. The 
findings conveyed that politicians that faced an audience with similar political attitudes 
used more abstract language, whereas facing a dissimilar audience led politicians to 
choose more concrete terms. The logic of this language difference is that convincing 
dissimilar ones requires more detailed action description. The linguistic category model 
is established in abstraction research for evaluating manipulations (Fujita, Henderson, et 
al., 2006) or constructing abstract or concrete stimuli (A. E. Clark & Semin, 2008; 
Menegatti & Rubini, 2013). Critical thoughts about the linguistic category model 
include discussions about the exclusion of nouns (Burgoon et al., 2013) and the 
subjectivity of the classification. The classification of the terms itself is not objective, 
because it distinguishes words based on their level of interpretation (Semin & Fiedler, 
1988).  
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The present research lends one basic assumption from linguistic psychology: 
Language can represent cognition. Abstract thinking should, in part, be detectable in 
language use, especially in speech acts pertaining to action and people description.  
3.3.2 Effects of abstract construal on evaluations. 
Inferences. Parallel to actions and objects, inferences about the world also have 
an underlying hierarchy, and they are important in judgment situations. Explaining 
others’ behaviors, for example, ranges from dispositional inferences to situational 
inferences. Inferences about socially distant versus close individuals from in- or out-
groups, for instance, have been a focus in social psychology for a while (Liberman & 
Trope, 2008). Empirical evidence suggests that descriptions of out-group behaviors 
over-emphasize the role of individual traits, whereas one’s own behaviors are readily 
attributed to situational factors (Nisbett & Valins, 1987). Moreover, behaviors in 
temporal (Nussbaum et al., 2003, Study 4) and spatial (Henderson & Wakslak, 2010, 
Study 3) distance have been attributed to individual dispositions. For future actions, 
Nussbaum et al. (2003) showed that behavior predictions in the distant future (abstract 
condition) are made based on de-contextualized and trait-based information compared 
to behaviors that have to be predicted in the near future. These inferences for future 
behaviors were consistent when participants had to predict and causally explain their 
own behavior in the future. In other words, under abstract construal conditions behavior 
is attributed to traits, whereas in the concrete construal condition behaviors are judged 
based on the situation they occur in as well. 
Goal desirability. Goal-directed actions and behaviors have an implicit or 
explicit goal as end state. The evaluation of this goal can rely on high- and low-level 
considerations, which have systematical similarity to abstract and concrete construal. At 
a high level the desirability of an end state is considered. It can also be understood as 
the general benefit of the end state, which is independent of context and superordinate 
to the individual costs. On the lower level of this dimension, which is the more concrete 
level, are feasibility concerns. They incorporate concrete means and costs necessary to 
reach an end state. Feasibility concerns are subordinate to desirability, as they may vary 
across individuals, time, and situations, whereas the end state is stable. For example, the 
outcome of studying for an exam is passing or getting a good grade, which is rather 
universal across a variety of students and therefore decontextualized and independent. 
The time invested to reach the desired end state, however, varies greatly amongst 
different students and thus counts as feasibility concern (Liberman & Trope, 1998). 
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Much theorizing places the desirability-feasibility distinction at the core of abstract and 
concrete construal.  
It is expected that with an increase in temporal distance to an action, the 
desirability considerations become more dominant, whereas the importance of 
feasibility concerns decreases, thereby influencing judgments. In an example Liberman 
and Trope (1998) confronted participants with the choice of buying concerts tickets for 
a show the next day or next year. Participants rated the importance of price (feasibility) 
versus liking the band (desirability). While desirability was dominant for near and 
distant decisions, it became strongly dominant in the distant future condition and 
feasibility decreased slightly.  
Time is a feasibility concern and Construal Level Theory would predict that 
individuals in an abstract construal mind-set should underestimate feasibility concerns. 
Time estimates have repeatedly shown to be sensitive to psychological distance as well 
as to construal level mind-set primes. Time contraction, the shortening of objective time 
intervals, happens when the action is in the distant future (vs. near future) (Liberman & 
Trope, 1998; Kanten, 2011) or when individuals are in an abstract mind-set (Kanten, 
2011). This leads individuals to plan many activities in the future, when the time 
constraints are biased and feasibility is less salient. In turn, the closer the time of the 
activity gets, the more salient are actual time constraints (Liberman & Trope, 1998, 
Study 5). This also partially explains procrastination effects in participants, who 
received tasks after an abstract construal level mind-set induction (McCrea, Liberman, 
Trope, & Sherman, 2008).  
Higher-order evaluations. An abstract construal level is related to higher-order 
evaluations. Idealistic and moral judgments count towards higher-order evaluations, 
because first-and-foremost they are not context specific, that means they are absolute 
claims, like eating a pet is wrong.7 In a number of studies Eyal et al. (2008) showed that 
participants applied moral principles in temporally and socially distant situations more 
readily. The researchers, of course, assumed that distant events are construed more 
abstractly. In a restatement task participants could choose between abstract and concrete 
restatements of the same action, all of which were morally charged (e.g., eating one’s 
own dog) at near or far temporal distance. On average, participants chose an abstract 
                                                
7 Morality is culturally constructed and divided along socio-economic status lines, among others 
(Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). Thus all action evaluation are based on the cultural and socio-economic 
background of the perceiver. It goes without saying that this research review relies heavily on research 
conducted using predominantly white, western, and student samples.  
  
32 
restatement (i.e., dishonoring a dead pet) over the concrete restatement (i.e., eating the 
meat of a dead dog) when the action was set in far temporal distance (Eyal et al., 2008, 
Study 1). The scenarios overall were restated more often in abstract terms, confirming 
the initial claims by Vallacher and Wegner (1987) that in case two action identifications 
are available and feasible, individuals will tend towards the more abstract one, as it 
helps to give broader meaning to a single event.  
Eyal et al. (2008) generalize their findings in the light of Construal Level Theory 
as support for the link between abstract construal and social judgments. This conclusion 
was doubted, because studies not using distance to perpetuate abstract construal but a 
mind-set manipulation failed repeatedly to replicate the association between abstract 
construal and moral evaluation (Gong & Medin, 2012). In these replications, abstract 
construal was primed by tasks that induce abstract or concrete thinking style (see more 
in Section 4.1.2). Contrary to Eyal et al. (2008), participants overall judged morally 
offensive actions more harshly when they were in a concrete construal mind-set. Gong 
and Medin (2012) discuss various possibilities why the previously so stable and strong 
link between construal and psychological distance does not hold for moral judgments. 
Concreteness influences perceived credibility of actions and thus could be one possible 
nuisance (Hansen & Wänke, 2010). Secondly, concrete descriptions of actions are more 
imaginable. Both previous arguments rely on research on abstract and concrete 
expressions (Semin & Fiedler, 1988) and their impact on the vividness of mental 
imagery. Lastly, Williams, Stein, and Galguera (2014) argue that construal level and 
psychological distance vary significantly in terms of their affective influence. In this 
view, distance reduces the intensity of affects, but abstract construal has been related to 
more positive evaluations (Eyal, Liberman, Trope, & Walther, 2004). The consequent 
predictions for the same actions are opposite. Consider the joy (or drag) of buying a 
new car. If construed in a distant future scenario the joy should be less pronounced, 
because it is not as vivid to the person, whereas in the abstract construal logic presented, 
the positive associations should dominate the negative ones. A series of studies 
exploring this contradiction showed that for actions that are associated with emotional 
evaluations (i.e., donating money to an organization or helping others with daily tasks) 
construal level primes and psychological distance primes led to the opposite results 
(Williams et al., 2014).  
Stereotypes and prejudice. Stereotypes and schemata are forms of generalized 
knowledge structures and as such have been linked to abstract construal (cp. Section 
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3.3.1). While abstract knowledge structures are not inherently negative or positive, their 
use in individual judgment situations can have biasing effects. For example, participants 
were given a mind-set manipulation (Freitas et al., 2004) to induce abstract or concrete 
processing and then read a job posting for a software engineer position and then 
applicants portfolios. The first two applicants were one man and one woman, with equal 
qualification portfolios. Participants in the abstract mind-set condition rated the male 
applicant to have more job-related traits, were more likely to hire him, and rated his 
likelihood to hold a leader position more likely than that of the female applicant. The 
differences were not observed for participants in a concrete construal level mind-set 
(McCrea et al., 2012, Study 1). The authors posit that an abstract construal of the job 
posting lead to more readily applied sex stereotypes (i.e., software engineers are 
typically male) that influenced the following evaluation. The researchers attributed this 
result to the activation of social categories by the abstract mind-set. Although the 
authors measured fairness, there was no significant difference between the abstract and 
the concrete construal level group. Fairness is a higher-order (abstract) evaluation. 
These effects are directly contrasted by the following findings for prejudice.  
Prejudices are defined as affective and evaluative dimension of stereotypes 
(Allport, 1954). Luguri, Napier, and Dovidio (2012) claim that abstract construal levels 
lead to more tolerance and less prejudice reactions to dissimilar others for conservative 
participants. To test the assumption that abstract construal results in more abstract 
evaluative associations like justice, morality, and fairness, three studies were conducted. 
Individual’s abstract action identification tendency and two different abstract (vs. 
concrete) construal level mind-set manipulations reliably reduced prejudiced feelings 
against non-normative groups. In the third study thoughts about fairness mediated the 
effect of abstract construal on feelings towards non-normative groups (Luguri et al., 
2012). In the study by Luguri et al. (2012) the underlying assumption was that an 
abstract mind-set and the resulting mental representations, are associated with other 
evaluative categories than concrete representations. Abstract mind-sets have repeatedly 
had associations to higher-order attitudes, which resembles the logic applied by Eyal et 
al. (2008). Abstract action identification tendencies are related to empathy and the 
willingness to help others (Levy, Freitas, & Salovey, 2002, Studies 4 to 6). Evaluations 
can change as a result of near and distant future manipulations. In a study on political 
decision-making, participants judging a distant future policy change (which was thus 
construed abstractly) reported to vote on political issues (e.g., euthanasia) according to 
  
34 
their consistent values and principles (Ledgerwood, Trope, & Chaiken, 2010, Study 3). 
In comparison, the same policy decisions in the near future (and thus a concrete 
construal) were rather determined by the partner’s voiced attitude, than by ideological 
considerations. 
Favorability. Abstract construal has been associated with more favorable 
evaluations. When participants had to come up with pro and contra arguments for 
changes in examination policies of their university in a study by Eyal et al. (2004), they 
came up with more positive arguments when the policy changes were set in the distant 
future. Trope et al. (2007) argue that pro arguments are superordinate to contra 
arguments when participants are in an abstract construal mind-set, similar to desirability 
and feasibility arguments, because the subjective importance of an action or event is 
reliant primarily on its favorable aspects rather than the unfavorable ones (Eyal et al., 
2004). Contra arguments are less relevant in abstract situations and become more salient 
only with more concrete thoughts (Herzog, Hansen, & Wänke, 2007). Finally, the ease 
of argument retrieval influences the attitudes towards issues (Schwarz, 1998). 
Participants in a study by Herzog et al. (2007) found it harder to generate unfavorable 
arguments when the subject matter was set in the distant (vs. near) future. The ease of 
retrieval then further mediated the attitudes of participants, so that participants reported 
more positive attitudes for the distant future situation compared to the near future 
situation.  
Persuasion. Within the Construal Level Theory framework, abstract construal 
level is assumed to make individuals more attentive to high-level arguments. This 
includes morals and normative attitudes, but goes beyond. If abstract construal mind-
sets are matched with abstract persuasive arguments, they can result in stronger 
persuasion effects (Fujita, Eyal, Chaiken, Trope, & Liberman, 2008). Students reading a 
course description in a course catalogue received arguments by former students about 
the merits of the course. One group considered the course being offered next semester 
(vs. next year) and then evaluated the course. The experiment was designed so that one 
groups received more high-level arguments supporting the class (fair grading or helpful 
professors) in relationship to low-level arguments (lecture hall facilities or lack of 
weekly discussion sections) and vice versa. In the distant future condition students rated 
the course more positively, if it was supported by more high-level arguments. In the 
proximal condition, no such difference was made out (Fujita et al., 2008). Additionally, 
participants of a second study were more persuaded to buy a product in the distant 
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future, if the message emphasized desirability of the product (high-level argument), but 
with feasibility (low-level) arguments in the near future (Fujita et al., 2008). Both 
studies imply a congruency principle between the level of construal of the attitude 
object (here manipulated by the temporal distance to the object, and the level of 
abstraction of the argument). In a third study, Fujita et al. (2008) extended their test to 
the role of argument strength. Commonly, under the elaboration likelihood paradigm, 
message scrutiny would be expected to decrease with more psychological distance, due 
to the decrease in personal relevance. Participants again displayed a general preference 
for abstract arguments for temporally distant decisions and concrete arguments for 
temporally close decisions. However, Fujita et al. (2008) proved that construal had an 
independent influence on message scrutiny. Only when the distance and the level of 
abstraction in the argument were matching, individuals also attended to the argument’s 
strength. So this research program underlines how the mental construals of an attitude 
object guide individuals’ attention when they evaluate arguments.  
In a similar vein, Ledgerwood, Wakslak, and Wang (2010) explored the 
influence of the message source in the decision-making for buying typical consumer 
household items, like a toaster and a migraine drug. Distant and abstract decisions were 
much stronger influenced by aggregated information, like consumer ratings or 
effectiveness statistics, compared to proximal decisions. In proximal decisions, 
individualized accounts of the products by costumer reviews were still less influential, 
but their relative weight was higher than in the abstract decision condition.  
Self-control. Self-control is an important link between attitudes and behavior. 
Humans exert self-control in order to achieve goals and act on our attitudes. Self-control 
suffers, if long-term goals are conflicted by short-term costs (Fishbach & Trope, 2005), 
for example by the strain of dieting and maintaining physical fitness to achieve the 
long-term goal of living healthy. As such, it is also a common concept in explaining 
health behaviors. Construal Level Theory has an important role in the theorizing about 
self-control. Concrete, low construal levels emphasize means and resources in social 
cognition. In light of the actual costs, self-control is harder to maintain. In turn, abstract 
construals facilitate self-control, because they stress the goal and the idealistic meaning 
of a single action (Agrawal & Wan, 2009). Agrawal and Wan (2009) showed that 
individuals who were primed with an abstract level of construal took more time to read 
a long and boring article about dental health. The activity is dull and therefore a short-
term cost, it requires high self-control per se. The time spent reading such an article is 
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an exercise of self-control. The article was also beneficial, because it held information 
on the long-term goal of maintaining dental health. In an additional measurement of 
self-control, participants with a more abstract construal level later also flossed their 
teeth longer. 
3.4 Consequences for the Present Research 
This chapter provided an overview of what may be entailed in abstract (or 
concrete thinking). It introduced the two theoretical frameworks, Action Identification 
Theory (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) and Construal Level Theory (Trope et al., 2007), 
that have helped to systematize what is commonly understood as abstract thinking. 
Abstract construal evidentially leads to the use and generation of broader mental 
categories. Abstract mental representations also have various associations with abstract 
evaluative categories. For example, the dominance of idealism over pragmatism, goal 
desirability and goal focus over feasibility concerns, positive over negative evaluations, 
high-level over low-level arguments, the value of situational over individual inferences, 
and moral evaluations are commonly associated with abstract construal. These 
evaluations are most likely functional in a majority of cases (cp. Section 2.4). When 
judging a group of individuals abstractly, because they are far away or lived long ago, 
knowledge about the individual circumstance is often unavailable or unnecessary. 
Typical examples would be news pieces about religious or political groups in a country 
far away or from a time long ago. Moral and ideological absolutes do not require further 
information, whereas individualized, circumstantial arguments must have more 
information to grant exceptions and divergent judgments.  
A majority of the academic application of Construal Level Theory thus far took 
place in consumer research, where some works included questions of advertisement 
processing (Hong & Lee, 2010; Tsai & McGill, 2011) and persuasive health messages 
(Agrawal & Wan, 2009). From a media effects standpoint, the construal of media 
messages and their resulting mental representations is also an important factor, 
influencing what attitudes and judgments media messages can impact. The consequence 
most likely is that persuasive messages that are subject to abstract construal are also 
evaluated on higher-order dimensions like idealism. Especially if those behaviors come 
with personal costs, like international aid appeals, blood donation, or the advocacy of 
preventive health measures, a positive normative evaluation of health behavior in 
question is necessary to achieve a positive attitude change in media users and possibly a 
behavioral outcome. Think about the monetary costs of international aid. Many 
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individuals, who give money to aid organizations, do in fact feel this expense in their 
everyday budget and blood donations or organ donation has a direct personal cost 
involved for the targeted media users. Consequently, media messages that would guide 
the attention to the personal costs should be less effective.  
I predict that abstract construal of health information will thus lead to more 
positive attitudes, as it possibly guides attention to the normative value of a behavior in 
public health, while concrete construal of the information would highlight costs. 
Because of the bidirectional relationship of construal level and psychological distance, I 
further assume that things construed at a more abstract construal level compared to a 
more concrete level will be judged as psychologically more distant.  
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4 Factors Eliciting Abstract and Concrete Mental Construal 
The literature review thus far has established that abstract thinking, as a mind-set 
during information processing, leads to abstract mental representations of reality and 
therefore can affect social judgments and behaviors in a number of ways. The previous 
chapter concentrated on manifestations of abstraction in attitudes and knowledge 
categories. However, abstraction is an endogenous variable. I determine four domains 
that can bear an effect on abstract or concrete thinking in the media use situation: 
incidental situational influences, the individual, cultural differences, and the media 
message itself.  
Central to this research thesis are random situational factors. Schwarz (2009) 
alludes to the social cognition hallmark, stating, “situational influences dwarf the 
influence of individual’s dispositions” (p. 121). These influences are important, if they 
change the intended message effect towards unintended effects, a problem commonly 
underrepresented in media effects research. Question to this end could include, whether 
media users who happen to be in an abstract construal mind-set, end up representing a 
health message in the media as abstract rather than concrete, wrongfully attributing it 
with, for instance, less relevance. Especially research applying Construal Level Theory 
has identified numerous situational cues that relate directly to abstract thinking (cp. 
Section 4.1). Two ideas have received wide attention by research that this chapter will 
concentrate on: The priming by random influences and affective cues as situational 
factors. The priming paradigm is very dominant in this research tradition and illustrates 
that information processing is not an independent mechanism, removed from its context. 
For example, mediated message processing can be accompanied by previous social 
interactions (e.g., a talk, a radio program, a painting) that function as prime. In this 
chapter, I will first discuss central research on perceptive and procedural primes that 
influence abstract thinking. Next, the review will cover the idea that affective cues elicit 
abstraction in mental construal. While conflicting approaches have been proposed, I 
follow the dominant discourse claiming that affective cues are used as information 
about the cognitive affordances of the information-processing situation. In this 
perspective, a positive mood signals an uncomplicated situation, whereas a negative 
mood signals a complicated or dangerous situation (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). In a 
similar vein, Action Identification Theory has established that abstract action 
representations are sufficient to construe benign situations, however situations that are 
rendered problematic call for a concrete construal (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). 
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Secondly, I will discuss individual differences, which have first been theorized 
by the Action Identification Theory. Although the abstract or concrete identification of 
an action is very much dependent on situational factors, individuals showed a tendency 
towards more abstract or more concrete action identification across a variety of domains 
(Vallacher & Wegner, 2012). Therefore, this tendency should also be a significant 
factor in explaining how individuals construe and represent a mediated message (cp. 
Section 4.2).  
Third, cultural differences in information processing are an equally large field, 
but in cultural psychology two dimensions have been identified that influence abstract 
and concrete construal (i.e., self-construal as well as holistic and analytical reasoning). 
In this chapter, I will argue that those factors are most elegantly summarized in the 
conceptualization of collective and individual cultures (cp. section 4.3).  
Lastly, when discussing the antecedents of how individuals construe messages, 
the form and content of the message itself must be mentioned. Media effects research 
commonly concerns itself with how message content and form can achieve (wanted) 
media effects. The message itself is not central in this research project, deviating 
somewhat from traditional media-centered research, adopting a psychological and 
specifically a social cognition approach. Rather, it will be part of the discussion later on, 
to assess how the theoretical aspects discussed here, can be useful for message tailoring 
in the future (cp. Section 8.3.1). 
4.1 Situational Factors 
4.1.1 Perceptive priming. 
Perceptual primes target the attentional scope (cp. Section 2.3). The referenced 
research in the section on abstract concept encoding (cp. Section 2.3.2) claimed a 
natural relationship of the human perceptual and conceptual scope. Consequently, 
researchers have used a variety of perceptive priming tasks to achieve a change in 
conceptual abstraction-the abstraction of ideas and concepts. While such perceptual 
tasks were initially designed to measure global or local perceptual attention, they have 
proven useful in manipulating the perceptual scope.  
The Navon letter task (as described in Section 2.3.1) has been broadly used for 
this purpose. Förster and Denzler (2012) had their participants do a computerized 
version of the Navon letter task to manipulate the perceptual scope. As conceptual 
outcome they operationalized category breadth. In a second step, participants judged a 
variety of atypical and typical exemplars of computer game figures against a prototype 
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figure. Participants with a global focus judged the atypical exemplars as more typical 
than participants in the local or control condition. The authors interpret this result as 
evidence that global perceptual scope lead to wider conceptual perception. Although 
none of the figures were an exact match, participants in a global processing mind-set 
included more examples of the figure in one category. Similarly, in a series of studies, 
Liberman and Förster (2009) could relate a global perceptual scope, achieved through 
the Navon letters, to greater psychological distance perception on all four dimensions 
(local, temporal, social distance and probability). Changes in psychological distance are 
interpreted as a conceptual shift in global and local processing. Furthermore, the 
changes in global perception were tied to increased social stereotyping—a sign of the 
use of broader categories (McCrea et al., 2012, Study 5a)—and increased likelihood 
judgments of unrelated actions (Wakslak & Trope, 2009, Study 4a).  
Other perceptual tasks have been developed over time. For example, the so-
called Kimchi and Palmer figures (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982) mirror the systematic 
approach of the hierarchical letters by Navon. A large target shape (e.g., a square) is 
made up of other, smaller shapes (e.g., triangles). These have been liked to changes in 
global and local processing in experimental studies, as well. For example, when 
Wakslak and Trope (2009) manipulated participant’s global perception with the 
Kimchi-Palmer figures, participants assigned an increased likelihood to random 
unrelated actions, thus relating it to a more abstract (global) construal (Study 4b).  
Finally, map tasks were used to target global or local perception by asking 
participants either to concentrate on the whole shape of a map or a specific detail on the 
map (i.e., a red star marking a particular place). In a series of studies, Friedman et al. 
(2003) used the map task and then assessed creativity and categorization (Studies 1 & 2). 
Participants named more unusual category exemplars and unusual uses for everyday 
objects in a global-focus condition (vs. the local-focus condition). Both results are read 
as signs of a broadened conceptual scope. The same method also led to more similarity 
judgments between two dissimilar objects . While hierarchical letter tasks and the 
Kimchi-Palmer figures can also be used as measurement, the map test is a sole 
manipulation task. 
4.1.2 Procedural priming. 
Unlike global and local focus primes procedural primes were established to train 
abstract or concrete cognitive operations, like the interpretation and organization of 
subsequent information (Freitas et al., 2004). The accessibility of such cognitive 
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operations defines the mind-set with which individuals approach new information. The 
tasks developed for these purposes usually concentrate on either the abstraction of 
actions or objects.  
Abstraction of actions. A central task to induce abstract or concrete thinking 
comes from Freitas et al. (2004). Prompted with an activity, individuals in abstract 
mind-set condition are asked to consider why they would do this activity, thereby 
activating a goal-focus (compare to Action Identification Theory, cp. Section 3.1). In 
contrast, individuals in the concrete mind-set condition are instructed to think about 
how they would do the prompted activity. This instruction aims to activate feasibility 
consideration. The task holds that participants perform this procedure three times. For 
example, the abstract prime would prompt the activity of working out regularly and ask 
participants why they would do that. The first answer could be to live a healthy live. 
Then participants are asked again why the want to live a healthy live. This would be the 
second instance of abstraction and a potential answer could be, to be more active. As a 
third instance of abstraction, participants would answer to the question why they want 
to be more active. For the purpose of concrete mind-set activation, participants would 
go through three subsequent responses to the question, how they want work out 
regularly. This manipulation of the construal level mind-set has previously shown to 
influence a variety of cognitive and social constructs associated with cognitive construal. 
Ledgerwood, Trope, et al. (2010) proved that participants in an abstract construal level 
mind-set aligned with their partner’s view in interviews, while individuals in a concrete 
did not (Study 2a). In another study, it was supported that ideologies held by the 
participants influence evaluations more, when participants were primed with an abstract 
construal mind-set (Ledgerwood, Trope, et al., 2010, Study 4). Construal level mind-
sets primed by the how and why tasks also influenced judgment of how likely an event 
is going to happen (Wakslak & Trope, 2009, Study 3). Abstract mind-sets lead 
participants to judge random events as less likely. Finally, for conservative participants 
the abstract construal mind-set lead to more positive feelings towards out-groups, 
showing more inclusiveness (Luguri et al., 2012, Study 2). In a variation of this priming 
task, participants are instructed to describe their goals and then asked why or how they 
want to achieve these goals (Henderson, 2013, Study 2). These forms of goal priming 
are the most commonly used manipulation of goal abstraction according to Burgoon et 
al. (2013).  
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Abstraction of objects. While the previous tasks concentrate strongly on the 
abstraction of actions, fewer studies work with tasks that are designed to achieve the 
abstract or concrete categorization of objects. The most widely used task in this 
subsection works with category generation and leads to similar effects. For this task 
participants were presented with words, such as actor, king, college, and movie. They 
were asked to either generate subordinate categories (concrete), by asking “an example 
of actor is what”, or superordinate categories (abstract), by asking, “actor is an example 
of what” (Fujita, Trope, et al., 2006). This reliably induced a tendency to construe 
subsequent, unrelated events at higher versus lower construal levels and had a 
measurable effect on self-control (Fujita, Trope, et al., 2006; Fujita & Sasota, 2011) or 
attitudes (Ledgerwood, Trope, et al., 2010). 
4.1.3 Mood. 
In the following section, I discuss mood as influence on construal. At first a 
concept definition is in order. Even though the impact of affective states such as mood 
or emotions is a fairly well-covered concept in media psychology, both as outcome of 
media use (Nabi & Krcmar, 2004; Vorderer, Klimmt, & Ritterfeld, 2004) and as 
motivational variable in media choice (e.g., Mood Management Theory, Zillmann, 
1988), concrete definitions and theoretical conceptualization of affect are rare. Research 
and theorizing about the influence of affect on cognition is a rich field, which can only 
be covered selectively here. To localize my specific theoretical approach a short 
overview on various theories is given hereafter, but a specific focus will be on the 
mood-as-information approach. 
Concept genesis and definition. If one is to dissect the human mind into the 
three traditional faculties, cognition, affect, and behavior, mood is studied under the 
roof of affect. The term affect is often used as umbrella term (for a detailed analysis of 
the terminology see Burger, 2013) to summarize affective signals (i.e., facial 
expressions, color, music), affective feelings (i.e., positive appraisal of a thing that can 
take the form of emotions and moods), emotions (i.e., anger, sadness, fear), and mood. 
Historically, affect—as an evaluative quality and as umbrella term for emotions, 
feelings, and mood—was understood as direct opposition to cognition (i.e., knowledge) 
(Clore & Huntsinger, 2009; Burger, 2013). However, research from the past decades 
demonstrated their interrelatedness. I will focus specifically on theoretical modeling and 
empirical evidence of the relationship between moods and abstract thinking. All 
affective cues have the potential to influence our information construal (for a 
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comprehensive summary see Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz, 2012). Definitions of the 
affective concepts are fuzzy and little specific, but mood can best be defined in 
comparison to the other concepts. Mood is defined as generic evaluative information 
(Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Psychology distinguishes mood from concrete emotions, such 
as anger and fear, which have a clear objective and cause, because mood lacks a clear 
object and cause (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Mood is less intense than emotions, lasts 
longer, and is rather subliminal in nature. Thus, mood can have multiple causes, which 
build up over the cause of time. Consequently, mood emerges gradually. A series of 
pleasant or unpleasant events can matter-of-factly swing the mood, but never gather 
enough intensity to elicit emotions (Burger, 2013). This understanding of mood will be 
valid for the present research. 
Affective influences on cognition. Various hypotheses about affective influence 
on cognition exist and not all of these hypotheses make specific predictions about mood, 
but rather affect in general. One concept is affective priming and it assumes that 
judgments are biased by affect, because memories and interpretations that are congruent 
with the valence of the present affect tend to be more accessible in a judgment situation 
(Bower, 1981; Bower & Forgas, 2001). A second hypothesis regards the influence that 
affect can elicit on cognitive resources. Because valence-congruent representations are 
more accessible and this is especially true for positive valence material, Mackie and 
Worth (1989) have argued that individuals in a positive mood process heuristically. 
Thirdly, mood management and mood-as-resource approaches claim that mood is a 
motivational factor in information processing. Individuals process information more 
systematically, because of an innate, hedonic drive to foster positive mood, if the 
message can serve to maintain the positive mood (hedonic contingency hypothesis, 
Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995). In a negative mood, based on this argument, the 
processing motivation is reduced. Additionally, positive mood can also function as 
motivational resource when individuals have to attend to negative information. Positive 
mood helps to preserve a positive affective state despite the affective costs of 
processing negative information (mood-as-resource hypothesis, Raghunathan & Trope, 
2002). A fourth hypothesis assumes that discrete emotions (i.e., anger, sadness) 
influence cognitive processes beyond the situation in which these emotions occurred. 
Anger, for example, is associated with the appraisal of blame. Angry individuals have 
the tendency to allocate blame in unrelated situations (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 
1993). Finally, the feeling-as-information approach has generated a broad research 
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framework. It summarizes both direct and indirect influences on cognition and 
applications span from emotions and moods, to affective and non-affective feelings. It 
differs from the other approaches, as it assumes that individuals interpret feelings as 
information about the current situation and its processing affordances. This approach 
provides an argumentative basis for the discussion of how mood influences abstraction 
and therefore will be introduced in greater detail.  
Feelings-as-information approach. The feeling-as-information framework is 
central to the theorizing about the impact of mood on mental abstraction, because its 
central assumption is that feelings can serve as informational source for cognition 
(Schwarz, 1990, 2012). The initial interest of researchers focused on a direct impact of 
mood on information processing (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990), only later 
empirical evidence showed that the whole range of affective and non-affective feelings 
also elicit the theorized influence on cognition. In the presentation of the general 
assumptions, I will use the terminology of Feelings-as-Information Theory instead of 
Mood-as-Information Theory to credit the various affective domains where this 
theorizing is applicable.  
Two conditions are important in this approach. First, individuals must consider 
their feelings to be about the current judgment and second, they must attribute 
informational value to the feeling, rightfully so or not (Clore & Huntsinger, 2009). To 
illustrate this, consider the famous experiment by Schwarz and Clore (1983), where the 
investigators interviewed individuals via telephone about their life satisfaction on sunny 
or on rainy days. On sunny days individuals were generally in a better mood than on 
rainy days and reported higher life satisfaction. The investigators argue that the 
difference in reported life satisfaction is due to a misattribution of participant’s life 
satisfaction on their current good or bad mood. The impact of bad weather on life 
satisfaction disappeared when individuals were made aware of the source of their mood 
either indirectly (“By the way, how is the weather down there?”) or directly (“We are 
interested in how the weather affects person's mood“).  
Direct influence. As a direct influence of feelings on information processing 
researchers assume that feelings are used as heuristic cue in information processing 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2003). This perspective posits that individuals make their 
judgments in part based on a gut feeling and implicitly ask how they feel about an issue 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983). The argument holds that individuals perceived their mood to 
be about the momentary judgment, which is not necessarily an conscious attribution 
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(Schwarz, 2012). In other words, participants attribute informational value to their 
feelings. Negative moods deviate from the typical positive mood valence individuals try 
to maintain and hence are presumed to require more explanation than a positive mood 
(Schwarz, 2012). Although on sunny days individuals reported higher life satisfaction in 
all three priming conditions (indirect, direct, no mentioning of the weather), the effects 
of negative mood in the weather study by Schwarz and Clore (1983) subsided when the 
cause for the participant’s negative mood was made salient and brought the 
misattribution to the participant’s attention.  
Indirect influence. Other than the notion that affect serves as heuristic cue, the 
cognitive tuning assumption posits an indirect influence of feelings on cognition. Affect, 
in this perspective, influences the processing style, because positive feelings signal 
uncomplicated and negative feelings problematic situations. The human brain reacts to 
these evaluations of the situation by tuning the cognitive style to meet the demands of 
the situation (Schwarz, 2012). Much initial evidence comes from persuasion research. 
Participants in a sad mood process persuasive communication centrally, whereas 
participants in a happy mood show a more heuristic processing style (Bless et al., 1990; 
Bless, Hamilton, & Mackie, 1992). While Mackie and Worth (1989) argue that 
participants in a positive mood have reduced cognitive capacities, no stable empirical 
evidence for this explanation exists. Rather a positive mood is interpreted as a cue about 
the cognitive demand of a given information-processing task. In one experiment, Bless 
et al. (1990) asked participants to concentrate on the arguments in a message. 
Participants in a positive and negative mood were influenced differently by strong and 
weak arguments. Argument strength did not affect the persuasive effect of the message 
for individuals in a positive mood, while individuals in a negative mood were more 
persuaded by strong arguments. The reliance on argument quality is seen as an indicator 
of central processing, which means that individuals in a sad mood had the cognitive 
capacities for high elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Schwarz concludes that 
individuals commonly rely on feelings for judgment tasks, but the judgments and the 
behavioral impulses from feelings can vary based on the situation (Schwarz, 2012).  
Mood-and-general-knowledge model. An extension of the cognitive tuning 
hypothesis is the mood-and-general-knowledge model (Bless, Clore, et al., 1996; Bless, 
2001), which argues that individuals in a positive mood rely on general knowledge 
structures more than individuals in a sad mood. It therefore explicates the cognitive 
tuning assumption by specifying what aspect individuals tune based on their feelings 
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(Burger, 2013). Similar to the general feeling-as-information theory (Schwarz, 1990), 
mood is a potential source of information about the nature of the situation in the 
general-knowledge model. However, differing from previous accounts, the model 
further claims that benign situations allow individuals to rely on their general 
knowledge structures, while problematic situations often require attention to details and 
concrete information from the situation (Bless, 2001). By relying on general knowledge 
structures the processing demands are lower in a positive situation. Note that this 
counters the argument claiming that individuals in a happy mood have a reduced 
processing motivation or capacity and thus rely on general knowledge structures like 
scripts and stereotypes (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Schwarz, 1990). Empirical evidence to 
this specific assumption comes from an experiment by Bless, Clore, et al. (1996). 
Assuming that reliance on general knowledge structures stems from the reduced 
processing motivation or capacities, this constrains should also influence the 
performance in a secondary task. The investigators showed that the recognition of items, 
which previously appeared in a videotaped story, and a secondary task (concentration 
test) was better for participants in a happy mood. This suggests that participants relied 
on activated general knowledge during their recognition task, but were not less 
motivated or capable of processing. In their concentration task the reliance on general 
knowledge opened up more resources and hence increased their performance.  
Mood’s impact on abstraction. From this history of theorizing a connection 
between mood and abstraction emerged. Mood can tune the cognitive processing of 
information insofar that individuals in judgment situations either feel confident relying 
on general knowledge structures or not. Problematic within this approach, as Bless 
(2001) argues himself, is that general knowledge structures are not defined. Research 
suggest that general knowledge structures summarize the use of abstract conceptual 
categories in individuals perception (Bless et al., 1992; Bless, Schwarz, & Wieland, 
1996; Isbell, Burns, & Haar, 2005), general object identification (Isen & Daubman, 
1984), and the use of scripts (Bless, Clore, et al., 1996, Experiment 1). Additionally, 
happy individuals showed to construe themselves more abstractly (Updegraff & Suh, 
2007). In a series of four studies Burger and Bless (2015) further found that mood-
induced shifts in construal are responsible for the weighting of pragmatic and idealistic 
arguments. As the Construal Level Theory suggested, more abstract construal led 
individuals to rely on more idealistic arguments (Trope et al., 2007).  
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All these studies support that positive mood leads to a reliance on the more 
abstract structures. Supporting convergent evidence comes from decision-making 
research, where de Vries, Holland, Corneille, Rondeel, and Witteman (2012) 
investigated the impact of mood on dominant choices (i.e., decisions where one option 
is clearly preferable). Traditional reasoning has it that judgments in dominant-choice 
situations require and allow less constructive effort, thus leaving less room for 
incidental influences like mood. The researchers still hypothesized that mood could 
influence dominant-choice judgments, because mood has proven to impact narrow 
versus broad conceptual focus (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994) and cognitive flexibility 
and creativity (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). In one study, using two movie clips, 
de Vries et al. (2012) manipulated the participant’s mood and in a second study they 
measured participant’s mood prior a gambling situation with two choices (coin toss). In 
both studies, one choice (A) was arguably and based on pretests the dominant choice, 
promising higher wins than choice B, while both offered the same odds of winning. The 
coins were tossed in a pseudo-randomized order so that participants experienced worse 
than the expected 50/50 chance outcome. Participants in a positive mood chose the less 
favorable option, or switched to the less dominant choice earlier than participants in a 
negative mood. Based on the experienced outcomes of the coin tosses, adhering to the 
formal rule was not beneficial. The authors interpret the fact that happy individuals 
diverge from the dominant choice earlier as higher cognitive flexibility and the reliance 
on associative and explorative processes, stemming from a conceptually broader focus, 
rather than a narrower focus on logic and rules.  
Further evidence supporting the assumption that positive mood leads to a more 
abstract cognitive processing is found in linguistic psychology and research using the 
LCM (Semin & Fiedler, 1988). After a mood induction using short video clips, 
Beukeboom and Semin (2006) asked participants to describe an unique event from their 
life they had either recalled after or before the mood induction. In both studies 
participants in a happy mood used more abstract language to describe their event. 
Following up on these results a third experiment used different mood induction and had 
participants describe a short movie clip. The language use between the happy and sad 
participants was still significantly different, in the hypothesized direction. Happy 
participants used more abstract language compared to sad participants. Other evidence 
connects mood to abstraction in the sense of the Action Identification Theory (Vallacher 
& Wegner, 1987). Beukeboom and Semin (2005) showed that individuals would use 
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more why-sentences versus how-sentences when asked to form re-descriptions of 
actions in a happy mood compared to a sad mood. Why-sentences described to what a 
behavior was performed (e.g., locking the door to secure the house), whereas how-
sentence described by what means the behavior was performed (e.g., locking the door 
by turning the key) (Beukeboom & Semin, 2005). This relationship between mood and 
the action identification framework is coherent with the feeling-as-information 
approach, because one underlying argument is that negative affective states render the 
situation as problematic. The cognitive tuning assumption expects that cognitive 
processing adapts to the problematic situation by becoming more specific and 
individuating (Bless, 2001). The same argument can be found in the Action 
Identification Theory, were one claim is that abstract action identifications are sufficient 
unless the situation is marked as problematic or novel (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). 
4.2 Individual Differences  
The levels of action identification are highly relative to the situation’s demands 
and flexible. Yet, early into the research on how individuals mentally represent their 
actions, the question about a possible individual difference in action identification 
emerged. The assumption was fueled by a reliable tendency of action identification 
across various domains (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Although the optimal hypothesis 
claims, individuals will identify actions on the highest, functional level available to 
them (cp. Section 3.1); this level of optimal identification may still vary between 
individuals. Some individuals concentrate on mechanical details of actions and others 
view the world in terms of its consequences and meanings (Vallacher & Wegner, 2012). 
As action identifications are relative to the situation, a general behavioral trait can 
hardly be derived. Instead, Vallacher and Wegner (1989) argue that the whole range 
between concrete and abstract action identifications serves as an individual difference 
and is determined by personal agency. According to their argument, high-level agents 
perform actions with the action’s higher meanings in mind, while low-level agents do 
not connect their actions to a broader context. This is conceptually relatable to abstract 
and concrete construal. A person low in personal agency is, “someone who commonly 
makes action errors and so must keep focusing on the details of action in order to 
negotiate the difficult path toward effective action performance“ (Vallacher & Wegner, 
1989, p. 669; Vallacher, Wegner, & Somoza, 1989). They are further characterized as 
impulsive, less self-motivated, exhibit less consistent behavior, and show a more 
  
49 
external locus of control. In contrast, high-level agents are portrayed as organized, 
consistent, and stable in their course of action (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). 
The initial hypothesis for action identification referred to the individuals’ 
construal of their own actions; not until later was this idea transferred also to the 
construal of other’s actions. This opened the theorizing of action identification to a 
broader application. Levy et al. (2002) showed that the different levels of action 
identification related to out-group biases. Participants with a more abstract action 
identification level perceived college professors to be very homogeneous with regard to 
their morals, social opinions, and intellect. Furthermore, the findings were replicated for 
stigmatized groups like individuals, who are homeless or individuals with HIV. 
Abstract action identification allowed participants to adopt the perspective of others; it 
increased empathy, willingness to help others, the willingness to volunteer, and the 
willingness and to donate money (Levy et al., 2002). Other investigations could relate 
action identification to other domains of social cognition. Individuals’ action 
identification was sensitive to the time frame in which the focal action took place. For 
distant actions individuals chose more abstract levels of identification (Liberman & 
Trope, 1998, Study 1). Likewise, local distance to the actions produced the same pattern 
(Fujita, Henderson, et al., 2006, Study 1). Finally, the increase of social distance 
through a third person perspective to an action (vs. a first person perspective) led 
individuals to identify actions more abstractly in mental images and visual images alike 
(Libby et al., 2009, Experiment 1a). 
Action Identification Theory offers a framework for individual differences in 
cognitions about actions on the continuum from abstract to concrete mental 
representation. This approach reflects personal agency at its core and provides a trait 
perspective on how individuals generally go about their life in terms of goal-
directedness and anticipation of effects of their actions. As such it provides an 
interesting concept in media effects research and particularly for persuasive media 
messages that are set out to influence a change in behavior. These behavioral appeals, 
even at the most latent level, will translate into a mental representation in the media 
users mind. The general level of abstraction of said representation should be crucial in 
determining behavior and thus makes the individual difference in action identification 
an important component in determining how abstractly media users construe and 
represent a persuasive message.  
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4.3 Cultural Differences 
Psychology had a vested interest in differences in reasoning and thought 
between cultures for the past twenty years. Culture is often defined using a consensus-
centered approach, arguing that cultures are shared norms, values, and beliefs of 
individuals living in local proximity (Medin, Unsworth, & Hirschfeld, 2007). This view, 
however, maintains a static, law-like definition of culture, potentially underestimating 
inherent variations in said beliefs and norms. Cultural psychology has thus adopted a 
more liberal approach, by investigating not what individuals think, but how they think 
and made reasonable claims along a limited number of dimensions that allow to 
differentiate cultures8 based on individual trait dimensions (Medin et al., 2007). I will 
concentrate on three dimensions of cultural differences that have been identified in 
anthropological as well as psychological theorizing and that can be directly linked to the 
proposed differences in abstract thinking between cultures. On an anthropologic level, a 
central factor in explaining cultural variations in abstract or concrete thinking is the 
difference between predominantly collectivistic and individualistic societies (cp. 
Section 4.3.1). On the individual level, the self-construal as independent or 
interdependent individual (cp. Section 4.3.2) and holistic and analytical thinking styles 
(cp. Section 4.3.3) were related to abstract thinking. Most notably these three lines of 
theorizing rely on similar if not the same anthropological assumptions, which I will lay 
out briefly hereafter, before discussing the dimensions in detail in the following sections.  
First, the cultural differences in abstract thinking are anchored in the 
anthropological observations, that individuals are challenged with fundamentally 
different tasks in their ecosystems (Edgerton, 1971). For example, in traditionally 
collectivistic cultures tighter family bonds are traced back to the historic, economic, and 
even geographical reasons. Agricultural societies show larger families, clans, or tribes, 
because it took many hands to organize their complex everyday tasks. Those societies 
coincide with collectivistic societies. In contrast, hunter and gatherer societies have 
smaller family units, so do the modern industrialized societies (Hofstede, 2001). The 
social organization has further perceptual consequences. On the one hand, individuals 
from collectivistic and individualistic societies have different self-construals 
(independent vs. interdependent) and consequently differ in their everyday attributions 
based on the relative importance of their surroundings (Kühnen et al., 2013). On the 
                                                
8 I am well aware of the critical dimension of this terminology, but due to the limited space in 
this work for this topic area, I will continue to use “culture”, adopting a majority assumption for all 
claims made.  
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other hand, members of agricultural societies tend to display more field dependence, 
because of their natural need to work together and care for each other. Field dependence 
is the perceptual attendance away from oneself to the social field (Nisbett et al., 2001) 
resulting in a broader perceptual scope, quite similar to theorizing on abstract 
perception (cp. Section 2.3.1).  
Furthermore, the logic of contrasting countries with a longer history of 
industrialization against those countries with lesser industrialization all too often fits 
another overused dichotomy—the discrimination of Western versus Eastern cultures. 
The dichotomy of Eastern and Western cultures is often related to philosophical 
orientation. Greek philosophy, as nub of modern Western cultures, has emphasized 
personal agency and the social organization was considered a loose bond of individuals, 
who lived their lives to their own liking, obedient only to laws. Chinese philosophy is 
usually considered in direct contrast to Greek philosophy. Chinese philosophy assumes 
that individuals belong to a tight-knit collective and that behaviors of any individual 
should be targeted toward the good of the collective (Hofstede, 2001; Nisbett et al., 
2001). This mirrors the contrast between collectivism and individualism as well as the 
related self-construal. Moreover, also metaphysical believe systems differed between 
these philosophies. Greek philosophers were concerned with formal logic to explain 
events, categorizing objects with precision and extracting the pure essence of it-in other 
words concreteness. Chinese philosophy had a more pragmatic approach in their 
metaphysics. Categorization of objects and events relied more strongly on similarities 
and relationships between the objects, instead of rules and patterns (Nisbett et al., 2001; 
Norenzayan, Choi, & Peng, 2007). With this distinction the core difference of holistic 
and analytical thinking style is captured. Both of these orientations developed in 
reciprocity with the very different economic and social systems, linking them to China’s 
traditional agricultural society and Greece’s hunting and gathering society (Norenzayan 
et al., 2007). Thereby the philosophical argument confirms Hofstede’s theoretical 
derivation of collectivism and individualism.  
In the cause of theory development, the discussed dichotomization of 
Westerners versus Easterners has been criticized for its ignorance of internal 
heterogeneity as well as the assumption of national cultures. The differentiation has 
been taken to the extreme in a vast number of publications speaking of Westerners and 
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Non-Westerners. 9  This becomes even more relevant, if one is to look at the 
methodological definition of Westerners and Easterners. While Non-Westerners are 
represented by a number of East Asian nations (exceedingly often by Korean, Japanese, 
Chinese nationals), Westerners are almost always represented by Americans 
(Norenzayan et al., 2007).10 The conclusion drawn from this is twofold. For one thing, 
the American nationals are prototypical Westerners. However, comparisons within the 
two categories Westerners and Non-Westerners are needed to achieve an understanding 
of the importance of these categories. This would be warranted given that also so-called 
Western societies have experienced numerous social systems with various notions of 
collectivism: socialist and communist societies as well as national socialism included 
some form of interdependence and collectivistic ideals.  
4.3.1 Individualistic and collectivistic societies. 
A central dimension to cognitive difference is the individualism-collectivism 
distinction. At its core this dimension describes the relationship of the individual with 
the collective in a society (Triandis et al., 1986; Hofstede, 2001). Individualism defines 
a society with loose ties between the individual and the collective, where everyone is 
only responsible for him/herself and the immediate family. Collectivism, on the other 
hand, is defined as life-long integration into a cohesive in-group, associated with 
protection and loyalty (Hofstede, 2001). One example of the impact of 
collectivism/individualism is the family, which is often understood as a model of 
society, in which values and beliefs are practiced and learned. Beside the mentioned 
size of families, collectivistic societies also show greater vertical integration (i.e., 
relationships across generations). Hofstede (2001) mentions, for instance, that children 
in individualistic societies tend to leave the family home earlier or that elders are 
increasingly often not cared for at home, but in care facilities. The importance of the 
individual and the individual’s preferences is higher in individualistic societies. This 
distinction has gained academic attention across disciplines with Geert Hofstede’s 
cross-national study of the organizational cultures at IBM affiliates. Initially four 
dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, collectivism/individualism, feminism/masculinity, 
                                                
9 This egocentric terminology was most likely coined by the strong research efforts in traditional 
Western countries, especially the United States of America and has been adopted from there on. 
10 Noteable exceptions are studies including at least a sample of different nationalities considered 
Westerners (e.g., Gudykunst et al., 1992; Kühnen, Hannover, Roeder, et al., 2001) or recognizing and 
analyzing American cultural heterogeniety (e.g., Marquez & Ellwanger, 2014) .  
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and power distance) and later a fifth dimension (long-term orientation) emerged from 
this long-term study (Hofstede, 2001). 
The self-proclaimed sociological/anthropological approach is not without 
criticism. Apart from methodological issues (Baskerville, 2003), Hofstede’s work has 
been so broadly relied upon, that is has experienced great over-emphasizes and over-
generalization. While Hofstede’s research and scale development as such were set in the 
study of organizational culture, it has quickly become a model for the study of culture 
(Baskerville, 2003; Hofstede, 2003). Reading Hofstede in an oversimplified manner 
would, in fact, allow assuming that his work equates nations with culture and 
organizational culture dimensions with cultural differences. The reason the five 
dimensions of culture were able to endure in academic literature, however, is most 
likely that the dichotomy of Hofstede’s dimensions of organizational culture rely on a 
few broadly accepted social and historical differences (cp. Section 4.3) and present a 
rather coherent framework. However, especially for the collectivism/individualism 
dimension more fine-tuned sociological and psychological theorizing exists (Triandis et 
al., 1986; Schwartz, 1990; Markus & Kitayama, 1991) which I will review in the 
following section.  
4.3.2 Self-construal as cultural difference. 
In Hofstede’s analysis collectivism and individualism are opposite ends of a 
bipolar scale. On an individual level, however, collectivism and individualism are 
understood as coexisting orientations of an individual towards the self and the collective. 
Markus and Kitayama (1991) differentiate individuals’ construal of the self in 
relationship to others as either independent or interdependent. The difference between 
the two is often tied to the existing cultural conventions of how individuals are seen. In 
its most extreme form independent cultures view individuals as self-contained and 
autonomous, with a unique set of dispositions, which also guide their behavior. 
Contrary to this view, interdependent cultures share a perception of the individual as 
being intertwined with the collective surrounding him/her. From this a widely supported 
assumption follows, that collectivistic cultures foster interdependent self-construal, 
whereas individualistic cultures reinforce independent self-construal rather than 
interdependence. It could be inferred that in abstract thinking the integration of various 
examples into a central category requires individuals to assume inter-relations and 
dependencies, whereas for a concrete thinking style individualized observations suffice. 
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These tendencies have been proven to determine cognitions in both social and 
non-social situations. For example, interdependent selves are expected to be more 
sensitive to others and context, which is predicted to increase the amount of elaboration 
about these areas. This, in turn, is expected to influence non-social activities such as 
categorization (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Experimental evidence by Kühnen et al. 
(2013) shows that independent self-construal causes stronger dispositionism (i.e., the 
tendency to attribute behavior to personal dispositions rather than circumstance, cp. 
Section 3.3.2). Dispositionism is associated with abstract mental construal (Nussbaum 
et al., 2003), and the same notion is strongly supported by cross-cultural research 
comparing American participants with Japanese (Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002) or 
Korean participants (I. Choi & Nisbett, 1998). The cross-cultural experiments found 
that in a no-choice situation Japanese and Korean participants were less prone to 
attribute behavior to disposition.11 Both nations (Korea and Japan) are localized on the 
opposite end of Hofstede’s collectivism/individualism distinction compared to the 
United States of America. These national cultures are therefore expected to show strong 
differences in self-construal correspondingly (Morris & Peng, 1994; Miyamoto & 
Kitayama, 2002). In an experiment by Kühnen, Hannover, and Schubert (2001), even 
primed self-construal has led to a stronger abstract (contextualized) versus concrete 
(decontextualized) perceptual focus (cp. Section 2.3.1). 
4.3.3 Holistic and analytical reasoning as cultural difference. 
Nisbett et al. (2001) argue that differences in reasoning that are rooted in 
philosophical, social, and economic differences in the past continue to exist even today 
between industrialized cultures. They differentiate holistic reasoning from analytical 
reasoning. Holistic thoughts are defined by an orientation towards the context, similar to 
field dependency, including an attention towards the relationship of objects with their 
context. Prediction and explanation are strongly shaped by these relationships. In 
contrast, individuals with analytical reasoning detach the object stronger from its 
context and rely using rule-based categories and reasons to predict and explain the 
object’s actions. As such, analytical reasoning mirrors much of what is discussed in 
concrete construal and holistic reasoning resonates with abstract construal on matters of 
inference or categorization (cp. Section 3.3.1). 
                                                
11 The experiments cited here are investigating the correspondence bias, the notion that even if 
behavior is rather obviously determined by the situation, individuals tend to attribute it to the actor’s 
dispositions (Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002). 
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When considering cultural differences, the relationship between cognitive style 
and self-construal are studied explicitly by Nisbett et al. (2001) referring in their 
argument to both Markus and Kitayama (1991) and Hofstede (2001). They claim that 
collectivistic cultures as well as an interdependent notion of the self result in holistic 
rather than analytical reasoning. Research results support this assumption. Masuda and 
Nisbett (2001) showed Japanese and American participants underwater scenes with 
plants, rocks, and fish swimming. A focal fish was larger and brighter than the rest, and 
participants were simply asked to describe what they saw. As predicted, Japanese 
participants began by describing the overall scene, while American started by referring 
to the focal fish. Although both groups made equally many mentions of the focal fish, 
Japanese participants made considerably more statements about specific background 
items and relationships between the objects. Another paradigm brought similar results. 
Americans and Japanese participants were asked to take pictures in an urban 
environment, which were later analyzed. Pictures from American participants displayed 
objects standing out from the scene, while Japanese urban scenes showed objects and 
surroundings equally represented (Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006). This 
relationship has conceptually also been connected to perceptual field dependency 
(Norenzayan et al., 2007) and Gestaltist’s debate (cp. Section 2.3.1) about the relation 
between the object and the ground (Morris & Peng, 1994). 
Holistic and analytical reasoning moreover has a strong impact on inference and 
causality. In both social and non-social cases, American participants perceived causality 
to originate from a focal object, while East Asian participants explained causality with 
reference to the context (Morris & Peng, 1994; I. Choi & Nisbett, 1998; I. Choi, Nisbett, 
& Norenzayan, 1999; Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002). For example, Morris 
and Peng (1994) analyzed reports on murder cases in both American and Chinese daily 
newspapers. Coding of locus of attribution differed significantly between Chinese and 
American reporters (Study 2). American reports had a higher tendency than Chinese 
reports to fundamental attribution errors (i.e., the wrongful attribution of behavior to 
disposition rather than circumstance). The results were replicated for readers of a 
murder report. American readers, compared to Chinese readers, were more likely to 
attribute the murder to traits than situational factors (Morris & Peng, 1994, Study 3).  
Experimental evidence, however, is scarce. As proxy, priming literature is often 
cited. In an meta-analysis of collectivism/individualism priming literature, Oyserman 
and Lee (2008) find convincing evidence that differences in holistic and analytical 
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cognitive style do in fact relate to the chronic salience of the self in relation to the 
collective (cp. Section 4.3.2). Self-construal can be directly linked to a holistic thinking 
style. Yet, conflicting evidence exists from Marquez and Ellwanger (2014). They 
measured self-construal and field dependence, finding none of the commonly associated 
relationships to cognitive style. This suggests that cultural differences, as discussed by 
Hofstede (2001), cannot only be seen as the sum of individual differences. Rather than 
caused by self-construal, difference in cognitive style parallel to self-construal has to be 
attributed to a complex array of cultural differences, which likely exert independent 
effects on the outcomes. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has introduced a variety of research areas that all contributed 
factors of abstract and concrete thinking. A situational mind-set, which is a dynamic 
construct, is expected to influence the construal of information, as is the current mood 
state. It is predicted that the processing mediated information in an abstract construal 
level mind-set would lead to more abstract mental representations relative to a concrete 
construal level mind-set. As presented above, perceptual and procedural primes in 
cognitive psychology concentrate either on the abstraction of actions or objects. Their 
effect as actual mind-set has not received thorough investigation. Mood is discussed as 
situational factor, which can influence the construal level as well. A positive mood, as 
was established above, signals a nonthreatening situation where abstract mental 
representations are effective. A negative mood leads to a stronger problem focus and 
consequently a concrete construal level mind-set is predicted.  
Action Identification Theory offers an individual difference factor, which is 
defined as general propensity to approach the identification of actions as abstract or 
concrete. Concentrating on action, it should be at least partially related to the construal 
of mediated information, particularly in the domain of action related information and 
thoughts.  
In the process of analyzing situated cognition in media effects research, cultural 
influences are another possible determinant of cognitive abstraction. Cognitive 
difference in self-construal and holistic/analytical thinking style show conceptual 
similarity with abstract and concrete construal of complex situations. A holistic thinking 
style and an interdependent self-construal are both associated with stronger context 
integration. I inferred that in abstract thinking the integration of various examples into a 
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central category requires a consideration of inter-relations and dependencies, whereas 
for a concrete thinking style individualized observations are the basis for judgments. 
The influences of self-construal as trait and cognitive style (holistic vs. 
analytical) are likely independent, but they are credited to the same complex historical, 
social, and economic differences between cultures. Based on this shared theorizing, the 
individualism/collectivism dimension is still continuously used as a basis of comparison, 
as it captures cognitive variations among national cultures most prominently on an 
aggregated level (Morris & Peng, 1994). The collectivism/individualism differentiation 
is functional in this present research to investigate intercultural differences in abstract 
and concrete thinking styles. It is predicted that individuals with a collectivistic cultural 
background have a more abstract construal of mediated health messages than 
individuals from an individualistic cultural background. It is seen as a given, that this 
cultural variable warrants a majority insight of cultural differences and has to be 
critically reflected.  
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5 The Present Studies 
This chapter’s goal is to summarize the rationale for the present work, based on 
the theoretical and empirical literature review in the last four chapters. I will provide six 
general research hypotheses and two exploratory research questions. The general 
research hypotheses are specified further for testing in the process. 
The central reasoning presented in this work relies first and foremost on the 
assumption that health-related knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors are mental 
representation of reality that are partially constructed by the exposure to persuasive 
messages. Health messages, in turn, are persuasive messages that try altering 
individuals’ cognitive, affective, and behavioral attitudes about a health-related topic—
specifically, they target shaping the media user’s mental representation. Mental 
representations of any one thing can differ in their level of abstractness, which entails 
variation in category breadth (cp. Section 3.3.1) as well as variation in the associated 
descriptive and evaluative categories (cp. Section 3.3.2). Media campaigns often target 
preventive public health behaviors with outspoken individual and societal benefits, such 
as condom use or vaccinations. Health topics epitomize the relevance of abstract and 
concrete mental representation. While at the most abstract level those behaviors are two 
relatively quick and simple choices (i.e., going to the doctor once or twice, using a 
condom during intercourse to achieve protection), concrete repercussions are often 
construed differently. Personal costs are, for instance, pain during the vaccination or 
loss of romantic spontaneity. Potential risk factors and feasibility of actions are weight 
against the goals and gains expected from the suggested health behavior. Knowing 
whether a health behavior is evaluated based on general, idealistic, and moral concerns 
compared to the associated individual costs and pragmatic concerns, is a central 
component for predicting the efficacy of such health messages. I argued that such 
evaluations are predominantly due to how abstract or concrete the media user represents 
the health information in his/her mind (message construal).  
The message construal is highly sensitive to context factors, individual 
propensity, and cultural factors. A typical research design in media and communication 
studies would entail to manipulate the media’s presentation of the health message and 
then investigate the media user’s associated representation, attitudes, and behavioral 
intentions. Often overlooked in this perspective are factors message designers cannot 
anticipate. Those ignored situational factors make up the second theoretical fundament 
for this research. The situated cognition approach assumes a fundamental impact of 
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circumstantial factors on cognitive processes. For the area of abstract and concrete 
processing of information, extensive empirical evidence from both Construal Level 
Theory and Action Identification Theory established that a construal mind-set 
systematically changes as function of semantic and procedural primes (Wakslak & 
Trope, 2009; Ledgerwood, Trope, et al., 2010; Abraham, Sheeran, & Henderson, 2011; 
Luguri et al., 2012; Henderson, 2013) as well as mood states (Isen & Daubman, 1984; 
Bless, Clore, et al., 1996; Beukeboom & Semin, 2005; Isbell et al., 2005; Beukeboom & 
Semin, 2006; Beukeboom & de Jong, 2008). Therefore, I propose two experimental 
studies that investigate the impact of situational factors, individual difference, and 
cultural difference on the media user’s message construal as well as knowledge and 
attitudes about a health issue. I will summarize the general hypotheses in the following 
section. An overview of all hypotheses, research questions, and the associated studies is 
provided in Table 1 at the end of this chapter.  
5.1 Hypotheses about the Factors Influencing Message Construal 
5.1.1 Situational factors. 
The situated construal level has not received specific attention from media 
effects scholars. Thus, the first general research hypothesis is that the influence of the 
situated construal level predicts the mental representation of the mediated information 
(H1). As for the influencing factors it can be assumed that an abstract construal level 
mind-set as well as a positive mood lead to more abstract mental representations of the 
mediated health message in direct comparison to a concrete mind-set or a negative 
mood (cp. Section 4.1).  
This assumption is based for one thing on the Construal Level Theory (cp. 
Section 3.2) and on the mood-as-information approach (cp. Section 4.1.3). The 
Construal Level Theory claims that the mind has the capacity for abstract, high-level 
decontextualized, and stable construction of mental representation as well as the 
concrete, low-level contextualized and detailed construction of mental representations 
(Liberman & Trope, 1998). Along this continuum a number of factors guide which 
construal level is used for information processing. One of those factors is the construal 
level mind-set (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Freitas et al., 2004; Trope et al., 2007). 
Individuals in an abstract construal level mind-set during media exposure will represent 
the mediated health information more abstractly than individuals in a concrete construal 
level mind-set (H1a). Additionally, the mood-as-information approach and specifically 
the mood-and-general knowledge model, assume that a positive mood is associated with 
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more abstract thoughts, as mood provides information about the situation’s cognitive 
affordance (Bless, 2001; Beukeboom & Semin, 2006; Schwarz, 2012). A positive mood 
signals a benign and uncomplicated situation, which allows for abstract construal and 
mental representations. A negative mood usually denotes a problematic situation, which 
calls for a more concrete construal and mental representation. While these assumptions 
are widely tested in situated-cognition research, the presented research uses them in a 
mass media environment. The related prediction holds that individuals in a good mood 
during media exposure will represent the mediated health information more abstractly 
than individuals in a negative mood (H1b).  
5.1.2 Individual and cultural differences. 
Individual and cultural differences are two additional factors that have been tied 
to abstract thinking. Action identification research could show that the individual 
tendency to construe actions as either abstract or concrete influences how individuals 
think about what they are doing (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Therefore, I hypothesize 
that a more abstract action identification tendency also contributes to a more abstract 
mental representation, as compared to a concrete action identification tendency (cp. 
Section 3.1; H2). Finally, I predict that cultural differences on the 
individualism/collectivism spectrum impact the resulting mental representation in the 
way that individuals from a more collectivistic societal background have a more 
abstract mental representation than individuals from a more individualistic society (cp. 
Section 4.3; H3).  
5.2 Hypotheses about the Effects of Construal Level  
5.2.1 Knowledge. 
As I have argued extensively in Chapter 3 and above, the varying degree of 
abstraction in the mental representation of a health message is expected to further 
influence what knowledge and attitudes associations are activated. The general 
assumption of the Construal Level Theory tested in H1a is that individuals with an 
abstract construal mind-set construct more abstract mental representations than 
individuals with a concrete construal level mind-set. According to the general 
associated network theory of memory (cp. Section 2.1) the activation level of abstract 
information should be higher if somebody construed information on an abstract level 
compared to an individual construing the information at a concrete level (Srull & Wyer, 
1979). Primary information is more abstract and the general information about an issue 
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and should be activated by individuals decoding information in an abstract construal 
level mind-set, while individuals construing the same message concretely would also 
activate secondary information. Hence, I predict that individuals encoding mediated 
health messages at a more abstract construal level will have better recognition of 
primary information than participants who construed the same message at a more 
concrete construal level (H4).  
5.2.2 Attitudes and Social Judgment.  
Attitudes. The fundamental argument relating abstract or concrete construal 
level mind-set to differences in attitudes and social judgment broadly relies on the 
associated network theory. The accessibility principle claims that attitudes are not only 
based on new information and the relevant, stored information about the attitude object, 
but rather on the information that comes to mind most easily (Srull & Wyer, 1979; E. R. 
Smith & Queller, 2001; Schwarz, 2009). Based on the idea of associative networks as 
well, E. R. Smith and Queller (2001) postulate that mental representations connect not 
only to related concepts, but also to evaluative categories. In the framework of abstract 
and concrete construal mind-sets this suggests that the activation of either abstract or 
concrete mental representations activates distinct evaluative categories as well. In other 
words, abstract evaluative categories within the associative network should come to 
mind more easily to individuals in an abstract construal mind-set compared to 
individuals in a concrete mind-set. Consequently, I predict that abstract and concrete 
construal level mind-sets during the time of media exposure to health information can 
play an important role in explaining health attitudes and behavior, because the media 
user’s mind-set at the time of information encoding biases the following information 
processing and retrieval of arguments.  
Section 3.3 summarized a number of abstract and concrete attitude domains. For 
example, theorizing suggests that favorable attitudes are superordinate (abstract) 
categories, whereas negative attitudes are rather subordinate (concrete) categories 
(Liberman et al., 2002; Eyal et al., 2004). A mind-set favoring either abstract or 
concrete construal would most likely have more access to the congruent attitudes. 
Further, abstract representations are broader and relate to more normative concepts, 
whereas concrete mental representations relate to secondary and individuating 
information (Trope & Liberman, 2012). I predict that individuals with a concrete 
construal level mind-set decode the health information in more detail and that personal 
costs, secondary information, or pragmatic concerns are more readily accessible to them. 
  
62 
In contrast, an abstract construal level during message decoding should make idealistic 
concerns, moral standards, favorable reasoning, and primary information more 
accessible. The resulting attitudes should therefore be more positive for individuals in 
an abstract construal level mind-set than for participants in a concrete construal level 
mind-set, because they construe the message more abstractly (H5). Therefore, I also 
predict that the situational factor (construal level mind-set and mood, H1a and H1b), the 
individual factor (H2), and the cultural factor (H3) have an indirect influence on the 
resulting attitudes, because those factors are predicted to impact the construal of 
information. H5a to H5d therefore specify a mediating influence of message construal 
for the main factors. 
Social judgment. Based on the Construal Level Theory of psychological 
distance (Trope & Liberman, 2010), changes in mental construal should impact the 
psychological distance with which a topic is construed. The bidirectional relationship 
has found some initial support (cp. Section 3.2), showing that construal level mind-set 
primes affect the perception of distance in the same way distance primes affect 
construal of information. Much of construal levels impact on social cognition has been 
investigated under the premise of exploring the impact of psychological distance on 
social cognition. In this work the impact of construal levels on the perceived 
psychological distance to the health topics should be explored. Given the literature 
review, I hypothesize that an abstract construal mind-set leads to a higher perceived 
distance to the health topic than a concrete construal level mind-set (H6). Furthermore, 
if the bidirectional assumption is to be true, a possible indirect impact of construal level 
mind-set (H1a), mood (H1b), individual differences in action identification (H2), and 
cultural differences (H3) on the psychological distance judgments, should be explained 
in part by the message construal. Concretely, I am looking at social distance judgments, 
probability judgments, and duration judgments.  
Social distance. For social distance, I predict that with more abstract message 
construal, the social distance to the issue is perceived as bigger than with a more 
concrete message construal (H6a). This would empirically equate to the assumed 
bidirectional relationship between abstract construal and larger social distance, or 
concrete construal and smaller social distance respectively (Bar-Anan et al., 2006; 
Liberman & Förster, 2009; Rim et al., 2012).  
Temporal estimates. Not only was a relation between construal level temporal 
distance demonstrated (Liberman et al., 2002), but also to how individuals construe 
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durations (McCrea et al., 2008). Time can be conceptualized as a feasibility concern and 
activities in the far future are usually construed with respect to their goals, I predict that 
individuals construing the mediated health information abstractly also estimate the 
related time intervals differently (e.g., how long it takes to get treated; H6b). 
Probability. Lastly, construal level theorizing has conceptualized probability (or 
likelihood) the fourth dimension of psychological distance (cp. Section 3.2). It is 
important to remember the egocentric nature of psychological distance in this context; 
distance is always relative to the person. In simple words, the more likely a thing is, the 
closer it appears to the self, because it also is more likely to happen to oneself. In 
contrast, an event with lower probability is more distant to the self. Hence, abstract 
construals have been tied to lower estimates of probability. Then too, concrete 
construals relate to higher probability estimates (Wakslak & Trope, 2009). Previous 
findings showed that a higher probability (low psychological distance) led to a higher 
salience of mean-related, concrete thoughts, whereas a lower probability, which equals 
a high psychological distance, led to more goal-relevant, abstract thoughts (Wakslak et 
al., 2006; A. Todorov, Goren, & Trope, 2007; Wakslak & Trope, 2009).  
Possible estimates about the occurrence or severity of a public health problems 
are relevant in this context, because the more severe it is and the more often it occurs, 
the closer it should appear to the individuals, because it is—in other words—more 
likely to happen to oneself. In H6, I predict that the mere processing of the health 
message in an abstract or concrete construal level mind-set will affect participants’ 
perceived psychological distance to the public health issue discussed in the message. 
Specifically, for probability this translates to the assumption that individuals in an 
abstract construal level mind-set estimate the likelihood that a public health issue as 
being lower, which corresponds to it being psychologically distant. On the opposite end, 
I assume that individuals in a concrete construal level mind-set estimate the likelihood 
of a specific public health issue as being higher and, therefore, psychologically closer to 
themselves (H6c).  
5.3 Exploratory Inquiry 
Subjective experience. So far, the extent to which the media user’s naïve 
judgment of the stimulus material detects the level of abstractness or concreteness has 
not been under investigation. Therefore, I suggest looking for indicators that allow 
comparing the media user’s subjective experience of the abstraction level presented in 
media with the other measures of abstract and concrete message construal. This has two 
  
64 
important objectives. Firstly, media and communication research is commonly 
concerned with judging media content in order to predict attitudes or behavior. In this 
research paradigm it would be of help to understand if and in how far the scientific 
modeling of a construct equates to the media user’s perception. Secondly, abstraction in 
media—especially audiovisual media fare—can be represented on a visual level (Navon, 
1977; Fujita et al., 2008; Libby et al., 2009; Amit, Wakslak, & Trope, 2013; Burgoon et 
al., 2013), on a semantic (Kay, 1971; Rosch, 1975; Kühnen, Hannover, & Schubert, 
2001; Henderson & Wakslak, 2010), or linguistic level alike (Semin & Fiedler, 1988; 
Semin & Smith, 1999; Beukeboom & de Jong, 2008; Fiedler, 2008; Semin, 2008; 
Hansen & Wänke, 2010; Burgoon et al., 2013). However, these dimensions are unlikely 
to factor in the user’s subjective experience of abstract or concrete presentation in the 
same way. The relationship of subjective perception and objectively measured construal 
level would further enable the first step to relate the mental construal level to different 
presentation modes.  
From the theoretical modeling of abstract and concrete construal levels thus far, 
the presentation of primary versus secondary information (Trope et al., 2007) as well as 
broad categories versus narrow categories (Förster, Liberman, & Shapira, 2009) 
constitutes two important factors that media users could make statements about. Further, 
the use of detailed versus abstract presentation could be a category where the actual 
presentation and the perceived presentation might overlap. The question is, how do the 
media user’s subjective perception of abstract and concrete presentation in the mediated 
message relate to their mental representation of the message (RQ1)? 
Narrative experience. A second field of inquiry is how the theoretical concepts 
construal level and action identification relate to the entertainment experiences of the 
media user during exposure to narrated media content. The first question would be, 
what is a narrative, especially in the context of persuasive health messages. What 
defines a narrative goes back to Aristotle’s Poetics (2008). I discuss narrative here as a 
mode of communication, rather than a formalized genre (Abbott, 2008). The event is 
one of three central components of a narrative. The second component is the character 
or characters of a narrative, which are the actors and subjects of the events. Thirdly, 
almost all narrative scholars discuss the recounting and connection of events and 
characters by an overt or covert narrator as defining part of the narrative. It is with such 
an open understanding of narrative that it can be considered a mode for both fictional 
and non-fictional media. Therefore, non-fictional persuasive health message can be 
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regarded as narratives, if they include characters and events (Tomaševskij, 1965; T. 
Todorov, 1972; Chatman, 1980; Prince, 1987; Genette, 1994; Abbott, 2008). A central 
concept of the media user’s experience during exposure to narratives is his/her 
involvement, which is often used as an umbrella term for different experiences during 
exposure to media narratives, such as narrative engagement (Busselle & Bilandzic, 
2009) or narrative presence (Lee, 2004).  
Some rather basic theoretical concepts are recurring in the different media 
experiences. They all relate to the individuals emotional and cognitive engagement with 
the narrative and its characters. The cognitive engagement includes phenomena such as 
the ease of cognitive access (Appel, Koch, Schreier, & Groeben, 2002) and a strong 
cognitive focus (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Green & Brock, 2000; Appel et al., 2002). 
When individuals focus their cognitive resources on the narrative world, they 
experience a loss of time (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Busselle & Bilandzic, 2009) and a 
loss of self-awareness (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2009).  
Taking the perspective of the narrative’s characters or engaging with them 
emotionally and cognitively is also a recurring prerequisite for narrative involvement. 
Empathy is a central component for the media user’s identification with a character 
(Zillmann, 1994; Cohen, 2001). It allows the media user to take the character’s 
perspective. Sympathy, on the other hand, is vital for the media user’s emotional 
involvement (Oatley, 1995). In this case, the audience does not feel the same emotions 
as the character, but actually feels emotions for the media characters (Busselle & 
Bilandzic, 2009).  
How narrative involvement relates to different construal levels has not been 
subject of investigation. One possible assumption could be that a more concrete 
construal level could lead to more involvement with the narration, because the media 
user concentrates more strongly on the secondary, concrete information about the 
characters and people in the media and therefore can experience empathy or sympathy 
for them with more ease. A more concrete construal level mind-set could also be 
associated with a stronger focus on the narrative’s specifics compared to the overall gist 
and allow a more detailed cognitive model of the story world (Green & Brock, 2002). 
Yet, alternative explanations are also plausible.  
Construal level and media presentation could offer the best opportunity for 
cognitive and emotional involvement when the construal level mind-set and the 
presentation of the information are congruent. From framing and persuasion it is well 
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known that motivational and mind-set congruency with message factors is an important 
gateway to attitude change. Mann, Sherman, and Updegraff (2004) found that gain and 
loss frames in health messages were most effective, if they were matched to the 
individual media user’s aversive or appetitive motivational orientation. Similar findings 
from Construal Level Theory research propose a congruency effect of construal level 
mind-set and abstract or concrete information. Implicit association tests show that 
words of concrete (vs. abstract) construal level are associated with words related to all 
four dimension of psychological distance. As predicted words of abstractness (value, 
categories) associated with words indicating distance (year 2525, there, they), while 
words of concreteness (item, detail) related to words indicating proximity (now, here) 
(Bar-Anan et al., 2006). Research suggests that the processing of information is most 
effective when presentation and construal level mind-set were congruent (Amit et al., 
2009; Amit et al., 2013). In addition, Fujita et al. (2008) demonstrated that people 
attended better to abstract (vs. concrete) arguments when the attitude object was distant 
(vs. near), which supposedly induced a more abstract construal level mind-set. If 
congruency of mind-set and message is processed with more ease, it could reduce 
counter-arguing as well. 
Finally, if abstract or concrete construal of media users influences involvement 
with the narrative, attitudes will be affected indirectly as well. Previous research 
suggests, for example, that empathy and sympathy with the media characters relate to 
more favorable attitudes or story-consistent attitudes (Bandura, 2004; Moyer-Gusé, 
2008; Murphy, Frank, Moran, & Patnoe-Woodley, 2011). Similarly, cognitive 
involvement with a narrative has shown to drastically reduce counter-arguing (Green & 
Brock, 2000; Slater & Rouner, 2002). Therefore, the research question relating 
construal level mind-set to the media use experiences asks how the media user’s 
narrative experience relates to the situational construal level mind-set, the mental 
representation of the message, the media user’s subjective perception of abstractness 
and concreteness in the mediated message, and the resulting attitudes (RQ2).  
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Table 1 
Overview of Research Hypotheses (H) and Research Questions (RQ) by Studies 
 Hypotheses & Research Questions Study 1 Study 2 
 Factors   
H1 The situated construal level mind-set during media 
exposure will predict the level of abstractness in the 
mental representation of the mediated health 
information. 
X X 
H1a Individuals in an abstract construal level mind-set 
during media exposure will represent the mediated 
health information more abstractly than individuals in a 
concrete construal level mind-set. 
X  
H1b Individuals in a good mood during media exposure will 
represent the mediated health information more 
abstractly than individuals in a negative mood. 
 X 
H2 Individuals with a more abstract action identification 
tendency will show a more abstract mental 
representation of the mediated health information than 
individuals with a concrete action identification 
tendency. 
X X 
H3 Individuals from a more collectivistic societal 
background will show a more abstract mental 
representation of the mediated health information than 
individuals from a more individualistic society. 
 X 
 Effects   
H4 Individuals in an abstract construal level mind-set 
during exposure to a mediated health message will 
show better recognition of primary information than 
participants in a concrete construal level mind-set, 
because they construed the information more 
abstractly. 
X  
H5 The mental construal of mediated health information 
affects individual’s attitudes towards a public health 
issue so that an abstract construal will lead to more 
positive attitudes and concrete construal will lead to 
more negative attitudes. 
X X 
H5a Individuals in an abstract construal level mind-set will 
show more positive attitudes towards the public health 
issue than individuals in a concrete construal level 
mind-set, because they construe the health-related 
information more abstractly. 
X  
H5b Individuals in a positive mood will show more positive 
attitudes towards a public health issue than individuals 
in a negative mood, because they construe the health-
related information more abstractly. 
 X 
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 Table continued Study 1 Study 2 
H5c Individuals with a more abstract action identification 
tendency will show more positive attitudes towards a 
public health issue, than individuals with a concrete 
action identification tendency, because they construe 
the health-related information more abstractly. 
X X 
H5d Individuals from a more collectivistic societal 
background will show more positive attitudes towards 
a public health issue than individuals from a more 
individualistic societal background, because they tend 
to construe the health-related information more 
abstractly. 
 X 
H6 The mental construal of mediated health information 
affects individual’s perceived psychological distance 
so that an abstract construal will lead to more 
psychological distance in the mental representations 
relative to concrete construal. 
X X 
H6a Individuals who construe mediated health messages in 
an abstract construal mind-set have a higher perceived 
spatial distance to the health topic than individuals in a 
concrete construal level mind-set. 
X  
H6b Individuals who construe mediated health messages in 
an abstract construal mind-set judge related time spans 
shorter than individuals in a concrete construal level 
mind-set. 
X  
H6c Individuals who construe mediated health messages in 
an abstract construal mind-set judge the likelihood 
concerning this health topic as lower than individuals 
in a concrete construal level mind-set. 
 X 
 Research Questions   
RQ 1 How does the media user’s subjective perception of 
abstractness and concreteness represented by the media 
fare relate to their construal of the mediated health 
messages? 
X  
RQ 2 How does the user’s narrative experience relate to the 
construal level mind-set, the construal of the message 
and the media user’s subjective perception of 
abstractness and concreteness in the message? 
X 
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6 Study 1 
Organ donation is one of the public health issues concerning both the individual 
and society. In Germany post-mortem organ donation is organized using opt-in 
declarations that are not centrally registered or managed, but carried along by the 
individuals. In 2014, while 80% of a representative German population sample declared 
a rather positive attitude toward post-mortem organ donation, only 35% actually have 
an organ donor card (Watzke, Schmidt, & Stander, 2015).12 The federal center for 
health education (BZgA) has made organ donation one of their central issues along with 
blood donation, HIV AIDS prevention, sexual health, and many others. Uncountable 
items of informative material exist and the topic continues to be in the public debate. As 
I argued before, little research exists assuming the abstract or concrete mind-set of 
individuals during media exposure as a factor in the persuasive process. Thus, the first 
study investigates how different construal level mind-sets during the exposure to a 
documentary about post-mortem organ donation impact the representation and resulting 
attitudes about post-mortem organ donation. According to the Construal Level Theory, 
the abstract or concrete construal level with which an information processing task is 
approached can influence how the information is understood and translated into a 
mental representation (Trope & Liberman, 2012). An abstract construal level relative to 
a concrete construal level mind-set results in more abstract mental representations and 
this includes mental representations about, “inanimate or animate objects, events, 
actions, and ideas” (Burgoon et al., 2013, p 503), as was argued in the introduction. 
Chapter 4 has furthermore identified individual propensity towards and more abstract or 
concrete construal of actions. The first study aims to manipulate the situated construal 
level of media users during the exposure to health information directly using a mind-set 
manipulation (H1a). This way the process could be established formally within the 
media use environment, and possible applications could be inferred. The study also tests 
the assumed influence of an individual disposition to approach new information with a 
more abstract or concrete action identification. The second hypothesis claims that the 
action identification disposition predicts individuals’ construal of mass media health 
messages (H2). In the literature review it was established further that abstract and 
concrete mental representations increase the accessibility of congruent attitude and 
                                                
12 The German organ donor cards also allow to indicate if someone does not want to be an organ 
donor. But only 4% of non-donors do have a declaration card. The public knowledge about the organ 
donor card system was relatively high in this represantative sample (98%). 
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judgment categories (cp. Section 3.3). Thus, the mind-set during media exposure is 
expected to affect memory recognition (H4), attitudes (H5a), and perceived 
psychological distance (H6a and H6b) mediated by the abstract or concrete mental 
representation (message construal) resulting from the mind-set. All hypotheses are 
summarized in the model displayed in Figure 2. To further understand the scope of the 
construal level assumptions in the media use situation the study investigates how 
subjective experiences of abstract and concrete presentation of media content relates to 
abstract and concrete mental construal (RQ1). Finally, since mass media often embed 
persuasive messages in narrative formats, the media user’s involvement with the media 
message was included as potential explanatory factor. Cognitively and emotionally 
involving sensations were considered. The related research question is, how the user’s 
experience during media exposure relates to abstract and concrete construal and to the 
attitudes media users report (RQ2).  
These hypotheses and research questions were investigated using an 
experimental design with self-report measures that were administered using paper and 
pencil. The study used and audiovisual target message consisting of a short 
documentary about post-mortem organ donation. The study had two ostensibly 
unrelated parts. The first part included a pretest questionnaire with the independent 
personality construct and the priming task, which was introduced as a test run for later 
research. This task was supposed to prime an abstract or concrete construal level mind-
set. A control group without a treatment was added to the design together with a second 
control group that was not exposed to the target message. In an unrelated second part of 
the study, participants watched the documentary. Once during the movie and 
immediately afterwards they were asked to list the thoughts they had while watching. 
Figure 2 
Model for Experiment 1 with hypotheses marked.  
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Then they answered questions that assessed the outcomes attitudes, psychological 
distance, and memory recognition.  
Conceptually this study concentrates on a direct mind-set manipulation and the 
individual difference factor as independent variables. The central hypothesis claims that 
the construal level mind-set during message processing affects the consequent attitudes 
and believes about the topic, through the different message construal, following the 
mind-set manipulation. Methodologically the study brings the initial criticism to bear 
that existing literature seldom measures construal level and most research literature is 
narrowed down to the abstraction of actions or objects. To counteract this critique, the 
message construal was operationalized using open thought listings. Because it is highly 
unlikely that participants could make a determination about the level of abstractness of 
their thoughts, the use of open thought listings is beneficial. Furthermore, open thought 
listings are not domain-focused. As a downside of these methods comes that the 
available options of coding open-answers in the Construal Level Theory framework are 
rather limited. In summary, semantic coding or linguistic coding schemes are possible. 
By far most often published is the coding scheme applying the linguistic category 
model (Semin & Fiedler, 1988; Coenen, Hedebouw, & Semin, 2006), which I have 
discussed previously in Section 3.3.1.  
To make sense of the thoughts, two coding schemes are pitted against each other 
in this first study. Both coding schemes claim to assess the theorized hierarchy of 
abstractness in language. The linguistic category model, according to Semin (2012), 
allows to assess language as a tool for the “communication about social events and their 
actors” (p. 312). With five categories (descriptive action verbs, interpretative action 
verbs, state action verbs, state verbs, and adjectives), which are differentiated on four 
levels of abstractness, the model seems to give room to interpersonal language that is 
not strictly referring to actions, through the categories of state action verbs and state 
verbs. Previous research supported this assumption. Ledgerwood, Wakslak, et al. (2010) 
utilized the linguistic framework in political speeches and found that politicians used 
more abstract language, when they considered their audience to hold different political 
views. Political speeches would involve not only action-related speech, but also a fair 
amount of attitude expression and therefore suggested that the linguistics category 
model can actually categorize speech beyond social events. 
However, little published research actually assesses attitudes in relation to 
construal levels. If they used thought listings, either the text production by participants 
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was forced to produce a specific text, for example, describing action or rephrasing 
actions (Beukeboom & de Jong, 2008) or open thought listings were assessed on a 
semantic level (Hong & Lee, 2010). This coding procedure was more correctly a 
dichotomous rating of the produced thoughts as abstract or concrete. Yet, it formally 
enabled the investigators to include more possible domains of abstractness, like whether 
the thought expresses an abstract desirability or more concretely the feasibility of an 
action; whether the thought is goal-oriented and therefore abstract or whether the 
thought is process-oriented and are thus concrete. Given the missing methodological 
standards for assessing abstract thinking in open thought listings as the general 
abstraction of actions, people, objects, and judgments alike, the study uses two 
established coding schemes to compare. As such, the study also aims to add to the 
methodological discourse on how to measure the construal level.  
6.1 Method 
6.1.1 Participants. 
A convenience sample of students at a German university was recruited on 
campus and through social media as part of a method-training course. A total of 62 
students came to the lab over the cause of four weeks. They could participate in an 
incentive lottery draw of ten book vouchers and a chocolate bar as direct reward. Five 
questionnaires were excluded, because they had large missing sections or a systematic 
response bias. Fifty-seven participants did participate (female 74.5 %) were between the 
ages of 18 and 26 (M = 21.24, SD = 2.16). One person did not report his or her age and 
one participant did not report sex. The sex of the participants was distributed equally 
across the three experimental groups, χ2 = 7.72, p = .052, but because the cell 
differences only marginally failed to reach the significance level, sex was considered as 
covariate in all computations.  
6.1.2 Procedure and design. 
The hypotheses were tested in a randomized experimental design (Abstract vs. 
Concrete Construal Level Mind-Set) with two control groups. One control group 
received no treatment to manipulate the construal level mind-set before watching the 
target clip. A second control group did not watch the movie only answer the attitude and 
memory recognition section. 
Participants were tested in groups of six in a lab with 15-inch laptops and 
headsets. They were randomly assigned groups and seats. After reading and agreeing to 
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the consent form, participants were informed about two experimental parts. They filled 
out the measure behavior identification form (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), assessing 
their individual action identification level. The experimental groups then worked on a 
procedural priming task to get into the routine of an abstract or concrete construal level 
mind-set before watching a documentary about organ donation. The control group was 
directed to watch the movie immediately after the pretest questionnaire. The movie was 
set on full screen for all participants before entering. Volume was adjusted to medium. 
The instructions told them how to start the video and adjust the volume. After approx. 
half of the movie (7.5 minutes), a green screen appeared for the participants with 
instructions to pause the movie and fill out the first thought-listing task. Instructions for 
the task asked to list five thoughts that they remember having during the movie. 
Participants were asked to list only full sentences. Afterwards they were directed to 
continue the movie. After the movie was finished (approx. 15 minutes) they were 
instructed for a second time to list their thoughts during the movie.  
The second part of the study was introduced after the second thought listing. 
Participants were directed to a post-exposure questionnaire booklet with items on their 
attitude, memory recognition, perceived psychological distance, and social 
demographics.  
The second baseline control group did not watch the movie and only filled out 
the post-exposure questionnaire parts not pertaining to the movie. This included the 
attitude questionnaire, memory recognition test, psychological distance items, and 
social demographics to control for the influence of the movie on the dependent attitude 
variables.  
After participants finished their questionnaires they were thanked, given the 
option to participate in the draw of the book vouchers, and offered a chocolate bar. 
They were released with a short debriefing letter. 
6.1.3 Material: Target message. 
An organ donation documentary from German public broadcasting station was 
used, which was first screened in 2012 (Rosenkranz, 2012). The movie is narrated by an 
off-voice. The edited version included three story lines to present both pro and con 
arguments for organ donation: A boy waiting for an organ transplant and his parents, 
who were highly favorable towards organ donation; a medical doctor at a transplant 
center, who is clearly describing positive and negative effects of organ donation; and a 
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mother, who lost her son at the age of 17 and agreed to donate his organs, but now 
suffers from her decision.  
6.1.4 Independent variables. 
Construal level mind-set. The experimental manipulation was set out to prime 
participant’s situational construal level mind-set. Each participant filled out a modified 
version of Freitas, Gollwitzer, and Trope’s (2004) how-and-why-task set. In this task, 
participants are presented with an action (e.g., “climbing a tree”) and are asked either 
how or why they would perform the action. For every generated answer they are asked 
why or how again. This was repeated four times. Asking how should encourage people 
to describe details of the behavior they performed, corresponding to a low construal 
level, while asking why should lead to more abstract reflections on the overall goal of a 
behavior, corresponding to a high construal level (Freitas et al., 2004). To allow 
sufficient time for the procedural mind-set manipulation to work, the participants did 
the task for three separate actions.  
Action identification. As second independent variable participant’s dispositional 
tendency to identify actions in abstract or concrete terms was tested using a total of 11 
items from the Behavior Identification Form (BIF, Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Every 
item consisted of a behavior description, such as “driving a car”. Participants were then 
given two possible descriptions of this behavior, one of which was goal-oriented and 
corresponding to high-level action identification (e.g., “getting around”) and one was 
action-oriented, focusing on the means to reach a goal (concrete action identification, 
e.g., “putting the key into the ignition”). Scale consistency was acceptable in the sample 
(M = 5.93, SD = 2.58, n = 44, Cronbach’s α = .72). Abstract alternatives were scored 1 
and concrete alternatives with 0. Participant’s individual action identification tendency 
was defined as number of abstract action alternatives chosen on the BIF and ranged 
from 0 to 11 (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989).  
6.1.5 Dependent variables. 
Message construal – linguistic category model. To approximate the construal 
level mind-set during message processing, the level of abstractness (vs. concreteness) in 
the participant’s mental representation after exposure was measured using a thought-
listing task. Participants were asked to list five thoughts that came to their mind in the 
middle of exposure and again five thoughts immediately after watching. These open 
answers were coded using the linguistic category model (LCM) coding manual (Coenen 
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et al., 2006). It allows categorizing the thoughts based on the groups identified by 
Semin and Fiedler (1988). Coding was restricted to the main categories of verbs and 
adjectives including auxiliaries, linking verbs, and subordinate clauses as described in 
the manual. A blind coder was trained based on pretest’s thought listings. After three 
tests, in which the author and coder met to discuss and finalize the application of the 
manual in German, inter-coder reliability between the author and coder was computed 
based on 10% of the total data set (Coenen et al., 2006). The reliability was satisfactory 
(Cohen’s κ = .73). For the first (t1) and second thought-listing task (t2) a single 
linguistic category score was calculated, as well as a total score from both thought-
listing tasks. Scores range from 1 (detailed) to 4 (very abstract). Two participants were 
identified as outliers (z > 3.29) and eliminated from the analyses.  
A dependent t-test of the linguistic category score tested for a systematic 
difference at the two time points of the thought-listing task. The linguistic category 
score differed between t1 and t2 only in the abstract experimental group, Mdiff = 0.36; 
t(13) = 2.87, p < .05, and thus suggested an additional separate analysis of t1 and t2. I 
will call this linguistic measurement of message construal the LCM score in the 
analyses. 
Message construal – semantic categorization. To offset the linguistic approach 
to abstract and concrete construal, the thought listings were also scrutinized according 
to their semantic value. Based on a approach suggested by Hong and Lee (2010), a 
graduate student assistant trained by the principle investigator and blind to the 
experimental conditions rated the participants’ thoughts as long as they related to the 
target movie or the target issue organ donation. Thoughts were scored as 1 (abstract) if 
they were made in reference to the participant’s general impression and evaluation of 
the movie or organ donation (“Why do people decide against organ donation?”, “I liked 
that the movie showed various perspectives on organ donation”). The thoughts were 
scored as 0 (concrete) if they made any reference to specifics or details of the movie or 
organ donation (“I feel sorry for the boy in the beginning [of the movie]”,”I try to put 
myself in their shoes”).13 The scores were summed up to an abstract thought index 
ranging from 0 (concrete) to 10 (abstract). The mean across groups was M = 5.42  
(SD = 2.53). I will call this semantic measurement of message construal abstraction 
score in the analyses, in contrast to the LCM score. 
                                                
13 Translations of German thoughts by the author. 
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Memory recognition items. A memory recognition task based on the 
documentary was designed for this study and included only memory recognition items 
that focused on primary and abstract information about organ donation rather than 
concrete issues depicted by the movie. Eight health statements were provided in a 
dichotomous forced choice task. Participants were asked to rate them as factually 
correct or incorrect. The chosen statements all occurred in the 15-minute-long edited 
versions of the documentary. Examples were, “After an organ transplant the patient will 
need drugs” (right) or “Brain death means the patients is able to breath independently” 
(wrong). Right answers were coded with 1 and wrong answers were coded with 0. For 
hypothesis testing the sum of right answers was calculated. The mean across all groups 
was M = 6.83 (SD = 1.11). 
Attitudes towards organ donation. Ten items from Gassmann, Vorderer, and 
Wirth (2003) were adopted and translated to assess attitudes towards organ donation. 
The items belonged to the three sub-dimensions: communicative (4 items, F2 in Table 
2). Participants rated the items from 1 (does not apply at all) to 6 (applies fully). A 
confirmatory factor analysis was computed to validate the sub-dimensions of the 
attitude measure, but the model fit was very poor according to Byrne (2010). 
Modifications yielded no admissible solution with the small sample at hand, Figure 4 
displays the tested model. This was followed by an exploratory factor analysis to assess 
possible changes in the factor solution. Gassmann et al. (2003) obtained the original 
factor solution using a Varimax rotation, which might be problematic (Kline, 1994), as 
the attitude sub-sets are likely to be moderately correlated. Despite the small sample  
(N = 57), the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure deemed the sample adequate for a factor 
analysis (KMO = .75) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity showed that the correlations 
among the items were sufficiently large, χ2(45) = 147.80, p < .05. Three factors 
emerged based on the Kaiser-criterion (Eigenvalue > 1, Oblimin rotation). The scree 
plot unambiguously supported the decision for three factors (cp. Figure 3). The factor 
solution explains 67.22 % of the variance. Table 2 shows the rotated item solution and 
the properties of the subscales. The first factor, Behavioral Intentions, refers to the 
direct behavioral intent to act as organ donor and mirrors the original concrete 
behavioral intention subscale (Gassmann et al., 2003), but now includes the item, “I 
consider organ donation from people diagnosed with brain death acceptable”.  
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Figure 3  
Scree plot of organ donation attitude factor analysis. 
Communicative Action Intention, the second factor, represents the extent to 
which individuals are willing to communicate their own behavioral intention and to 
inform others. Here one item was dropped from the original measurement. Finally, the 
factor General Acceptance summarizes the attitudes towards the practice of organ 
donation. With minor corrections here the item solutions mimic the original scale. 
Possibly because of the selection of only three sub-dimensions these loading changes 
might have occurred. 
Temporal distance. Another item was constructed to assess the temporal 
psychological distance the participants associate with the health message. The item 
again referred to a hypothetical person, Conrad, who is introduced as doctor of a patient, 
whom needs an organ-transplant. The patient is in fifth place on the transplant list. 
Participants are asked: “How long do you estimate will the patient have to wait for a 
transplant?” The open field asked for an estimate in days. Mean of the estimates was  
M = 247.76 (SD = 32.54).  
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Table 2  
Exploratory Factor Analysis of the Attitudes Towards Organ Donation with Oblimin 
Rotation 
  Rotated Factor Loadings 
Item Behavioral Intention 
Com. Action 
Intention 
General 
Acceptance 
O10re - I refuse becoming an organ donor in 
case of my brain death.* .79   
O9 - I would accept if my organs are 
removed from me in case I suffer brain 
death, even if I haven’t got a signed organ 
donor card.  
.71   
O1 - I consider organ donation from people 
diagnosed with brain death acceptable.  .54   
O5 - I plan to fill out an organ donor card 
soon.   .82  
O6 - I will obtain more information on the 
issue.  .72  
O11 - In the future I will suggest to my 
family and friends to obtain an organ donor 
card.   
.49  
O8 - In the future I will let my family know 
how I feel about organ donation so they 
know how to choose in case I would suffer 
brain death. 
.22 .33  
O3re I feel removing organs from brain-
dead patients is a desecration of dead bodies.   −.22 .85 
O2re - In my opinion removing organs from 
people diagnosed as brain-dead degrades 
them to a spare parts warehouse.  
.20  .64 
O4re - In my opinion removing organs 
violates the dying’s right to die with dignity.  .49  .48 
Eigenvalues 4.32 1.35 1.10 
% of variance 43.19 13.48 10.55 
M 
(SD)  
4.70 
(1.05) 
4.76 
(1.30) 
3.86 
(1.67) 
Cronbach’s α .72 .74 .76 
Note. N = 55. Items were translated into English by author. Item names with the suffix –re designate 
reverse scored items. German items can be reviewed in Appendix 10.1. Loadings below .2 are not 
printed. KMO = .75. *In the original measurement model this item was part of the General Acceptance 
subscale.  
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Figure 4  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of proposed measurement model by Gassmann et al. 
(2003). F1 = General Acceptance, F2 = Communicative Action Intention,  
F3 = Concrete Action Intention. Model fit: 2(66) = 123.78, p < .05, CMIN/df = 1.88, 
comparative fit index (CFI) = .860, root mean square error approximation  
(RMSEA) = 0.090, 90% CI [0.065, 0.114], and standardized root mean square of 
residuals (SRMR) = .090. Scores in the figure represent standardized estimates. 
Narrative involvement. To assess narrative involvement with the target message 
a total of nine items assessed the dimensions of, empathy ("The documentary affected 
me emotionally", Green & Brock, 2000), sympathy ("I worried for some of the 
characters”, Busselle & Bilandzic, 2009), narrative realism ("The documentary was 
logic", Busselle & Bilandzic, 2009), ease of cognitive access ("I could easily follow the 
action an events", Appel et al., 2002), narrative involvement (3 items, e.g., "While 
viewing I wanted to know how the events would unfold", Green & Brock, 2000; Appel 
et al., 2002), and loss of time (2 items, e.g., "During the documentary, I lost track of 
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time.", Busselle & Bilandzic, 2009).14 The answer options ranged from 1 (does not 
apply at all) to 6 (applies fully). A list of all items can be found in Table 3. The 
selection of items was done ad-hoc from existing scales for the constructs determined to 
comprise narrative involvement. The goal was to economically cover various parts of 
the construct. An exploratory factor analysis was computed to assess the dimensionality 
of the construct. Again, despite the small sample size, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure 
proved that the sample was adequate for a factor analysis (KMO = .65) and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity proved that the correlations among the items were sufficiently large, 
χ2(36) = 138.57, p < .05. 
Two factors emerged based on the Kaiser-criterion (Eigenvalue > 1, Varimax 
rotation). The scree plot backs the factor extraction unambiguously (cp. Figure 5). The 
factor solution explains 57.61 % of the variance. The items clustering on Factor 1 
summarized a predominantly emotional involvement (M = 4.71, SD = 0.92, n = 45), 
while items on Factor 2 captured various instances of cognitive involvement (M = 4.17, 
SD = 0.94, n = 45). The factor loadings and the reliability assessment revealed that the 
item for ease of cognitive access had low accuracy (item-total correlation) and was 
therefore dropped from the scale.  
Table 3 
Exploratory Factor Analysis of Narrative Involvement with Varimax Rotation 
 Rotated Factor Loadings 
Item Emotional Involvement 
Cognitive 
Involvement 
The documentary affected me emotionally. .83  
The documentary was thought provoking.  .76 .29 
I worried for some of the characters. .48  I could easily follow the action and events.* −.42 .33 
I was mentally involved in the story while 
viewing.NI  .54 .73 
The documentary seemed to drag.LT (−)  .67 While viewing I wanted to know how the events 
would unfold.NI .26 .57 
During the documentary, I lost track of time.LT .26 .55 
The documentary was logic.  .49 Eigenvalues 3.60 1.62 
% of variance 40.02 17.98 
Cronbach’s α .69 .76 
Note. NI = Narrative Involvement, LT = Loss of Time, *Item deleted due to loadings. Loadings below .2 
are not printed. KMO = .65. 
                                                
14 The items were partially adapted for the purpose of this study.  
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Figure 5  
Scree plot of the narrative involvement factor analysis 
Subjective abstractness. To measure the participant’s subjective judgment of 
abstract and concrete presentation within the target message, a ten-item scale was 
derived based on the theorizing in the existing literature. Three items pertained to the 
perceived level of detail-richness in (a) the visual presentation, (b) the subject 
presentation, and (c) the character presentation. Answer options were 1 (little detail) to 
6 (very much detail). Seven items pertained to matters of abstract (vs. concrete) 
presentation, for example, the amount of particulars (vs. primary information) in the 
presentation (Trope & Liberman, 2000) or the level of inclusiveness the documentary 
provided (Rosch, 1975; P. K. Smith & Trope, 2006). Items read, “In the documentary 
many interesting details were mentioned” or “The documentary represented the lives of 
everyone waiting for an organ transplant” (cp. all items in Table 4). As this 
measurement was an ad-hoc instrument an exploratory factor analysis was computed to 
explore its dimensionality. Again, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure deemed the small 
sample adequate for a factor analysis (KMO = .62) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
established that the correlations among the items were sufficiently large,  
χ2(45) = 129.20, p < .05. Three factors emerged based on the Kaiser-criterion 
(Eigenvalue > 1, Varimax rotation).15 The scree plot was ambiguous; it showed a steady 
decline of Eigenvalues with no particular inflexion (cp. Figure 6). The suggested factor 
solution explains 62.53 % of the variance. Table 4 displays the factor solution.  
 
                                                
15 An oblimin rotation yielded no pattern matrix after 25 iterations. 
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Table 4 
Exploratory Analysis of Subjective Abstractness with Varimax rotation 
  Rotated Factor Loadings 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
The documentary represented the lives of everyone 
waiting for an organ transplant. −.62 .34  
The documentary gave a rough overview of the 
topic. .59 .56  
The presentation with regard to content was 
abstract/concrete. .58  .49 
The presentation of the characters was 
abstract/concrete. .55   
The visual presentation was abstract/concrete. .54   The documentary dealt with the issue very 
superficially.  .26 .65  
The documentary described the topic very 
abstractly.   .62  
In the documentary many concrete examples were 
mentioned. .35 .58 .22 
The documentary dealt with the topic very 
concretely.    .62 
In the documentary many interesting details were 
mentioned. .30 .21 .48 
Eigenvalues 3.45 1.71 1.10 
% of variance 34.47 17.15 10.90 
Note. Items translated into English by author. Table shows a Varimax rotation. Loadings below .2 are not 
printed. KMO = .62. 
 
Figure 6  
Scree plot of subjective abstractness factor analysis 
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A clear interpretation of factor loadings is not possible due to a substantial 
number of double loadings, particularly because most of the loadings are only 
moderately large to begin with.An overall mean index of all ten items has a Cronbach’s 
α of .68. The item “The documentary represented the lives of everyone waiting for an 
organ transplant” was removed due to its lack of accuracy (cp. Table 4). The nine-item 
solution had a satisfactory Cronbach’s α of .78 (M = 2.73, SD = 0.67, n = 45) and is 
used in the analysis.  
Social demographics. Age and sex were assessed as social demographic 
variables. 
6.2 Results 
6.2.1 Preliminary analyses. 
Randomization check. To check if the randomization had worked across the 
experimental groups, a one-way independent ANOVA tested whether the means of the 
individual difference factor action identification measured by the BIF (Behavior 
Identification Form, Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) differed across experimental groups. 
Within the small sample the BIF scores were normally distributed (zskewness = 0.93, 
zkurtosis = 1.49) and homogeneity of variances could be assumed, F(2,42) = 0.27, p > .05. 
There were no group differences of individual preference for abstract or concrete 
behavior identification, F(2,42) = 0.24, p > .05, suggesting that the randomization had 
worked. The groups were further indistinguishable in terms of age, F(3,50) = 0.65; p 
> .05 and sex, χ2(3) = 7.72, p > .05.16 Furthermore, the participants who already had an 
organ donor card were of interest within the study. They were also randomly distributed 
across the experimental and control groups, χ2(3) = .78, p > .05 (cp. Table 5 and  
Table 6). 
Manipulation check. To test the effectiveness of the construal level mind-set 
manipulation, a one-way ANOVA with a contrast test for a linear trend was computed. 
It was expected that the concrete construal level mind-set manipulation led to less 
abstract thoughts about the message (message construal) than the no-manipulation 
control group showed. Similarly, the abstract construal level mind-set condition was 
expected to display more abstract thoughts about the message than the control or the 
concrete mind-set condition.  
                                                
16 Age: zskewness = 1.97, zkurtosis = –0.85, homogeneity of variances F(3,50) = 1.34, p > .05. 
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Table 5  
Means and Confidence Intervals of BIF and Age Across Experimental Groups 
  BIF Age 
Experimental 
Groups M(SD) 
95% CI 
[LL,UL] M(SD) 
95% CI 
[LL,UL] 
 control 7.80 (2.65) [6.44, 9.27] 20.57 (1.91) [19.47, 21.67] 
 concrete 7.81
 (2.81) [6.32, 9.31] 21.31 (2.02) [20.23, 22.39] 
 abstract 7.21 (2.42) [5.82, 8.61] 21.57 (2.17) [20.32, 22.83] 
 control 2 - 21.60 (2.72) [19.66, 23.54] 
 
Table 6 
Distribution of Sex and Organ Donor Cards Across Experimental Groups 
  Sex 
Organ Donor 
Card 
Participants 
Total 
Experimental Groups female male yes no n 
 control 11 4 4 11 15 
 concrete 15 1 5 11 16 
 abstract 7 7 5 9 14   control 2 8 2 2 8 10 
 total 41 14 16 39 55 
 
The manipulation effect overall was non-significant by traditional standards, 
F(2,38) = 2.64, p = .09, ω2 = .06 (cp. Figure 7). No significant linear trend emerged, 
F(2,38) = 2.02, p > .05, ω2 = .03. To further evaluate these results planned non-
orthogonal contrasts were conducted and significant results were further probed with a 
Tukey adjustment for multiple comparisons.17  
As predicted the planned contrasts indicated that participants in the abstract 
construal condition showed a higher mean message construal (LCM score) (M = 3.29, 
SD = 0.25) than the control condition (M = 3.09, SD = 0.22), t(38) = 2.25, p < .05,  
r = 0.34. After probing the mean difference, 0.20, (SE = 0.09, 95% CI [−0.02, 0.42]), 
with a Tukey correction it only approached significance (p = .075). This lends some 
support to the assumption that the abstract construal level mind-set manipulation had 
worked. Contrary to the expectations, the control group had the lowest message 
construal of all three groups. The mean difference between the abstract and the concrete 
                                                
17 Non-orthogonal contrasts are prone to type-I errors, the adjustments usually include a more 
conservative α-level. At the same time these tests have less power to detect effects. Gonzalez (2009) 
suggests Tukey as correction for pairwise comparisons in the case that all pairwise comparisons are 
planned.  
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condition was not significant; neither was the difference between the concrete condition 
and the control condition (cp. Table 7).  
Table 7 
Means for Abstract Representation by Experimental Group for LCM and Hong&Lee 
Coding 
    LCM Score Abstraction Score (Hong&Lee) 
Experimental Groups M  (SD) M  (SD) 
 control 3.09
ab  (0.22) 5.60de  (2.64) 
 n 15 15 
 concrete 3.15
ac  (0.24) 3.86df  (1.96) 
 n 12 14 
 abstract 3.29
bc  (0.25) 6.79ef  (2.15) 
 n 15 14 Note. Higher scores indicate more abstract message representation. LCM scores ranged from 1 (concrete) 
to 4 (abstract), the abstraction score according to Hong & Lee ranged from 1 (concrete) to 10 (abstract). 
a Planned contrast control vs. concrete construal level group was not significant, t(38) = 0.65, p > .05,  
r = .10. 
b Planned contrast control vs. abstract construal level group was significant, t (38) = 2.25, p < .05, r = .34. 
c Planned contrast concrete vs. abstract construal level group was not significant, t (38) = 1.48, p > .05,  
r = .23. 
d Planned contrast control vs. concrete construal level group was significant, t (40) = −2.06, p < .05,  
r = .31. 
e Planned contrast control vs. abstract construal level group was significant, t (40) = 3.40, p < .05. r = .22. 
f Planned contrast concrete vs. abstract construal level group was not significant, t (40) = 3.40, p < .05,  
r = .47. 
As this experiment included a second coding scheme to assess the participants’ 
message construal in the thought listings, the abstraction score based on Hong and Lee 
(2010) was used in the same one-way ANOVA to compare the effects. This test showed 
that the effect of the manipulation on this measure of message construal was significant,  
F(2,40) = 5.86, p < .05, ω2 = .18 (cp. Figure 8). For this measurement of message 
construal a significant linear trend emerged, F(2,40) = 11.56, p < .05, ω2 = .22. Planned 
contrasts demonstrated that the concrete construal level mind-set manipulation led to 
smaller abstraction scores and therefore less abstract message construal compared to the 
control group, t(40) = −2.06, p < .05, r = 0.31 and compared to the abstract construal 
mind-set manipulation, t(40) = −3.40, p < .05, r = 0.47. These mean differences were 
probed with a Tukey correction for multiple comparisons. The mean difference between 
the control group and concrete construal level mind-set condition, −1.74 (SE = 0.85, 
95% CI [−3.80, 0.32]) was no longer significant (p > .05). 
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Figure 8  
Mean plots of the abstraction score across the experimental conditions. 
The mean difference between the concrete and abstract construal level mind-set 
condition, −2.93 (SE = 0.86, 95% CI [−5.02, −0.83]) withheld this probe. The abstract 
construal level mind-set manipulation did not differ significantly from the control 
condition. The initial results showed that, depending on which outcome measure was 
used, the manipulation worked only partially and this has to be considered interpreting 
the hypotheses tests. 
2.95%3.00%3.05%
3.10%3.15%3.20%
3.25%3.30%3.35%
Concrete%Construal%Level% Control%Condition% Abstract%Construal%Level%Treatment%LCM%Score%(1%"concret "%to%4%"abstract")%
Figure 7 
Mean plots of LCM Score across the experimental conditions. 
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8%
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Descriptive analyses. Before checking the hypotheses, zero-order correlations 
among the mediators, the dependent variables, and some central covariates were 
analyzed. First it should be noticed that the two applied measures of abstract or concrete 
message construal, the LCM and the abstraction score based on Hong and Lee (2010), 
showed no correlation (cp. Table 8).  
The LCM score did have a significant moderately negative correlation with the 
participants’ dispositional action identification tendency (BIF, r = −.39). According to 
this, participants with a more concrete action identification propensity had on average a 
more abstract message construal. Probing this relationship for both measuring time 
points separately, only the LCM score at t2 had this negative correlation (r = −.29) with 
the BIF. The LCM measured at the two time points seemed to differ in other instances 
as well. The LCM score at t1 correlated negatively with two attitude dimensions, while 
t2 did not demonstrate any significant relationship with the attitude sub-dimensions. 
This means, an abstract message construal at t1 was associated with less general 
acceptance of post-mortem organ donation and less intentions to get active in terms of 
communicating about organ donation. What was more, the LCM score at t1 was 
negatively related to both social distance items, while the compound score and the 
single t2 score were not related to the social distance items. An association with the 
attitude and judgment outcomes thus is mostly established at t1. The reversed picture 
was true for the relationship with the narrative involvement. Here the second thought-
listing tasks’ LCM score was moderately negative related to both Cognitive  
(r = −.34) and Emotional Involvement (r = −.43), whereas the score from the first 
thought listing was not. No associations were found between the Hong & Lee 
abstraction score and any of the outcome measures. It is therefore not of any use in 
analyses that include the outcome constructs. In the hypotheses testing the mediation 
through message construal only the LCM score will be assessed. 
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Memory recognition also remained unrelated to any other outcome. 
Inconsistently, only one of the two social distance items was related negatively with the 
attitude subscales Communicative Behavioral Intention (r = −.55) and Acceptance  
(r = −.31). The temporal distance item did not relate to any other outcome. Lastly, the 
age of the participants had some small to medium correlations with the t2 LCM score, 
the Communicative Behavioral Intention subscale of the attitude measure, and with 
emotional narrative involvement. Therefore it was considered as covariate in the 
analyses including those constructs. 
6.2.2 Situational construal level and individual disposition as factors. 
Main analyses. In Hypothesis 1a, I predicted an experimental effect of the 
construal level mind-set manipulation on the abstract or concrete mental representation 
of the message by the participants. The control group should demonstrate an average 
message construal, which should be more abstract than the concrete manipulation 
group’s construal but less abstract than the message construal of the abstract mind-set 
condition. Similarly, H2 predicted a positive effect of the abstract or concrete action 
identification tendency on the abstract or concrete mental construal of the health 
message. The tests of Hypotheses 1a and 2 thus largely resembled the manipulation 
check, but controlled the covariance of the individual difference factor action 
identification. The randomization check already demonstrated that the individual action 
identification was independent from the experimental groups and thus assured the 
appropriateness of conducting an ANCOVA, using the message construal measured in 
the thought listings as outcome, the experimental groups as factor, and action 
identification as covariate. The same non-orthogonal contrasts as in the manipulation 
check were selected. Both manipulation groups were compared individually with the 
non-manipulation control group and the concrete and abstract manipulation conditions 
were compared against one another. Effects were probed with a Šidák correction.18 
LCM score. The data showed that the participants’ individual action 
identification tendency was significantly related to the message construal measured 
according to the linguistic category model, F(1,37) = 6.48, p < .05, ηp2 = .15. Moreover, 
the marginal effect of the covariate was negative, b = −0.04 (SE = 0.01), and therefore 
contrary the suggested direction of H2. The higher the participants’ individual action 
                                                
18 The ANCOVA procedure only offers limited post-hoc corrections. According to Field (2013), 
the Šidák-correction is slightly less rigid than the Bonferroni-correction, thus imposing slightly less 
power loss on the test. 
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identification tendency was, the more concrete they represented the health information. 
Therefore H2 is not supported.  
The main effect of the mind-set manipulations remained marginally non-
significant after controlling for the effect of the individual action identification tendency 
(F(2,37) = 2.57, p = .09, ηp2 = .12) and the linear trend was also not significantly 
different from zero (p > .05). Planned contrasts established that, while controlling for 
the influence of the covariate, getting the abstract mind-set manipulation (M = 3.29,  
SE = 0.06) increased the LCM score compared to the control group (M = 3.11,  
SE = 0.06, t(37) = 2.15, p < .05, r = .33). The effect did not withstand Šidák adjustment 
for multiple comparisons (p > .05). Furthermore, while controlling for the influence of 
the individual difference in action identification, participants in the abstract construal 
level mind-set manipulation condition still showed higher LCM scores (M = 3.29,  
SE = 0.06) compared to the participants in the low construal level manipulation group 
(M = 3.14, SE = 0.07), but the difference was marginally non-significant t(37) = −1.67, 
p = .10, r = .27. With the Šidák adjustment this comparison became non-significant  
(p > .10). H1a is thus only partially supported.  
Additional analyses − Hong and Lee abstraction score. Using the semantic 
abstraction score (Hong & Lee, 2010) as measurement for message construal in the 
same ANCOVA changed the results very little in comparison to the LCM score. H1a 
received partial confirmation again. The experimental groups significantly differed on 
this level of message construal (F(2,39) = 5.71, p < .05, ηp2 = .23), while controlling for 
the influence of the covariate action identification. A linear trend estimate, 2.07  
(SE = 0.62), was different from 0 (95% CI [0.82, 3.32]). The planned contrasts 
suggested that participants of the concrete construal level mind-set condition (M = 3.85, 
SE = 0.62) differed significantly in their message construal from those in the abstract 
mind-set condition (M = 6.78, SE = 0.62), when controlling for the influence of the 
covariate (t(39) = −3.36, p < .05, r = .47). Probing this effect with a Šidák-corrected 
comparison made no difference (p < .05).  
With the covariate in the model, the concrete construal level condition led, as 
predicted, to lower abstraction scores compared to the control group (M = 5.61,  
SE = 0.60). This mean difference, −1.76 (SE = 0.86) was significant (p < .05), however, 
the Šidák correction made the effect disappear (p > .05). As projected, the abstraction 
scores in the abstract construal level mind-set condition (M = 6.78, SE = 0.62) were 
higher than the control conditions’ (M = 5.61, SE = 0.60). The difference was non-
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significant when controlling for the covariate action identification, t(39) = −1.40,  
p > .05, r = .21.  
In this model the covariate, participants’ individual action identification 
tendency, was not significantly related to the message construal, F(1,39) = 0.19, p > .05, 
ηp2 = .00. Based on these analyses, both the abstraction score measure based on Hong 
and Lee (2010) as well as the LCM score allowed only partial confirmation of H1. The 
predicted influence of the individual difference in action identification tendency on the 
abstraction of the health message was also not supported by the data (H2).  
Summary. The LCM measurement of message construal had correlations with 
some outcome measures and covariates, whereas the Hong & Lee abstraction score as 
measure of message construal does not. A missing correlation between the 
measurements deemed the abstraction score hard to interpret. The more established 
measurement is the LCM score. As an immediate result only the LCM-based message 
construal will be considered in the hypotheses tests hereafter. In this case, especially the 
abstract construal level mind-set condition is of interest, as the manipulation check 
revealed that only the abstract manipulation had the predicted effect.   
6.2.3 Memory recognition.19 
For the memory recognition of the health issue, I predicted that participants in an 
abstract construal level mind-set during the exposure to a mediated health message will 
show better recognition of primary information than participants in a concrete construal 
level mind-set, because their message construal of the information is more abstract (H4). 
Again, the control group should display medium memory recognition of primary facts 
and have higher memory recognition compared to the concrete construal level mind-set 
group. This hypothesized mediation model was estimated using ordinary least squares 
path analysis with the PROCESS Macro for SPSS (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Hayes, 
2013; Hayes & Preacher, 2014). The construal level conditions were dummy coded 
using the control condition as reference condition. The two dummy variables and the 
individual action identification tendency were used as factors. The message construal 
(LCM score) was used as mediator in the model (cp. Figure 9). First of all, message 
construal (hereafter only LCM score based message construal) had a direct effect on the 
recognition of primary information about the health topic. Participants with more 
                                                
19 All 95% Confidence intervalls reported in the following analyses were bootstrapped from 
10,000 samples, unless noted otherwise. 
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abstract message construal showed a better memory recognition, b = 1.40, SE = 0.68, 
95% BCa CI [0.02, 2.63] than participants with a relatively more concrete construal of 
the message. There were no direct effects of the abstract (b = −0.01, SE = 0.34, 95% 
BCa CI [−0.73, 0.69]) and concrete construal level mind-set on the memory recognition 
(b = 0.15, SE = 0.37, 95% BCa CI [−0.48, 1.03]). The 95% BCa CI [−0.14, 0.56] for the 
indirect effect of the concrete mind-set condition (relative to the control group) on 
memory recognition through the abstract or concrete message construal  
(b = 0.18, SE = 0.18) included zero. 
 
Figure 9  
Statistical diagram for the hypothesis test of H4, eM = measurement error of the 
mediator, eY = measurement error of the outcome variable. 
Similarly, there was no indirect effect for the abstract construal level condition (relative 
to the control condition) on memory recognition through the message construal, because 
the 95% BCa CI included zero (b = 0.25, SE = 0.18, 95% BCa CI [−0.03, 0.68]). The 
action identification tendency did relate to the memory recognition score in the 
expected manner. The more abstract the action identification tendency, the better the 
recognition of primary information was (b = 0.19, SE = 0.06, 95% BCa CI [0.07, 0.30]). 
No indirect effect of the individual action identification tendency on memory 
recognition, through construal of the health message, was found. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is 
rejected. The very small coefficient (b = −0.05, SE = 0.03, 95% BCa CI [−0.11, 0.00]) 
for the effect of BIF on message construal further resembled the counterintuitive effect 
direction already produced in Section 6.2.2, in the test of H2. This supports the decision 
to reject H2 and the assumption that the individual difference in abstract or concrete 
action identification influences the applied message construal of the participants. 
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Additional analyses. The second control group came to use at this point to 
substantiate the assessment of memory recognition. It was assessed whether the 
memory recognition answers were too easy, and whether they were answered equally 
well by participants, who had not seen the documentary. The mean differences between 
the second control group and the other conditions were tested using an ANOVA. Table 
9 shows the participants who had not watched the documentary had the lowest sum 
score of correct answers of all conditions. Planned contrasts compared the second 
control group against all others and showed that all mean differences were significant 
when compared to the non-manipulation control group (t(43) = −2.85, p < .05), the 
concrete manipulation (t(43) = 3.89, p < .05), and the abstract manipulation condition 
(t(43) = −3.38, p < .05). All contrasts remained significant after a Bonferroni correction 
for multiple comparisons (p < .05). This suggests that memory recognition was, in fact, 
due to watching the documentary and less likely common knowledge. 
 
 Figure 10  
Ordinary least square path models for the influence of the construal level mind-set 
conditions and individual action identification tendency on memory recognition of 
primary facts through message construal measured with the linguistic category model,  
n = 34, F(5,28) = 2.67, p < .05, R2 = .32. † p < .10, *p < .05. 
6.2.4 Attitude measures. 
In Hypotheses 5a and 5c I assumed that the abstract and concrete construal level 
mind-set manipulations and the individual action identification would affect the 
participants’ attitudes towards the health topic in the message, because those two factors 
should influence the message construal (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989; Freitas et al., 2004). 
Particularly, for the abstract manipulation condition their abstract message construal 
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should lead to more positive attitudes in comparison to the control group, while 
concrete message construal should lead to less positive attitudes towards organ donation. 
To estimate this mediation model, ordinary least squares path analysis with the 
PROCESS Macro for SPSS (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Hayes, 2013; Hayes & Preacher, 
2014) was used. As in the hypothesized model in Figure 10, the construal level 
conditions were dummy coded, using the control condition as reference condition. The 
two dummy variables and the individual action identification tendency were used as 
factors. Message construal was used as mediator in the model. The organ donation 
attitude items loaded on three sub-dimensions in the initial factor analysis (cp. Table 2). 
The three sub-dimensions Behavioral Intentions, the Communicative Action Intent, and 
the General Acceptance (of organ donation practices) will be used as outcomes in the 
model (cp. Figure 11). 
The results were particularly ambiguous, because the direct effect of message 
construal on the attitudes was contrary to the hypothesized direction. A more abstract 
message construal, when assessed using the LCM, led to less positive attitudes towards 
organ donation, whereas a more concrete message construal led to more positive 
attitudes (cp. Figure 11). Additionally, the direct effect of the individual difference in 
action identification had a negative effect on message construal, as was already 
indicated in the ANCOVA testing Hypothesis 2. As could be expected from the 
previous analyses, none of the indirect effects tested in the mediation model was 
entirely different from zero, they are reported with the respective confidence intervals in 
Table 10. In fact, the indirect effects of the mind-set conditions through message 
construal indicated a reversed effect than the one hypothesized for the abstract construal 
level mind-set condition. Table 10 displays how participants in the abstract construal 
level condition, relative to the control condition (Abstract Construal Mind-Set Dummy) 
report less positive attitudes for all three attitude sub-dimensions. The indirect effects of 
action identification on the attitude outcomes through message construal were in the 
hypothesized directions, however, their confidence intervals were also including zero 
and very small. The direct effects of the factors in the model on the attitude outcomes 
complement the picture thus far. As Figure 11 also shows, only the small effect of the 
individual difference in action identification, measured by the BIF, indicated the 
expected direction based on theoretical assumptions derived from literature. The two 
dummy variables also show no significant direct effects and the estimated effects are 
contrary to what was expected. Compared to the control group, both abstract and 
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concrete construal level mind-set manipulations led to less positive attitude outcomes 
on two attitude sub-dimensions. The hypotheses related to this question, H5a and H5c, 
have to be rejected based on the data at hand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11  
Ordinary least square path models for the influence of the construal level mind-set 
conditions and individual action identification tendency on attitude outcomes through 
message construal measured with the linguistic category model. Panel 1: R2 = .22,  
F(4,36) = 3.32, p >.05, n = 41, Panel 2: R2 = .18, F(4,36) = 1.57, p > .05, n = 41,  
Panel 3: R2 = .33, F(5,34) = 3.48, p < .05, n = 40. † p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Table 10  
Indirect Effect of the Independent Factors Construal Level Mind-Set Manipulation and 
Action Identification Tendency on the Attitude Outcomes Through Message Construal 
    Consequent: Attitudes 
    
95 % BCa CI 
Antecedent Coeff. SE LL UL 
  
General Acceptance 
Concrete Construal Mind-Set Dummy 
 
−0.02 0.10 0.29 0.13 
Abstract Construal Mind-Set Dummy 
 
−0.10 0.18 −0.57 0.14 
Action Identification 
 
0.02 0.03 −0.04 0.09 
  
Behavioral Intention 
Concrete Construal Mind-Set Dummy 
 
−0.01 0.07 −0.21 0.09 
Abstract Construal Mind-Set Dummy 
 
−0.05 0.13 −0.36 0.16 
Action Identification 
 
0.01 0.02 −0.04 0.06 
  
Communicative Action Intention 
Concrete Construal Mind-Set Dummy 
 
−0.03 0.12 −0.35 0.14 
Abstract Construal Mind-Set Dummy 
 
−0.18 0.17 −0.59 0.04 
Action Identification  0.04 0.03 −0.01 0.10 
Note. Construal level mind-set conditions were dummy coded with the control group as reference group. 
Additional analyses. A second control group was part of the experiment to 
assess a possible influence of the target movie. This second control group did not watch 
the target movie and did not receive a mind-set manipulation. Participants only 
answered to the questions on attitude and psychological distance. An ANOVA with 
planned contrasts tested the second control groups’ mean attitudes against all other 
groups. Table 9 shows the mean differences. On the sub-dimensions General 
Acceptance and Communicative Action Intention there were no meaningful differences. 
For those dimensions planned contrasts showed that no condition did significantly differ 
from the second control group. For the sub-dimension General Acceptance all planned 
contrast comparing the second control group with the non-manipulation control group 
(t(51) = 0.00, p > .05), the concrete mind-set condition (t(51) = −1.33, p > .05), and the 
abstract mind-set condition (t(51) = 1.58, p > .05) remained non-significant. In case of 
the dimension Communicative Action Intention, the planned contrasts comparing the 
means of the second control group and the non-manipulation control group (t(51) = 0.53, 
p > .05), the concrete mind-set condition (t(51) = −0.49, p > .05), and the abstract mind-
set condition (t(51) = 0.93, p > .05) remained also non-significant. For the dimension 
Behavior Intention, Table 9 shows that the control group, who did not watch the target 
message, reported the lowest level of behavioral intentions. Comparisons of the control 
group to the concrete mind-set condition (t(51) = 0.90, p > .05) and the abstract mind-
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set condition (t(51) = −1.38, p > .05) displayed no significant mean differences, 
however, compared to the non-manipulation control group the mean differences were 
significant (t(51) = −2.30, p < .05). The test did not withstand the Tukey correction for 
multiple comparisons (p > .05).  
6.2.5 Psychological distance. 
The study used three single items to measure the psychological distance 
activated by the mind-set manipulation. Based on construal level theorizing (Liberman 
et al., 2002; Nussbaum et al., 2003; Fujita, Henderson, et al., 2006), I expected that 
people in the abstract construal level mind-set condition would show more 
psychological distance, by reporting less social proximity to the example person (H6a) 
or by estimating a longer temporal time span (H6b). Again, a mediation model using the 
ordinary least square method with the PROCESS macro was calculated including 
message construal as mediator and the three sub-dimension of organ donation attitude, 
extracted in Table 2, as outcomes. The hypothesized indirect effect from the construal 
level mind-set conditions to the psychological distance outcomes through message 
construal was not found for the first social distance item, when comparing the concrete 
mind-set condition against the control condition (b = −0.08, SE = 0.16, 95% BCa CI 
[−0.42, 0.26]) and the abstract condition against the control condition (b = −0.20,  
SE = 0.25, 95% BCa CI [−0.79, 0.19]). All confidence intervals included zero. Direct 
effects and indirect effects for the first social distance item were all small, the 
confidence intervals were not entirely above zero, and they were contrary to the 
hypothesizing (except the comparison of the concrete vs. control condition, cp. Figure 
12). As for the direct effects, message construal related to social distance in a way that 
more abstract message construal, when measured with the LCM, led to more social 
proximity. The concrete mind-set condition displayed more social distance than the 
control group, while the abstract mind-set condition showed less social distance 
compared to the control group. Almost the same pattern of results could be witnessed 
for the second social distance item. No indirect effect of the manipulation on social 
distance through message construal could be found for the concrete (vs. control) 
comparison (b = −0.06, SE = 0.18, 95 % BCa CI [−0.57, 0.12]) and the abstract (vs. 
control) comparison, b = −0.16, SE = 0.24, 95% BCa CI [−0.72, 0.25]. Again, the 
confidence intervals for the indirect effects did not exclude zero and the coefficient for 
the abstract versus control group comparison was contrary to the predictions. The 
direction of the non-significant direct effects was as predicted, yet small (H6a, cp. 
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Figure 12). Finally, in the case of the temporal distance (measured in days), no results 
could be established either. The direct effect of message construal on the temporal 
distance estimate of the participants was, similar to the previous results, not in the 
expected direction and included zero in the 95% confidence intervals. In fact, 
participants with more abstract message construal estimated that the referenced person 
in the question would wait fewer days on the organ donor list, compared to participants 
with a more concrete construal level. No indirect effects were found for both dummy 
groups (bconcrete= −23.47, SE = 34.74, 95% BCa CI [−13.75, 23.52], babstract= −46.52,  
SE = 42.87, 95% BCa CI [−143.94, 23.26]). Again, the indirect effect for the abstract 
construal level condition through message construal was reversed. The direct effects of 
the dummy conditions were as hypothesized, showing that people in the concrete mind-
set condition estimated the person in the question would wait fewer days on the organ 
donor list, compared to participants in the control group (p > .05). The participants in 
the abstract mind-set condition, on average, estimated more days than the control group 
(p > .05, cp. Figure 12). Yet, all these results were statistically not reliable. 
Additional analyses. As before, an ANOVA with planned contrasts tested the 
second control group’s means on the psychological distance items against the mean 
psychological distance of all other groups. This should establish whether the movie 
itself had made a difference for the outcome measures. Table 9 displays the mean 
differences. For the first social distance item the mean comparisons of the second 
control group and the non-manipulation control group (t(51) = −0.39, p > .05), the 
concrete mind-set condition (t(51) = 1.08, p > .05), and the abstract mind-set condition 
(t(51) = 0.58, p > .05) were all non-significant. In the case of the second social distance 
item the comparisons also remained non-significant, when testing the mean difference 
between the second control condition and the non-manipulation control group  
(t(51) = 0.87, p > .05), the concrete mind-set condition (t(51) = −1.03, p > .05), and the 
abstract mind-set condition (t(51) = 0.59, p > .05). The final multiple comparisons were 
done for the temporal distance item. Here, the mean differences between the second 
control group and the non-manipulation control group (t(51) = −0.74, p > .05), the 
concrete mind-set condition (t(51) = −0.14, p > .05), and the abstract condition  
(t(51) = −0.80, p > .05) were not significant as well.  
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Figure 12  
Ordinary least square path models for the influence of the construal level mind-set 
conditions and individual action identification tendency on psychological distance 
through message construal measured with the linguistic category model. Panel 1:  
R2 = .17, F(4,36) = 1.80, p > .05, n = 41, Panel 2: R2 = .08, F(4,36) = 0.86, p > .05,  
n = 41, Panel 3: R2 = .07, F(4,35) = 0.63, p > .05, n = 40. † p < .10, *p < .05. 
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6.2.6 Research question 1. 
The first research question was concerned with the participants’ subjective 
experience of the documentary as abstract or concrete and how this would relate to the 
post-exposure measurements of abstract or concrete message construal. To relate 
message construal with the subjective experience and to better understand the 
abstraction score according to Hong and Lee (2010), I considered both measurements of 
message construal in the following descriptive analysis. The participants’ subjective 
evaluation of the abstractness displayed in the documentary was used as an independent 
factor in two simple linear regression models and in each one of the two assessments of 
the thought listings as dependent variable. The subjective abstractness accounted for 
11% of the variance in the LCM score (R2 = .11, F(1,39) = 4.78, p < .05). There was a 
significant small positive association between the subjective abstractness and the LCM 
score, β = .33 (b = 0.12), SE = .10, 95% CI [0.01,0.23], p < .05. In turn, the subjectively 
perceived abstractness did not explain any significant variance in the Hong & Lee 
abstraction score, R2 = .00, F(1,41) = 0.01, p > .05. The related beta-values were very 
small and non-significant (β = .01, b = 0.04, SE = .58, 95% CI [−1.14,1.22], p > .05). 
Looking at the correlation table (cp. Table 8), the subjective abstractness rating by the 
participants showed a similar pattern of correlations with the attitude outcomes as the 
LCM score did. The more abstract participants rated the documentary, the less 
accepting they were of organ donation (r = −.33, p < .05), the fewer behavioral 
intentions (r = −.37, p < .05), and the fewer communicative action intentions they 
reported (r = −.37, p < .05). A portion of the message construal thus related to how 
abstract or concrete participants rated the documentary. Therefore, the similar 
relationship of the subjective abstractness ratings to the attitude outcomes substantiates 
the small counterintuitive relationships of message construal and attitude outcomes that 
emerged in the path models (cp. Figure 11). 
6.2.7 Research question 2. 
The second research question aimed to relate the narrative experience of the 
participants with the subjective and more objective assessment of abstraction. The 
correlational analysis displayed in Table 8 showed that both cognitive and emotional 
narrative involvement correlated rather strongly with each other (r = .45, p < .05). There 
was no correlation with the abstraction score (Hong & Lee, 2010). There was, however, 
a medium negative correlation between the LCM score and the cognitive narrative 
involvement (r = −.32, p < .05). For the second time point the correlation was even 
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more pronounced. The LCM score of the second thought-listing task correlated 
negatively with both cognitive (r = −.43, p < .05) and emotional narrative involvement 
(r = −.34, p < .05). In comparison, the first time point for the thought listings showed no 
associations with the narrative involvement at all.  
Both forms of narrative involvement correlated also with the subjective 
abstractness of the participants. For emotional involvement the correlation was of 
medium strength and negative, (r = −.37, p < .05), but for cognitive involvement the 
correlation with subjective abstractness was very large (r = −.71, p < .05). Finally, 
emotional narrative involvement was significantly positive related to the attitude 
outcome Communicative Action Intention (r = .47, p < .05), but not significantly 
associated with any other attitude outcome. Cognitive narrative involvement was, in 
turn, also related to the communicative action intention of participants (r = .41, p < .05) 
and marginally significantly to behavioral intentions (r = .26, p < .10).  
Table 11  
Means for Cognitive and Emotional Narrative Involvement 
    Cognitive Emotional 
Experimental Groups M  (SD) M  (SD) 
 control 4.03
  (0.93) 4.53  (1.05) 
 n 15 15 
 concrete 4.41
  (0.73) 5.06  (0.61) 
 n 16 16 
 abstract 3.99
  (1.16) 4.49  (0.99) 
 n 14 14  
To further this inquiry, I also assessed a possible experimental influence of the 
abstract and concrete mind-set manipulation on narrative involvement. The main effect 
remained insignificant for emotional narrative involvement, F(1,42) = 0.02, p > .05 and 
cognitive narrative involvement, F(1,42) = 0.09, p > .05. However, the mean 
differences between the experimental groups, although small, supported the notion of 
the correlational analysis. On both sub-dimensions the concrete construal level mind-set 
group showed the highest mean involvement. The latter two findings allow the question 
whether the negative influence of message construal on the three attitude outcomes 
could be explained through the narrative involvement. The negative association of 
message construal and narrative involvement, which in turn is positively related to 
attitudes, would allow the assumption that narrative involvement is the driving 
mechanism through which the attitudes are negatively associated with message 
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construal. I analyzed the direct and indirect effect of message construal on each of the 
three dimensions of organ donation attitudes through the mediators cognitive and 
emotional narrative involvement using ordinary least squares path analysis and the 
PROCESS Macro for SPSS (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Hayes, 2013; Hayes & Preacher, 
2014). Table 12 and Table 13 show the indirect effects.  
Table 12  
Indirect Effect of the Message Construal on the Attitude Outcomes Through Cognitive 
Narrative Involvement 
    Consequent: Attitudes 
    
95 % BCa CI 
Antecedent Coeff. SE  LL UL 
  
General Acceptance 
Message Construal 
 
−0.23 0.21 −0.65 0.18 
  
Behavioral Intention 
Message Construal 
 
−0.40 0.33 −1.02 0.12 
  
Communicative Action Intention 
Message Construal 
 
−0.41 0.30 −1.07 0.11 
Note. Controlled for the influence of emotional narrative involvement. General Acceptance: R2 = .14,  
F(3,37) = 1.98, Behavioral Intention: R2 = .15, F(3,37) = 2.19, Communicative Action Intention: R2 = .32, 
F(3,37) = 6.98**; ** p < .01. 
Table 13  
Indirect Effect of the Message Construal on the Attitude Outcomes Through Emotional 
Narrative Involvement 
    Consequent: Attitudes 
    
95 % BCa CI 
Antecedent Coeff. SE LL UL 
  
General Acceptance 
Message Construal 
 
0.01 0.12 −0.23 0.28 
  
Behavioral Intention 
Message Construal 
 
0.03 0.19 −0.28 0.55 
  
Communicative Action Intention 
Message Construal 
 
−0.03 0.15 −0.34 0.30 
Note. Controlled for the influence of cognitive narrative involvement. General Acceptance: R2 = .14,  
F(3,37) = 1.98, Behavioral Intention: R2 = .15, F(3,37) = 2.19, Communicative Action Intention: R2 = .32, 
F(3,37) = 6.98**; ** p < .01. 
While the models with emotional narrative involvement as mediator are only 
showing very small effects (cp. Table 13), the cognitive narrative involvement seems to 
be more relevant in this model (cp. Table 12). Particularly the effects on the participants’ 
behavioral intention and communicative action intention were of medium strength. The 
confidence intervals included zero, but only marginally. The confidence intervals for 
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the indirect effect through narrative involvement on participants’ behavioral intentions 
and the communicative action intentions included zero. They suggested that with every 
unit increase of message construal (on a scale from 1 to 5) the Behavior Intention and 
Communication Action Intention decrease by approx. 0.4 units, mediated by cognitive 
narrative involvement.  
6.3 Discussion 
The presented research examined the mental construal of organ donation 
messages on television, specifically the construal level at the message encoding stage 
and individual differences in action identification. Instead of message features, the 
participants’ mind-sets were manipulated (i.e., abstract or concrete processing), using 
the perceptual priming approach before media exposure (Freitas et al., 2004). The goal 
of this study was to introduce the pre-exposure construal level mind-set as a relevant 
explanation of mass media effects on attitudes and knowledge. The related outcomes 
thus included the memory recognition of facts from the target message, attitudes 
towards organ donation, and psychological distance to the health issue. A second aim of 
the study was to add the media users’ perspective as relevant comparison dimension. 
This was done by including the media users’ subjective experience of the target 
message as abstract or concrete presentation of information. Finally, the study included 
aspects of narrative involvement with the target message. This aimed to explain more of 
the relationship the construal level mind-set has on the entertainment processes of the 
media user.  
The results were mostly not supportive of the theoretical assumptions. The 
experimental manipulation of the construal level mind-set only partially showed an 
effect of the message abstraction participants displayed in their thought listings. I will 
discuss the individual aspects of the study hereafter, explore alternative hypotheses, and 
discuss methodological issues. 
6.3.1 Construal level mind-set. 
An effect of the perceptual priming task on the message construal was only 
noticeable in the high construal level group. Three points offer explanations for this 
result. First, the partial result is possibly caused by the dynamic portrayals of abstract 
and concrete features the documentary offered. The target message of this study, as 
documentary about organ donation, could have influenced the situational construal level 
of the participants for sure. Visually and auditorily the audiovisual text possibly uses a 
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number of abstract or concrete primes (Amit et al., 2009; Amit et al., 2013). The 
experimental effect should have carried over these influences, similar to what would be 
expected for the effect of the individual difference in action identification. If the 
message influence was indeed superior, no differences between the experimental groups 
should occur.  
Secondly, the manipulation used for the study, a priming task based on Freitas et 
al. (2004), was administered three times to fortify the effect. The tasks used three 
actions and participants had to either come up with how they would perform the action 
(concrete) or why they would perform the action (abstract). The example tasks used 
here were kept close to the original priming task specification (cp. Section 6.1.4). This 
also means they were not domain specific, for example, to a health issue. The actions 
used were unrelated to the topic of the target message, which should have supported the 
argument that a construal level mind-set is an independent mind-set, which widely 
affects all cognitive processes and mental representations. Given that the research in 
Construal Level Theory and on action identification concentrated on either the construal 
of actions or objects, the assumption of an independent mind-set could be inaccurate for 
the construal of evaluations and judgment tasks. Here the idea of construing not only 
behavior, but also attitudes could mirror a deliberative state much more than an 
implemental state (Freitas et al., 2004). For such deliberative matters, which are not 
directly connected to action implementation it could be a possibility that the construal 
level mind-sets are domain specific. Further research extending the narrow boundaries 
of existing tests is needed to answer this question.  
Third, the central methodological issue in this study was the access to the 
cognitive level of abstraction participants applied when construing the target message. 
This could also be the source of this issue. First of all, the thought-listing technique 
from Petty et al. (1981) employs a post-hoc method. Assuming that language use does 
show mental construal (Semin, 1994, 2008), thought listings do not measure construal 
of the message, as it would happen during exposure. Instead they would measure the 
level of abstraction in the active mental representations of the target message. This 
might in fact be different from the construal level mind-set the participants had during 
exposure. Yet, in the spirit of a parsimonious research project it entailed one of the few 
options that approximated the construal level at the encoding stage of message 
processing. Secondly, one particular benefit of this technique is the fact that it allowed a 
slightly more implicit assessment of participants than self-reports would have. In its 
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nature, however, it is also entailed that thought listings require an interpretational effort 
from the researcher, to assess the theoretical constructs in question—in other words, to 
make sense of them. Two theoretically closely guided options were assessed in this 
study, by comparing linguistic and semantic coding. Results and implications from both 
coding schemes will be critically assessed hereafter. 
Linguistic category model. The linguistic category model (LCM) was 
introduced in Section 3.3.1. The theoretical notion assumes a hierarchal structure in 
language describing people and their behaviors. This hierarchy ranges between a broad 
and abstract reference to a person and their behavior versus a concrete and particular 
reference to a specific action (Semin & Fiedler, 1988). The more abstract the language 
use, according to this theory, the more interpretative freedom is available, and thus, the 
applied categories are more inclusive.  
Concrete actions refer to things that are almost all directly observable and easily 
verifiable (talking, walking, eating). Slightly more abstract references allow the receiver 
of the communication to assume a number of discrete behaviors, for example A is 
helping B. Here, the form of helping is unclear and can include various discrete actions. 
Internal states (e.g., liking, hating) and adjectives (A is mean to B) further decrease the 
extent to which a concrete action is identifiable. This hierarchy is qualitatively similar 
to the Action Identification Theory introduced in section (cp. Section 3.1). By using 
construal in this study not only with reference to action construal, but also construal of 
objects, people, attitudes, actions, and the free combination of all, it could be expected 
that the instrument only detected part of the construct message construal, yet to do so 
with accuracy. The manipulation check of the LCM score showed a small effect of the 
abstract construal level mind-set manipulation, but failed to produce a significant 
difference, especially between the concrete construal level mind-set and the control 
group. Contrary to my expectation, the mean of the control group did not fall between 
the two conditions; it was rather almost not distinguishable from the mean of the 
concrete mind-set manipulation condition. On the one hand, the manipulation could 
have been too weak to counteract possible influences by the target movie. On the other 
hand, the missing effect on concrete message construal would suggest a somewhat low 
default construal level among the participants.  
One explanation for this result lies in the experimental lab setting, where a lower 
construal level could be a natural reaction. I have argued a form of cognitive tuning can 
be found in Action Identification Theory, because action identification is flexible to the 
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situational demands (cp. Section 3.1) and I have prominently discussed the cognitive 
tuning assumption from mood-as-information theory (cp. Section 4.1.3). Based on these 
example, also a lab experiment could constitute a new or uncommon setting, quite 
similar to a negative mood, that motivates a more concrete construal of the situation 
(Bless, Clore, et al., 1996). Action Identification Theory has shown that individuals tune 
their action identification to a more concrete level in new situations in order to master 
them accordingly (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 2012) and that this carries over to 
activate more abstract categories (Levy et al., 2002). Furthermore, undergraduate 
students did the recruitment of the participants as part of a research methods course. 
They reported having difficulties finding participants with the offered vouchers and 
chocolate bars, as many on campus studies offered higher rewards.20 This could suggest 
low motivation and accuracy in participants. This would further explain why many 
participants then neglected to fill out the full questionnaire leaving the study with only a 
small number of total participants.  
Against this alternative explanation and against the validity of the measure stood 
a negative correlation between the behavior identification score (BIF), which was used 
to measure the individual propensity of participants to more abstract or concrete 
thinking, and the LCM score (cp. Table 8). Particularly because the BIF was designed 
to measure the construal of actions, it should have correlated positively with the LCM 
score, if the LCM score mostly captured the abstraction of interpersonal actions, as 
assumed by theory and existing empirical evidence (Vallacher & Wegner, 2012). This 
relationship would counteract the cognitive tuning assumption, because the BIF should 
react in the same way to the experimental lab situation as the LCM, if it were to be the 
responsible mechanism for these results. Previous research has used the BIF also as 
measurement of outcomes of abstraction manipulations and shown it reacts to 
situational demands (e.g., Freitas et al., 2004; Fujita, Henderson, et al., 2006).  
This leaves to argue why the LCM did only partially detect the predicted change 
in message construal. The linguistic coding scheme becomes overly complex in 
thought-listing tasks, if they contain a majority of state and attitude statements instead 
of action statements. As I have introduced, the LCM assumes overall four detectable 
levels of language abstraction. The thought-listing task did not limit or guide the 
participants in their text production (Petty et al., 1981). As intended, many voiced their 
attitudes towards the issue or the documentary. Take for example a statement like 
                                                
20 Walk-ins were no option for this experiment, because the lab was located in a building off 
campus. 
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“Organ donation is scary”, a typical statement format in this thought-listing data 
collection. Linking verbs like “is” have no meaning by themselves, however they can be 
the only verb in a sentence. The coding scheme suggests in these cases: 
To correctly code the part of a sentence containing a linking verb the following 
questions should be answered: Does the part of the sentence imply an action? If 
this is not the case, the linking verb should not be coded. The “supplier of 
meaning” determines how the part of the sentence should be coded. If the 
“supplier of meaning” refers to an emotional consequence of an action, it should 
be coded as SAV [state action verb, author] (…). If, in contrast, the “supplier of 
meaning” refers to a personality trait, it should be coded as ADJ [adjective, 
author]. (Coenen et al., 2006, pp. 4-5) 
More often than not the thought listings produced by the participants in this 
study did not refer to actions, the core of the LCM hierarchy. Even liberally applying 
the LCM, for example, by not only considering person or action references, but also 
object traits, the linguistic coding scheme rates such statements as adjectives, the most 
abstract linguistic category. Additions that would suggest a more personal consideration 
and could thus stand for a more concrete thought, like “to me, organ donations are 
scary”, make no difference according to the LCM. The coding scheme knows only two 
categories for such thoughts, thereby limiting the discriminatory ability of the 
measurement. Auxiliary compositions like ‘I want to start an organ donation register 
drive’ are handled similarly and fall either into the most abstract category adjectives or 
into interpretative action verbs. Subordinate clauses, like in this example, ‘I was 
remembering the time that I needed to have blood drawn for a test and it was the worst 
experience. It was so scary and I almost fainted’, are complex and ambiguous. ‘[T]hat I 
needed to have blood drawn’ qualifies ‘time’ in this sentence, like an adjective. The 
coding instructions here assume that the clause as a whole is coded as adjective (very 
abstract), so long as it is not an interpersonal term. Imagine the clause was, ‘I was 
remembering the time when Susi told me to get my blood drawn […]’. In this case the 
qualifying clause would not be coded as adjective, because it is interpersonal and thus is 
handled by the general LCM rules (told = descriptive action verb, get = here auxiliary 
verb, drawn = descriptive action verb).  
The thought listings obtained in this study, however, contain only very little 
interpersonal phrases and are thus more often categorized on the abstract end of the 
spectrum. Fiedler (2008) discusses briefly the possibility of using the LCM to implicitly 
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assess stereotypes and attitudes. As seductive this linguistic instrument seems, open 
thought listings seem an unfit corpus for the LCM coding, because they have a slight 
overweight in passive constructions, incomplete sentences (phrases), and object or state 
descriptions. Although the LCM offers an extensive toolbox for many speech varieties, 
it is little flexible and accurate aside from interpersonal communication. A combination 
with findings about abstractness and concreteness in nouns would be helpful, for 
example based on research suggested in Section 2.2.1 by Rosch (1975); Rosch et al. 
(1976). Furthermore, a more comprehensive measurement of the different domains of 
abstract thinking should include not only the abstraction of actions but also the 
psychological distance or the conveyed desirability in the participants’ thought listings.  
Semantic assessment of message construal. I used a semantic coding scheme 
for the thought listings to assess the level of abstraction in the participant’s message 
construal. I oriented this coding scheme largely on a published method by (Hong & Lee, 
2010). In Experiment 3 of their paper, they assessed thought listings from individuals 
after the exposure to an advertisement. As in the study at hand, Hong and Lee (2010) 
asked the participants to note down all thoughts they had during exposure. The 
differentiation was made dichotomously between abstract and concrete thoughts and 
later summed up. A fundamental benefit of such a semantic categorization was that it 
could include various domains of abstract and concrete construal. It is not particularly 
bound to thoughts that include interpersonal actions and can much better incorporate 
thoughts that express attitudes by referring to the desirability, idealism or pragmatism of 
a situation, goals, and feasibility concerns.  
The manipulation check using this measurement for message construal appears 
to adhere to the hypothesized effect of the mind-set manipulation more closely (cp. 
Figure 8). Problematic are, still, the probabilities of these results, which allowed no 
reliable conclusion. The results could be largely due to chance. Of course, the decision 
whether a single thought is abstract or concrete is highly subjective and has to deal with 
a large portion of unexplained variance. There was no association of the Hong and Lee 
(2010) abstraction score with the LCM (cp. Table 8), which is suggestive of its 
unreliability, given that the LCM score has captured at least part of the message 
construal. Further, this missing association with either of the linguistic abstraction, any 
hypothesized outcome, or the subjective abstraction suggests that it is completely 
uncertain, which construct the Hong & Lee abstraction score measures.  
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6.3.2 Construal level effects on the outcomes.  
As a result of the two manipulation checks, hypotheses including message 
construal were further tested using only the LCM measurement as indicator. The 
missing experimental effect of the concrete construal level mind-set manipulation 
repeatedly showed in the following tests. If any, the effect stemming from the abstract 
construal level condition compared to the non-manipulation control group yielded the 
only significant or close to significant effects. For example, the indirect effect of the 
abstract construal level condition (relative to the control condition) on memory 
recognition through the participants’ message construal was marginally not significant. 
The coefficient, however, supported the predicted direction. The participants in the 
abstract construal level group actually presented better memory recognition, because 
they showed more abstract message construal. An advancement and substantiation of 
this finding could be to include concrete items instead of only abstract items, using a 
metric measurement, or even an implicit measurement of memory recognition.  
An additional analysis comparing the second control group, which did not watch 
the target message or get a treatment, with the three experimental groups, showed that 
the movie did activate information about organ donation. This lends support to the 
necessary condition that the used memory recognition test did not simply tap into the 
general knowledge about organ donation, but that it actually captured the activated or 
newly acquired information about the issue from the target message.  
For the attitude outcome none of the predicted effects showed in the data. 
Neither direct effects nor indirect effects were visible. This is further complicated by the 
fact that the estimates of the central relationships are not only unreliable. The influence 
of message construal on attitudes in the data at hand was also contrary to the initial 
predictions. It is nearly impossible to attribute these results to a single methodological 
issue. First, the partially failed manipulation of the construal level mind-set could be 
responsible for the inability to assess the direct effects. As discussed in the previous 
section, the assessment of the participants’ message construal via the linguistic category 
model (LCM) only covers part of the theorized construct “abstract thinking”, which is 
in the focus of the investigation. Mediation effects of message construal could be hard 
to detect because of this. Secondly, the target movie or the pre-manipulation construal 
level mind-set of the participants could be a source for unexplained variance in the 
outcomes. Yet, a systematic influence of the target movie is not supported in the data. 
The small mean difference in the attitude scores could suggest that very little change in 
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message construal was produced by the manipulation, or the change produced by the 
manipulation was nullified by the target movie. The movie was rather long, providing 
an ecological target message, but at the same time many unsystematic influences. 
Furthermore, the study was conducted in 2012, while a debate about fraud in organ 
donation practices in Germany was still present in the media.  
Central advancements for future studies should include not simply a larger 
sample, given the path models controlling for sex (and age) are most likely 
underpowered, but a better measurement of message construal.  
The additional analysis including the second control group, who did not watch 
the target message, was used to put the observed results into perspective. While on the 
two sub-dimensions General Acceptance and Communicative Action Intention no 
meaningful group differences to the second control group was found, on the dimension 
Behavior Intention particularly the first (non-manipulation) and second control group 
differed significantly. The likely explanation is that the target movie did activate 
cognitions about actually becoming an organ donor and the actions that would be 
entailed to become a potential donor, like signing an organ donor card. The fact that 
there was no significant difference between the first and second control group on the 
other dimensions could suggest that the movie mainly activated behavioral cognitions. 
Particularly, in this case a relationship with the LCM measure of message construal 
would have been relevant, because, as I argued earlier, the LCM-based coding should 
centrally capture the abstraction of actions. A lack of support for this relationship calls 
the measurement further into question.  
Finally, the psychological distance outcomes did show a similarly unreliable and 
counterintuitive structure of results. For all three assessed items of psychological 
distance more abstract message construal was associated with less psychological 
distance. Given the small sample size and a probably small effect, these results are 
unreliable. Furthermore issue-related psychological distance is hard to assess. The 
psychological distance to the issue of organ donation was the sought theoretical 
construct. This entails so many different associations, that the operationalization of 
social distance to imagined individuals and the temporal distance to an imaginary event 
could be fairly blind to it. Furthermore, because of the already large study it was 
measured using single items.  
Alternative explanations. A recurring issue in the data seems to be a negative 
association between the message construal and the outcomes, when I have predicted 
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throughout that abstract message construal would be associated with more positive 
attitudes and higher psychological distance relative to more concrete message construal. 
As the literature review has shown, abstract construal is reliably related to 
psychological distance. Specifically, the two concepts are believed to share a 
bidirectional relationship (Liberman, Trope, McCrea, et al., 2007). It is part of my 
argument that abstract message construal possibly leads to more psychological distance 
to the health issue and in the process makes more abstract evaluations accessible, for 
example moral, ideological, or higher-order evaluative judgments. Psychological 
distance is often also associated to perceived relevance of a topic (Levy et al., 2002). 
Given this line of thought, abstract or very concrete construal could bias the relevance 
of a target issue to the self. This alternative hypothesis would be that abstract construal 
of a mediated message leads to more psychological distance to the issue and results in 
decreased relevance of the message’s topic. Obviously, abstract thinking as 
conceptualized in the present work does involve more concepts than the activation of 
psychological distance. Other judgment domains, like positive or negative associations 
or ideology would be inflicted, which is why this hypotheses was not favored.  
6.3.3 Action identification preferences. 
The hypothesized impact of the action identification preference as individual 
trait on the movie construal was based on previous findings showing a stable 
relationship between individual preferences for abstract or concrete action identification 
and perceived psychological distance (Liberman & Förster, 2009; Wakslak & Trope, 
2009), decision making (Liberman & Trope, 1998), and social judgments (Malkoc, 
Zauberman, & Bettman, 2010). The research shows that individuals with an abstract 
action identification tendency base judgments and decisions on abstract and distant 
features. The data yielded by the present study contradicts previous research. 
Individuals with a concrete individual construal level tendency showed slightly more 
abstract message construal in their thought listings. The participants over all were more 
likely to identify actions by their low-level, concrete features. This offers a possible 
explanation of why I found the primes to be only partially effective on the participants’ 
message construal. The effectiveness of the abstract construal level prime could have 
been due to the naturally rather concrete individual action identification tendency.  
Methodologically, the participants were only given a selection of items from the 
original BIF item catalogue (Vallacher & Wegner, 2011). This could have led to a 
possible reduction of validity and reliability at the same time. It is not possible to assess 
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the reliability of the selected items at this time, but a reduction was necessary to keep 
the study economical in its length; likewise a pre-study that was devoted to test the 
selected items was also deemed uneconomical. 
6.3.4 Subjective abstractness ratings in context. 
To extend the theoretical potential of the study, I assessed how media users 
perceive the presentation of abstractness in an audiovisual format. It could be expected 
that the media users only partially perceive abstractness in the media content or can 
only in part provide information about the level of abstractness in the content. Yet, a 
relationship between the message construal and the media users’ subjective experience 
of the content does support the underlying assumption that besides situational, 
individual, and cultural factors, also the presentation of media content influences the 
mental representation.  
The correlational analysis showed that only the linguistic assessment of message 
construal showed a meaningful association to the participants’ subjective experience of 
abstract presentation in the documentary. There was no association with the Hong & 
Lee cognitive abstraction score. This would suggest that the abstract presentation 
features that were captured by the subjective experience instrument did affect a small 
portion of the message construal. This result is unchanged by critique I noted on the 
LCM measurement earlier on. While it seemed to capture only a small proportion of 
cognitive construal of the message, namely the action and behavior-related abstraction, 
these could well be related to the participants’ subjective experience of the thoughts. 
The fact that the subjective experience of abstractness in the media content does again 
only relate to the LCM measurement supports the decision to drop the Hong and Lee 
(2010) abstraction score from further analyses after the main analysis.  
6.3.5 Narrative involvement with the target message. 
Finally, the last research question did introduce the concept of narrative 
involvement to the inquiry how abstract or concrete thinking about mediated health 
information can affect attitudes and social judgment. Two sub-dimensions were 
investigated, the cognitive involvement with the narrative included a rather strong 
mental attentiveness to the narrative unfolding and an emotional engagement with the 
narrative. The documentary illustrated various figures in separate storylines, much like 
fictional formats do. Specifically, emotional involvement with the non-fiction 
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characters through processes like identification and empathy are likely to occur both in 
non-fiction and fictional narratives.  
The results showed that narrative involvement has a negative relationship to the 
message abstraction, but only for the linguistically determined message abstraction. 
This correlation was mainly driven by the second thought-listing time point, but not the 
first. It could suggest a recency-effect (i.e., that the second part of the documentary and 
the related thoughts were more strongly related to the later self-reports of narrative 
involvement). Narrative involvement was assessed very late after the participants 
watched the target message and could mainly have been determined by the end of the 
documentary. Of course, the correlational nature of this relationship does not allow 
inferences about the causality. Yet, the correlation of message construal and subject 
experience of abstractness supports the argument for a recency-effect. In this instance 
also the second time point of message construal showed a marginally meaningful 
relationship with the subjective abstractness, but not the first time point (cp. Table 8).  
The directions of all associations between the message construal as well as 
subjective abstraction ratings and narrative involvement are negative. They showed that 
the more abstract the message construal was or the more abstract participants 
experienced the presentation of the documentary, the less narrative involvement they 
experience. The result that narrative involvement is positively related to the attitude 
outcomes replicates findings from narrative persuasion research (Green & Brock, 2002; 
Appel & Richter, 2007). Further the analysis indicated that in the case of the 
documentary the negative effect of message construal on behavioral intentions and 
communicative behavioral intentions is partially due to the participants’ cognitive 
narrative involvement. The results overall suggest that on the one hand, a concrete 
construal of the narrative information actually did allow for more involvement. 
Additionally, a more subjectively experienced abstractness of participants was 
associated with less narrative involvement. On the other hand, these findings could 
point at the central difference of narrative and non-narrative messages. All previous 
findings from Construal Level Theory or neighboring theories, particularly the ones 
including distinctive mediated messages of any kind (Fujita et al., 2008; Hong & Lee, 
2010; Förster & Denzler, 2012), dealt with non-narrative information modes. 
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7 Study 2 
Goals of the second experiment were to investigate mood as a situated factor, to 
include cultural differences in information processing, and to establish alternative ways 
to measure the mental construal of media users experience. The situated mood of 
individuals has been identified as central factor in information processing (Clore et al., 
2001). The central hypothesis for this experiment predicted that individuals in a positive 
mood show more positive attitudes towards blood donations, because the situated mood 
of individuals influences the level of abstract information processing (H1b). 
Furthermore, the experiment introduces the hypothesized cultural dimension using 
samples from two countries. Based on the thoughts developed in Section 4.3 about the 
cultural differences in abstract and concrete information construal, the experiment was 
conducted both in the United States of America and Germany, resembling two cultures 
that differ on the dimension of collectivism (H3), for example according to Hofstede 
(2001). Individual differences in abstract and concrete action identification were also 
kept as a factor potentially determining the message construal (H2), so that the study 
should offer further answers on the leading research question about how situated, 
cultural, and individual factors impact the abstract and concrete processing of mediated 
information and resulting attitudes and inferences. As attitude outcomes I included the 
general attitude for and against blood donation, behavioral intentions, and the 
perceived relevance of blood donation. It was assumed that the attitude outcomes differ 
between the experimental groups (mood condition), the quasi-experimental groups 
(country), and depend on the individual preference for more abstract relative to more 
concrete action identification, because these factors affect the message construal in 
media users (H5, H5b-H5d). Similar to the previous study, psychological distance to the 
health issue was also considered as outcome due to changes in the individual’s message 
construal level (H6). Figure 13 summarizes the basic hypotheses. 
Deliberate changes in the experimental set-up were based on findings from 
Study 1. Given the complex audio-visual stimulus in the first study and the arising 
problems in the measurement of construal level, this second study used a printed target 
text about a public health issue (instead of a target video clip) that conveys the health 
information. The text was a short persuasive information about the need for blood 
donations; it was intentionally kept non-narrative to reduce the confounding influences 
of narrative involvement that the first study suggested.  
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Figure 13 
Hypothesized model for Experiment 2 with individual hypotheses marked. 
Similar to the set-up of Study 1, participants answered questions to determine 
their individual action identification tendency in an ostensible first study prior to the 
treatment. Then they watched a short video clip as mood manipulation. In an unrelated 
second study, they were asked to list their thoughts and answer questions concerning 
their attitude towards blood donation. Rather than to solely relying on self-reports, 
participants were asked to list their thoughts (open thought-listing technique). To offset 
the discussed issues with the linguistic and semantic coding schemes used in Study 1, 
however, I am introducing a more elaborate method to interpret the thought listings. 
Based on the literature review, I derived a multi-dimensional coding scheme, comprised 
of six dimensions, which will be introduced in length in the measurement section. 
7.1 Method 
To evaluate the outlined hypotheses, a 2 (Positive/Negative Mood) x 2 (United 
States/Germany) between-subject (quasi-)experimental design was administered online. 
7.1.1 Participants. 
A convenience sample of students in the United States received course credit for 
participating at a large private campus on the West Coast. In Germany, students 
participated as part of a course requirement and recruited friends as part of their course 
work at a mid-sized University in South Germany.  
A total of N = 325 participants answered at least some of the pre-treatment 
questions. The following steps were taken in order to identify outliers and corrupted or 
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biased cases: Fifteen participants quit the study before watching the manipulation movie. 
Amongst the 310 participants who logged on the mood manipulation page of the study, 
no significant difference of missing items was found comparing the positive mood and 
negative mood manipulation. There was also no significant difference in missing values 
between participants from Germany and the U.S.21 In a next step, participants were 
excluded from the hypotheses tests based on their missing items (out of 57 central items 
and 10 thought-listings). The participants who quit the study on the page directly 
following the mood manipulation (n = 34) had only answered the pretest questions and 
listed no thoughts. Amongst these participants there was no observable difference in 
missing items between the positive manipulation group (n = 21) and the negative 
manipulation group (n = 13). Therefore, they were excluded.22 For the remaining 276 
participants, the time they spent watching the manipulation movie was considered as a 
criterion. There was neither a significant difference between the participants watching 
the positive (n = 140) and the negative mood-manipulation movie (n = 136), nor 
between the countries in terms of the time spent on the movie page.23 Twenty-five 
percent of those participants (n = 69) only watched a maximum of 45 seconds of the 
four-minutes-long clips. These 69 participants were excluded together with the 
participants who were deemed outliers, because they lingered on the movie page for 
more than 10 minutes (n = 6, upper 1% of the distribution, z > 2.58) or did not produce 
any thought-listings (n = 67).24  
The final sample of participants (N = 187) was on average 21.05 years old  
(SD = 1.85) and included 45 male participants. The German subsample (n = 93,  
M = 21.59, SD = 1.81) was on average one year older than the U.S. subsample (n = 94, 
M = 20.52, SD = 1.75). The mean age difference, −1.07, was significant, t(185) = −4.11, 
                                                
21 Missing values: positive mood manipulation (n = 161): M = 11.60, SE = 0.77; negative  
(n = 149): M = 9.98, SE = 0.68. The mean difference, –1.63, BCa 95% CI [–3.73, 0.69], is not significant, 
t(308) = –1.57, p > .05, r = .007. Germany (n = 183): M = 12.54, SE = 0.69; U.S. (n = 142): M = 10.84, 
SE = 0.89. The mean difference, 1.70, BCa 95% CI [–.81, 4.09], is not significant, t(323) = 1.53, p > .05, 
r = .007. Confidence intervals are based on 1,000 bootstrapped samples, unless noted otherwise. 
22 Missing values: positive mood manipulation M = 35.10, SE = 1.00; negative M = 34.08,  
SE = 1.01. The mean difference, 1.01, BCa 95% CI [–1.74, 3.70], is not significant t(32) = .659, p > .05, 
r= 0.01. 
23 Time spent on the movie: negative movie M = 04:30 minutes, SE = 00:24 minutes; positive  
M = 02:42 minutes, SE = 00:11 minutes. The mean difference of 01:48 minutes, BCa 95% CI [01:02, 
02:45], is significant t(274) = 4.08, p < .05, r = 0.06. Country difference: Germany (n = 153) M = 03.14 
minutes, SE = 00:15 minutes, U.S. (n = 123) M = 04:02 minutes, SE = 00:23 minutes. The mean 
difference of -00:48 minutes, BCa 95% CI [–01:51, 00:06], is not significant t(274) = –1.77, p > .05,  
r = 0.01.  
24 The number of missing thought-listings was equally distributed between positive (n = 21) and 
negative (n = 17) mood manipulation, Pearson’s χ2=.192, p > .05, as well between countries: Germany  
(n = 33), U.S. (n = 20), Pearson’s χ2=.913, p > .05. 
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BCa 95% CI [−1.61, −0.54], p < .05, r = .08. The sex of the participants was equally 
distributed across the experimental groups, χ2 = .78, p > .05 and the countries, χ2 = 1.53, 
p > .05. Participants in the U.S. were mostly undergraduate students and seven 
participants had a Bachelor’s degree. Participants in Germany were undergraduate and 
graduate students.  
7.1.2 Procedure. 
All participants received a de-personalized link to the online protocol; the study 
started with a consent form. After consenting to the study, participants received an 
ostensible “first” study, which was masked as a test run of items for an unrelated, later 
research project. Participants answered the individual difference items in a randomized 
order. Again, this questionnaire was administered first, because the BIF questionnaire is 
known to react to construal manipulations (Burgoon et al., 2013). Participants then 
received the mood manipulation (positive or negative) watching a four minute long clip. 
They reported their mood and then moved on to the so-called “second” and allegedly 
unrelated study. Here, participants read a short stimulus text about blood donation in 
their respective country (cp. Appendix 1.1). Afterwards, they were asked to list the 
thoughts they remembered to have had while reading the blood donation message. After 
the thought-listing task, participants were asked to respond to the outcome measures. 
Next, participants were prompted again with each of the thoughts they wrote down 
previously and were asked to rate each thought’s valence. Finally, participants’ 
donation experience and social demographics were examined. Participants were 
eventually thanked and forwarded to an unrelated online protocol to provide identifying 
information for course requirements and credit. 
7.1.3 Mood manipulation.  
Previous research by Beukeboom and Semin (2005) provided the stimulus 
movies to manipulate the mood of the participants. To induce a happy mood, 
participants were presented with an approx. four minute long part from Walt Disney’s 
“The Jungle Book”, where Mowgli is singing with Baloo, the bear (Disney & 
Reitherman, 1962). The tune was “The bare necessities”, which was exclusively written 
for the animated movie. American participants saw the original version, while German 
participants saw the dubbed German version of this clip. The negative mood stimulus 
was also an approx. four minute long clip from the movie “Sophie’s Choice” (Paulka, 
Barish, Gerrity, Starger, & Paulka 1982). The clip showed the key scene of the movie, 
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where an officer in the Auschwitz death camp forces Sophie, a Polish woman and 
mother of two, to choose which child of hers will live and which will die. In the original 
English movie the characters in this flashback scene speak German with subtitles. The 
same clip was therefore used for the American and German participants. 
7.1.4 Materials.  
The target message used in this study was a short blood donation information. It 
was comprised from blood donation information from the U.S.-American and German 
Red Cross websites. After the headline “Donate Blood!”, the information included why 
blood can only be collected from donors and in what medical situations it is used. A 
short summary of the mismatch between blood demand, donor eligibility, and blood 
donations followed. The second half of the message ran through the donation process, 
including the free physical assessment and the snack and drinks afterwards. The picture 
accompanying the message was selected from the German Red Cross promotional 
material available on the organization’s website, depicting a mid-aged woman during 
blood donation with a female nurse (cp. Appendix 1.1). The blood donation message 
was pretested for participants’ liking, credibility, and ease of understanding.25 
7.1.5 Measurements. 
Manipulation check - Mood. Participant’s mood was assessed with two 
questions asking the participants to what extend they were experiencing positive and 
negative feelings at this moment. Answer options ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very 
much) and both questions were combined in one mean index after recoding the answer 
options for the negative feelings.  
Action identification. Individual preferences for action identification were 
measured using the Behavior Identification Form (BIF) by Vallacher and Wegner 
(1989), which is a forced choice questionnaire. Participants were presented with 25 
actions (e.g., “caring for houseplants”) and two possible descriptions of each action. 
                                                
25 Measured on a 7-point Likert scale. Nineteen German participants (Age: M = 20.48, SD = 1.71, 
1 male) judged the message as relatively realistic (M = 5.42, SD = 1.31), easy to read (M = 6.37,  
SD = 1.01), easy to understand (M = 6.47, SD = .96), balanced (M = 4.37, SD = 1.11), and well written  
(M = 4.37, SD = 1.12). Seven U.S. participants (Age: M = 26.89, SD = 2.93, 2 males) also judged the 
message as relatively realistic (M = 6.00, SD = 1.83), easy to read (M = 6.43, SD = 1.51), easy to 
understand (M = 5.71, SD = 1.89), balanced (M = 5.29, SD = 1.60), and well written (M = 5.14,  
SD = 2.20). The mean differences between German and U.S. participants were all non-significant: 
• realistic: –.58, 95% BCa [–1.78, 1.02], t(24) = –0.90, p > .05, 
• easy to read: –.06, 95% BCa [–.95, 1.25], t(24) = –0.12, p > .05, 
• easy to understand: .76, 95% BCa [–.54, 2.32], t(24) = 1.36, p > .05, 
• balanced: –.92, 95% BCa [–2.05, .43], t(24) = –1.65, p > .05, 
• well written: –.46, 95% BCa [–2.10, 1.45], t(24) = –0.62, p > .05. 
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One description was more abstract (“making the room look nice”) and a second 
description was more concrete (“watering the plants”). Participants were asked to 
choose which description best represented the action. Abstract alternatives were scored 
1 and concrete alternatives 0. Subjects’ individual action identification tendency was 
defined as number of abstract action alternatives chosen on the BIF (Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1989). Scale consistency was acceptable in the sample from Germany  
(M = 14.35, SD = 4.70, n = 93, Cronbach’s αGermany = .74) and the U.S. (M = 12.95,  
SD = 4.60, n = 94, Cronbach’s αU.S. = .80).  
Message construal. Social psychological research has produced some initial 
work that captures the mental abstraction level, which is applied to social situations 
(Semin, Higgins, de Montes, Estourget, & Valencia, 2005; Fujita, Henderson, et al., 
2006) using open thought-listing techniques. Linguistic (Coenen et al., 2006) and 
semantic coding (Beukeboom & Semin, 2005; Hong & Lee, 2010; Lutchyn & Yzer, 
2011) of thought-listings (open and structured) was used to approximate the abstraction 
level that was applied during information decoding, thus bypassing self-reports.26 A 
semantic coding scheme was adjusted to better indicate theoretically and empirically 
substantiated markers (cp. Section 3.3.2) of abstract and concrete construal. It is thus 
multidimensional and allowed exploring all dimensions separately as well as combined.  
The first dimension of the measurement is called valence and rated whether the 
thought is positive or negative in nature. I assumed that more abstract representations 
should overall be more positive, whereas more negative thoughts should signal a more 
concrete representation. Based on findings from the mood-as-general-knowledge model 
(Bless, Clore, et al., 1996; Bless, 2001), positive mood can be related to abstract 
knowledge structures. The cognitive tuning assumption posits that mood serves as 
information about the situational cognitive demands and that negative mood diverges 
from the typical positive mood (Schwarz, 2012). This signals a demand for more 
concrete representations (Bless, 2001; Vallacher & Wegner, 2012). Thus, the valence of 
the participant’s thoughts could be an indicator of their abstract or concrete construal.  
The second dimension, favorability, is based on the assumption that arguments 
against an action are subordinate to favorable arguments. Theoretical work and 
empirical evidence suggest, for example, that favorable arguments are superordinate 
and abstract because they define the object’s or action’s inherent subjective importance. 
                                                
26 In the first study, I offset the LCM coding with a semantic coding based on Hong and Lee 
(2010). This semantic coding had no association with the LCM measurement (cp. Table 8). In the 
discussion section (cp. Section 6.3.1), I summarized the problems connected to the coding schemes.  
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In simple words, without favorable arguments, con-arguments have no value. Pro-
arguments are also more salient than con-arguments in distant future situations and 
therefore abstract construal situations, whereas contras are equally salient in near distant 
situations, which marks a concrete construal level situation (Eyal et al., 2004). Thoughts 
that display a strong favorable standpoint thus rather indicate a more abstract mental 
representation, while strongly opposing standpoints can be considered stemming from a 
concrete mental representation.  
The logic is similar for desirability (vs. feasibility) arguments. Desirability is 
superordinate to feasibility. Similarly, desirability arguments are more salient in 
psychologically distant (abstract) situations (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Sagristano, 
Trope, & Liberman, 2002; Lutchyn & Yzer, 2011). Feasibility considerations have 
more impact on psychologically close situations and thus are examples of concrete 
thoughts. Hence, the third dimension considered the weight of desirability versus 
feasibility concerns conveyed in the thoughts by the participants as indicator for abstract 
or concrete mental representation.  
Psychological distance is also a hallmark predictor of abstract construal 
(Ledgerwood, Trope, et al., 2010; Trope & Liberman, 2010). Vast empirical evidence 
connects psychological distance to abstract mental construal and psychological 
proximity to concrete construal of information (Trope & Liberman, 2010) . It is unlikely 
that all sub-dimensions of psychological distance are touched in a single thought, which 
is why the fourth dimension measures the thought’s relative ego-centrality on either one 
of the social, temporal, local, and hypothetical distance dimension. While a relative ego-
centered thought would indicate a concrete mental representation, any psychologically 
distant statement should indicate relative abstractness of the thought.  
As a fifth dimension the participant’s thoughts were coded based on their 
implicit or expressed idealistic versus pragmatic concern. Resembling the logic of pros 
versus cons or desirability versus feasibility, Kivetz and Tyler (2007) argue that 
idealism is superordinate to pragmatism. It was thus an indicator for abstract mental 
representation in this study. Thoughts conveying pragmatic and instrumental concerns 
denote concrete mental representations (Burger & Bless, 2015). This also resonates with 
the arguments used by Eyal et al. (2008) that abstract judgments rely on moral and 
normative rules, while concrete judgments consider context-specific and therefore 
pragmatic information.  
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The final and sixth dimension was derived from Action Identification Theory 
and aims to categorize thoughts according to their self-regulatory focus (Vallacher & 
Wegner, 2012). According to theorizing, actions are hierarchically arranged in people’s 
minds ranging from abstract action identifications that identify why an action is done or 
with what purpose or goal, while concrete action identifications recognize how an 
action is done, detailing the specifics of an action (cp. Section 3.1). 
Figure 14  
Rating scheme to assess level of construal multidimensional per thought. 
All thoughts that implicitly or explicitly referred to an action in this study were 
categorized on this dimension. The dimensions were all rated on a 5-point scale detailed 
in Figure 14.  
A trained graduate student-coder rated all thoughts. For training purposes, the 
coder was given excerpts from peer-reviewed articles and book chapters cited above, to 
get familiar with the theoretical aspects of the dimensions. The training used thought 
listings from previous data collections. Investigator-coder reliability was established 
using Lin’s concordance correlation coefficient (CCC, Lin, 1989; Barnhart, Haber, & 
Valence 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
1 
only negative 
2 
mostly negative 
3 
neutral 
4 
mostly positive 
5 
only positive 
99 
not applicable 
(Concrete)    (Abstract)  
 
Favorability 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
1 
only contra 
2 
mostly contra 
3 
neutral 
4 
mostly pro 
5 
only pro 
99 
not applicable 
(Concrete)    (Abstract)  
 
Desirability 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
1 
only feasibility 
2 
mostly 
feasibility 
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Neutral 
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only desirability 
99 
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(Concrete)    (Abstract)  
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! ! ! ! ! ! 
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(Concrete)    (Abstract)  
 
Idealism 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
1 
only pragmatic 
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neutral 
4 
mostly idealistic 
5 
only idealistic 
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(Concrete)    (Abstract)  
 
Self-regulatory focus 
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only how 
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4 
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99 
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(Concrete)    (Abstract)  
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Lin, 2007; Barchard, 2012).27 I used the absolute concordance correlation coefficient, 
which compares raw scores and interprets every deviation as disagreement between 
coders (Barchard, 2012). It is therefore the strictest and most common understanding of 
agreement compared to relational or linear agreement, which is for example assessed 
using Pearson’s r (Barnhart et al., 2007). For better interpretation of the CCC, which is 
a standardized measure, the root mean square difference of absolute agreement (RMSD) 
is also reported.28 Based on 44 cases (55 thoughts) from the main data collection in both 
countries (17 U.S. cases and 27 German cases), investigator-rater-reliability was 
satisfactory across all categories, Lin’s CCC = .80 (RMSD = 0.98).29 Mean ratings of 
the individual dimensions are displayed in Table 14. 
The agreement on the individual dimensions was also good to very good: 
valence, Lin’s CCC = .86 (RMSD = 0.76), favorability, Lin’s CCC = .83  
(RMSD = 0.83), desirability, Lin’s CCC = .70 (RMSD = 1.23), ego-centrality,  
Lin’s CCC = .84 (RMSD = 0.85), idealism, Lin’s CCC = .86 (RMSD = 0.86), and self-
regulatory focus, Lin’s CCC = .73 (RMSD = 1.21).  
Table 14  
Mean Ratings Message Construal on the Six Coding Dimensions 
 
Germany  
(n = 88) 
U.S.  
(n = 82) 
 
M SD M SD 
Valence 3.31 0.75 3.12 0.77 
Favorability 3.65 0.63 3.56 0.76 
Ego-Centrality 3.66 0.70 3.40 0.79 
Desirability 2.46 0.93 2.61 0.90 
Idealism 3.11 0.75 2.75 0.80 
Self-regulatory Focus 3.58 0.65 3.53 0.69 
Note. All ratings ranged from 1 (equivalent to concrete) to 5 (equivalent to abstract). 
Attitudes. Societal benefits and individual costs of blood donation were assessed 
using 12 items. Items were adopted from previous research identifying positive and 
                                                
27 This correlation coefficient has not been applied frequently in psychology and social sciences 
to assess inter-rater data, although it has superior qualities over standard measurements of agreement for 
continuous data because it considers also differences in means and standard deviations between the raters. 
Estimates presented here are based on the supplement Excel sheet from Barchard (2012).  
28 The root square difference shows the raw mean difference between two raters in the original 
measurement unit. Perfect agreement is 0. The maximum is defined by the largest possible mean 
difference between to raters, depending on the used scale. In my case this would equal 4 (Barchard, 2012). 
29 For comparison: Pearson’s r = .80 across all six dimensions. Interpretation guidelines do not 
exist for Lin’s in the literature because they would be arbitrary. Given the interpretative nature of the 
ratings that make measurement disagreements more likely, a CCC of .80 can be considered a very good 
standard of absolute agreement. 
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negative attitude aspects of blood donation (Bednall & Bove, 2011; S. Y. Choi, Park, & 
Oh, 2012). Items read for example “I think blood donation does not contribute to other's 
well-being”, “I think donating blood is an ethical behavior” (reverse coded), or “I fear 
I’ll get bruised and sore arms from donating blood”. Answer options ranged from  
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The items showed satisfactory consistency 
in both countries, Cronbach’s αGermany = .76 (M = 5.26, SD = 0.92, n = 93),  
Cronbach’s αU.S. = .74 (M = 4.85, SD = 0.91, n = 98), and were combined to a mean 
index. The initial mean index was reversed so that higher scores indicate more positive 
attitudes.  
Behavioral intentions. The behavioral intention was a second indicator for 
participants’ attitude towards blood donation. It was assessed using two questions on 
the intention to donate blood and intention to test eligibility for blood donation within 
the next 12 months (e.g., “How likely are you to donate blood within the next 12 
months”). Answer options ranged from 1 (absolutely not likely) to 7 (definitely). Scale 
consistency was acceptable for Germany (Cronbach’s αGermany = .77, M = 3.99,  
SD = 1.60, n = 88), and the U.S. (Cronbach’s αU.S. = .87, M = 3.72, SD = 1.64, n = 92), 
and items were collapsed in a mean index of behavioral intentions ranging from 1 (low 
behavioral intentions) to 7 (high behavioral intentions).  
Relevance. Relevance was included in the study as important indicator of 
attitudes. It was assessed by asking participants “How relevant is blood donation to you 
personally?”, with answer options ranging from 1 (highly irrelevant) to 7 (not at all 
relevant) (MGermany = 4.83, SD = 1.54, n = 93; MU.S. = 3.82, SD = 1.53, n = 94).  
Likelihood estimates. Given the frame of blood donation shortage the message 
implies, participants were asked to estimate the availability and the demand of blood 
donations. They were asked four questions: “What percentage of treatments in hospitals 
incorporates blood transfusions?” (Estimate 1, M = 44.16, SD = 25.26) and “What 
percentage of individuals will need a blood transfusion at least once throughout their 
life?” (Estimate 2, M = 41.62, SD = 25.42) as items for the estimated demand of blood 
donation. “What percentage of the U.S. [German] population is eligible to donate 
blood?” (Estimate 3, M = 66.64, SD = 18.44), and “What percentage of the U.S. 
[German] population donates blood on a regular basis?” (Estimate 4, M = 14.76,  
SD = 12.37) were the items referring to the availability of blood donations. Behind each 
question participants could insert three digits. Given a problematizing frame of blood 
donation shortage within the message used in this study and the critical health care 
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implications such a shortage has, Estimates 1 and 2 are reversed by the ego-centered 
logic of psychological distance. Because Estimates 1 and 2 asked for how often blood 
donations are needed, here higher numbers imply that it is also more likely to threaten 
the participants’ health (psychological proximity) and lower numbers imply that it is 
less likely to concern the participants (psychological distance). In contrast, Estimates 3 
and 4 referred to the availability of blood, by asking how many people donate blood or 
are eligible to donate. Thus, in this case higher numbers mean more people donate 
blood and imply less shortage. This, in turn, resembles more psychological distance. 
Estimates 1 and 2 will be treated as reversed coded. 
Covariate. Aside from socio demographic markers, participants’ experience with 
blood donation was assessed. To measure blood donation experience, participants were 
asked to indicate whether they are regular blood donors. They indicated this by a 
dichotomous choice between “Are you (a) a regular blood donor? (at least two times in 
the past 12 months) or (b) not a regular blood donor”. Eight participants in the German 
sample and 8 from the U.S. sample indicated that they are regular blood donors.  
Social demographics. Age, education, and sex were assessed as social 
demographic variables. 
7.2 Results 
7.2.1 Randomization check.  
The individual difference factor action identification measured by the BIF 
(Behavior Identification Form, Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) was used to test whether the 
randomization did work, as it was administered in the pretest questionnaire. The BIF 
scores were not normally distributed in Germany (zskewness = −2.11, zkurtosis = 0.92) but in 
the U.S. (zskewness = −0.07, zkurtosis = −0.68). Homogeneity of variances could be assumed, 
for Germany F(1,101) = 0.38, p > .05 and the U.S. F(1,96) = 0.15, p > .05. Thus, the 
mean difference was bootstrapped using 1,000 samples. Both countries showed no 
action identification mean difference between the experimental groups. The mean 
difference in Germany, −1.29, BCa 95% CI [−3.15, 0.56], was not significant,  
t(101) = −1.39, p > .05, r = .14. The mean difference for the U.S. sample, 0.07, BCa 
95% CI [−1.81, 1.95], was also not significant, t(96) = 0.07, p > .05, r = .00. The groups 
were further indistinguishable in terms of age (cp. Table 15).  
The German mean age difference, 0.56, BCa 95% CI [−0.21, 1.32], was not 
significant, t(101) = 1.48; p > .05. The U.S. mean age difference, 0.49,  
BCa 95% CI [−0.22, 1.21], was also not significant, t(96) = 1.37, p > .05.. Finally, there 
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was no sex difference between the experimental groups in Germany, χ2(1) = 0.63,  
p > .05, and the U.S., χ2(1) = 0.22, p > .05 (cp. Table 16). These results suggest that the 
randomization did work.  
Table 15  
Mean and Standard Deviations Action Identification and Age by Country and Group 
  Germany U.S. 
  BIF Age BIF Age 
Experimental Groups M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
 negative mood 
13.89 
(4.45) 
21.83 
(1.71) 
13.04 
(4.70) 
20.78 
(2.01) 
 n 53 45 
 positive mood 
14.97 
(4.98) 
21.28 
(1.91) 
12.86 
(4.54) 
20.29 
(1.46) 
  n 40 49 
 
Table 16 
Distribution of Sex by Country and Group 
    Germany U.S. 
Experimental Groups female male female male 
  negative mood 39 14 38 7 
  positive mood 28 12 37 12 
 Total 67 26 75 19 
 
7.2.2 Preliminary analyses 
Participants watching the positive movie clip reported feeling better (M = 7.21; 
SD = 1.37, n = 89) than participants watching the negative mood induction (M = 2.15; 
SD = 1.05, n = 98). According to an independent t-test, the mood manipulation was 
successful and the mean difference, 5.07, BCa 95% CI [4.70, 5.45], was significant, 
t(185) = 28.49, p < .05, r = .90. The mood manipulation was also successful for both 
countries individually, but the U.S. sample showed significantly more extreme mood 
values than the German sample (cp. Table 17).  
Preliminary analyses further revealed a sex influence on the dependent variables 
attitudes and behavioral intentions. Men (M = 5.29, SD = 0.90, n = 45) showed more 
positive attitudes towards blood donation than women (M = 4.97, SD = 0.94, n = 135). 
The mean difference, −0.32, BCa 95% CI [−0.64, −0.002], was significant,  
t(178) = 1.98, p < .05, r = .14. Further, men also showed more positive behavioral 
intentions towards blood donation (M = 4.30, SD = 160, n = 45) than the women of the 
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sample (M = 3.72, SD = 1.65, n = 135). The mean difference in behavioral intentions, 
−0.57, BCa 95% CI [−1.13, −0.01] was significant, t(178) = 2.02, p < .05, r = .15. 
Table 17  
Means for Mood by Country and Experimental Group 
  Germany      (n = 93)  
U.S.               
(n = 94) 
 Total 
Experimental Group M(SD)   M(SD)  M(SD) 
 positive 6.91
ac (1.19)  7.47
ad  (0.83)   7.21e (1.37) 
 n 40  49  89 
 negative 2.75
bc (0.83)  1.44
bd  (1.46)  2.15e (1.05) 
 n 53  45  98 
 Total 4.54
f  (2.30)  4.58
f    (3.25)    
Note. Higher scores indicate a more positive mood.  
a Mean difference, 0.56, BCa 95% CI [0.07, 1.19], is approaching significance, t(87) = 1.94, p = .056,  
r = 20. 
b Mean difference, −1.31, BCa 95% CI [−1.66, −0.99], is significant, t(96) = −7.77, p < .05, r = .62. 
c Mean difference, 4.16, BCa 95% CI [3.66, 4.59], is significant, t(91) = 19.88, p < .05, r = .90. 
d Mean difference, 6.02, BCa 95% CI [5.55, 6.52], is significant, t(77.41) = 24.77, p < .05, r = .94. 
e Mean difference, 5.07, BCa 95% CI [4.70, 5.42], is significant, t(185) = 8.50, p < .05, r = .53. 
f Mean difference, 0.04, BCa 95% CI [−0.77, 0.80], is not significant, t(167.30) = 0.10, p > .05, r = .04. 
Before moving on to the main analyses of the hypotheses, I analyzed the zero-
order correlations among the studied variables (cp. Table 18). The pre-exposure mood 
reports of the participants showed small but significant correlations with the overall 
abstraction index and with the individual dimensions favorability, idealism, and self-
regulatory focus. The dimension ego-centrality did not correlate with the sub-
dimensions idealism and self-regulatory focus, but moderately with favorability, 
valence, desirability, and the overall index. Idealism correlated moderately with all 
dimensions but ego-centrality and the dimension desirability shows particular strong 
covariance with most other dimensions. This suggests that the dimensions indeed 
measure individual aspects of abstract and concrete mental representation, but that 
desirability, idealism, and favorability are outstanding constructs in this measurement. 
The individual propensity measurement BIF, assessing people’s tendency to identify 
actions more abstract or concrete, shows small significant positive correlations with 
idealism and desirability. As could be expected, the attitude outcomes (blood donation 
attitudes, behavior intentions, and relevance of blood donation) showed small to 
moderate positive correlation amongst each other. 
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7.2.3 Situational, individual, and cultural factors. 
Main analyses. In Hypothesis 1b I predicted that a positive mood would lead to 
a more abstract message representation in participants compared to a negative mood 
pre-exposure. Further, H2 assumed that the more abstract the individual difference in 
action identification is, the more abstract is the message representation in participants. 
Finally, participants from a more collectivistic culture (Germany) should, according to 
Hypothesis 3, also show more abstract message representation than participants from a 
more individualistic culture (U.S.). The experimental and quasi-experimental groups 
were compared for differences in mental representation using individual action 
identification tendency as covariate. The covariate, individual action identification, was 
not independent from the cultural factor, as the BIF was more abstract for the German 
sample (M = 14.35, SD = 4.69, n = 93) than for the U.S. sample (M = 12.95, SD = 4.60, 
n = 94). This mean difference, −1.41, was significant, t(185) = −2.07, p < .05, r = 0.15. 
The multidimensional ratings of the thought-listings were averaged to calculate a mean 
score of abstract mental representation. This score was entered in a 2 (Mood) x 2 
(Country) independent ANCOVA.  
The ANCOVA revealed a small main effect of mood on the level of abstraction 
in the thought-listings, F(1,165) = 3.56, p < .10, ω2 = .02.30 Participants in the positive 
mood group showed more abstract thought-listings (M = 3.30, SD = 0.51, BCa 95% CI 
[3.19, 3.41]) than participants in the negative mood group (M = 3.15, SD = 0.53,  
BCa 95% CI [3.05, 3.26]). This trend supports H1b. There was a non-significant main 
effect of country on the level of abstraction in the thought-listings, F(1,165) = 2.55,  
p > .05, ω2 = .01. As predicted, participants from Germany showed more abstract 
thought-listings (M = 3.29, SD = 0.53, BCa 95% CI [3.18, 3.39]) than participants from 
the U.S. (M = 3.17, SD = 0.50, BCa 95% CI [3.05, 3.29]). Yet, given the probability of 
this small effect, H3 is not supported based on this data set. Additionally, there was no 
interaction effect as it is illustrated in Figure 15, F(1,165) = 0.02, p > .05, ω2 = −.01. 
Finally, the individual difference factor measured by the behavior identification index 
(BIF) did not show any significant influence on the abstract or concrete representations 
in participants, F(1,165) = 0.66, p > .05, ω2 =.004. Hypothesis 2 is not supported.  
A simple effects analysis was conducted. It showed that the message construal 
difference in the German sample, 0.18, 95% CI [−0.03, 0.38] approached significance, 
                                                
30 Equation for ω2 for multi-factorial designs based on Fritz, Morris, and Richler (2012). 
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F(1,180) = 2.95, p = .09, r = .13, while the difference in the U.S. sample, 0.15, 95% CI  
[−0.06, 0.37] did not, F(1,180) = 2.01, p > .05, r = .10 (cp. Figure 15).  
 
 
Figure 15 
Mean message construal in thought-listings on a scale from 1 (concrete) to 5 (abstract) 
as a function of pre-exposure mood and country. Germany: Mpositive = 3.38 (0.48), 
Mnegative = 3.20 (0.53); U.S.: Mpositive = 3.25 (0.50); Mnegative = 3.09 (0.49). 
Additional analyses. For a more detailed analysis, the individual dimensions of 
the multidimensional representation measure (valence, favorability, ego-centrism, 
desirability, idealism, and self-regulatory focus) were entered in a 2 (Mood) x 2 
(Country) MANOVA.31 The main effect of the mood manipulation was not significant 
using Pillai’s trace, V = .04, F(6,139) = 0.85, p > .05, η2 = .04. The second main effect 
of the country on the level of abstraction in the mental representation, V = .07, F(6,139) 
= 1.60, p > .05, η2 = .07, as well as the interaction effect remained non-significant,  
V = .01, F(6,139) = 0.29, p > .05, η2 = .01. Mean differences between the mood groups 
on the individual dimensions can be seen in Table 19. They adhere to the projected 
pattern of higher means and thus more abstract thoughts in the positive mood condition 
compared to the negative mood condition. Individual ANOVAs for the country 
differences revealed that participants from Germany showed significantly more 
idealism and desirability than participants from the U.S. in their thought-listings  
(cp. Table 20).  
                                                
31 The statistical assumption of multivariate normality was violated, which was complicated by 
the different group sizes. Even by the most liberal standards, probability values were not trustworthy 
(Field, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). The smallest cell for this MANOVA was 37 cases big (German, 
positive mood group). To assess the MANOVA, I randomly sampled 37 cases from all other cells, in 
order to equalize the initial group sizes. With equal group sizes, Pillai’s trace is robust against violations 
of multivariate normality. However, this technique automatically reduces the power to detect effects. 
1.50%2.00%
2.50%3.00%
3.50%4.00%
Positive%Mood% Negative%Mood%Mood%Condition%
Country%U.S.%Country%Germany%
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Table 19  
Analysis of Variance for the Six Individual Dimensions of Mental Representation by 
Group 
    
Positive mood 
condition 
Negative mood 
condition       
  
n = 74 n = 74 
   Dimensions  M SD M SD F df par. η
2 
Valence 
 
3.28 0.72 3.24 0.76 0.12 1,144 0.01 
Favorability 
 
3.71 0.66 3.59 0.67 1.22 1,144 0.00 
Ego-Centrality 
 
2.63 0.82 2.48 1.03 0.87 1,144 0.01 
Desirability 
 
3.59 0.72 3.56 0.78 0.84 1,144 0.00 
Idealism 
 
3.10 0.70 2.91 0.81 2.37 1,144 0.02 
Self-regulatory Focus  3.67 0.66 3.56 0.63 0.98 1,144 0.01 
 
Table 20  
Analysis of Variance for the Six Individual Dimensions of Mental Representation by 
Country 
  
 
Germany U.S.       
  
n = 74 n = 74 
   Dimensions  M SD M SD F df par. η2 
Valence 
 
3.34 0.72 3.19 0.75 1.36 1,144 0.01 
Favorability 
 
3.68 0.64 3.62 0.69 0.19 1,144 0.00 
Ego-Centrality 
 
2.51 0.96 2.60 0.91 0.36 1,144 0.00 
Desirability 
 
3.71 0.73 3.45 0.76 4.36 1,144 0.03* 
Idealism 
 
3.15 0.73 2.85 0.76 6.15 1,144 0.04* 
Self-regulatory Focus  3.64 0.65 3.59 0.63 0.26 1,144 0.00 
Note. *p < .05. 
7.2.4 Attitudes outcomes. 
For the attitudinal outcomes (attitudes, behavioral intentions, relevance), I 
predicted that participants in a positive mood would show more positive attitudes 
towards a public health issue than participants in a negative mood (H5b), because 
participants in a positive mood would construe the health information more abstractly 
than participants in a negative mood. Similarly, H5c specifically assumed that 
individual differences in action identification tendency also predict differences in 
attitude outcomes, because abstract action identification too should overall lead to a 
more abstract construal of information compared to concrete action identification 
tendencies. Finally, H5d predicted that the cultural background (collectivistic and 
individualistic) also affects the attitudes towards a public health issue, because 
participants from a more collectivistic societal background would construe the health 
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information more abstractly than participants from an individualistic societal 
background. 
The hypothesized mediation model (cp. Figure 13) was estimated using ordinary 
least squares path analysis with the PROCESS Macro (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Hayes, 
2013; Hayes & Preacher, 2014). The three independent factors mood condition, country, 
and individual action identification level were regressed on the three attitude outcomes 
blood donation attitudes, behavioral intentions, and relevance of blood donation. The 
message construal was used as mediator. Based on the preliminary analysis, the sex of 
the participants was added to the model as covariate. The model is split in three 
individual models for each outcome for a better overview (cp. Figure 16).  
The individual path models show that message construal had a significant direct 
influence on the attitude outcomes. Relative to more concrete thought listings, 
participants with more abstract thought listings reported stronger positive attitudes 
towards blood donation (b = 0.46, SE = 0.13, 95% BCa CI [0.21, 0.72]), more 
behavioral intention (b = 1.24, SE = 0.23, 95% BCa CI [0.80, 1.69]), and assigned blood 
donation a higher relevance (b = 0.91, SE = 0.22, 95% BCa CI [0.48, 1.35]).32 
According to bias corrected bootstrap CIs, these effects were different from zero and 
therefore H5 is supported. The sex of the participants had a moderate effect on two 
attitude outcomes. Relative to the male participants, female participants showed 
significantly less positive attitudes towards blood donation (b = −0.33, SE = 0.15, 95% 
BCa CI [−0.63, −0.03]) and marginally non-significant, less behavioral intention  
(b = −0.51, SE = 0.27, 95% BCa CI [−1.03 ,0.02]). The mood manipulation indirectly 
influenced attitudes (b = 0.07, SE = 0.04, 95% BCa CI [0.01, 0.18]), behavioral 
intentions (b = 0.18, SE = 0.11 95% BCa CI [−0.01, 0.42]), and the reported relevance 
of blood donation (b = 0.14, SE = 0.09, 95% BCa CI [0.01, 0.38]) through the 
participants’ message construal.  
On average and relative to the negative mood condition, participants in the 
positive mood condition showed 0.1 units more positive attitudes towards blood 
donation, reported 0.2 units more intent to donate blood, and assigned blood donation 
0.1 units more relevance as a result of the measured mental construal.33 The bias 
corrected CIs suggest that these small indirect effects are different from zero (except for 
                                                
32 All 95% Confidence intervals reported in section 7.2.4 and section 7.2.5 were bootstrapped 
from 10,000 samples, unless noted otherwise. 
33 All outcomes were measured on a 7-point Likert scale. Because of the dichotomous nature of 
the factor mood condition, the indirect effect can be understood as mean difference between the negative 
and positive mood group. 
  
133 
 
behavioral intentions) and thus H5b is partially supported. There was no evidence that 
the mood condition had any direct effect on these attitude outcomes (cp. Figure 16). 
Secondly, the individual difference factor was treated as independent variable in 
this model, as hypothesized in H5c. There was no indirect effect of the participants’ 
individual difference on their blood donation attitudes (b = 0.003, SE = 0.004,  
95% BCa CI [−0.01, 0.01]), behavioral intentions (b = 0.01, SE = 0.01, 95% BCa CI 
[−0.01, 0.04]), and the reported relevance of blood donation (b = 0.01, SE = 0.01, 95% 
BCa CI [−0.01, 0.03]) through message construal. The data does not confirm H5c. 
Therefore, the corresponding null-hypothesis, that there is no indirect effect of 
individual action identification tendency through mental construal, is accepted. A direct 
influence of the individual difference factor on the blood donation attitudes and 
behavioral intentions was significant.  
The country of the participants was the last factor of interest (H5d). The indirect 
effect of the participants’ cultural background, through the message construal, on their 
blood donation attitudes (b = 0.06, SE = 0.04, 95% BCa CI [−0.01, 0.15]), behavioral 
intentions (b = 0.18, SE = 0.11, 95% BCa CI [−0.01, 0.41]), and the reported relevance 
of blood donation (b = 0.11, SE = 0.08, 95% BCa CI [−0.01, 0.29]) resemble the 
hypothesized mean differences between the countries due to participants’ construal. 
Relative to the participants from the U.S., the German participants scored on a  
7-point Likert scale on average 0.1 units higher in their positive attitudes towards blood 
donation, 0.2 units higher in positive behavioral intention to donate blood, and 0.1 units 
higher in the relevance of blood donation. The 95% bias corrected CIs all marginally 
included 0. Therefore, H5d is not supported based on this data set. Additionally, there 
was evidence that the participants’ country had a direct effect on the attitudes towards 
blood donation and its relevance. Here, participants from Germany showed significantly 
more positive attitudes and reported higher relevance of blood donation than U.S.-
participants.  
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Figure 16 
Ordinary least square path models for the influence of mood condition, country, and 
individual action identification on blood donation attitudes, behavioral intentions and 
relevance through construal level mind-set. Panel 1: n = 170, F(5,164) = 7.45, p < .05,  
R2 = .18; Panel 2: n = 164, F(5,158) = 9.29, p < .05, R2 = .23; Panel 3: n = 170,  
F(5,165) = 9.12, p < .05, R2 = .22; †p < .10; *p < .05, **p < .01. 
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7.2.5 Psychological distance outcomes. 
Hypothesis 6c predicted that individuals who construe mediated health messages 
in an abstract construal mind-set, judge likelihoods concerning this health topic as lower 
than individuals in a concrete construal level mind-set. Likelihood judgments are a 
special case of psychological distance (Wakslak et al., 2006). In an experimental test, 
this translates to a mean difference between the mood conditions and the countries, so 
that positive mood or participants from more collectivistic countries respectively 
estimate the likelihood of blood donation as less likely (thus abstract) compared to the 
negative mood condition or individualistic cultural background, because the latter have 
more concrete mental construals. The influence of the individual action identification 
tendency is also modeled as independent factor (cp. Figure 17). The hypothesized 
model resembles the mediation model for the attitudes outcomes and also includes sex 
as covariate, as the two of the four estimates significantly differ between the sexes.  
 
Figure 17  
Hypothesized model of the factors mood condition, country, and individual differences 
in action identification predicting the likelihood of blood donation-related events 
mediated by the construal level. 
An index of all four questions was not reliable (α = .49) and the correlations among the 
items regarding the availability of blood donations and the demand of blood donations 
were not substantial enough (cp. Table 18). So I will present four separate models, one 
for each estimate. The individual path models show no strict pattern (cp. Appendix 
10.1). Construal level had a significant direct influence on Estimates 1 and 3. Relative 
to more concrete thought listings, participants with more abstract thought listings 
reported lower estimates of the percentage of treatments in hospitals that incorporate 
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blood transfusions (Estimate 1, b = −7.72, SE = 3.84, 95% BCa CI [−0.13, −15.30]).34 
This equals a decrease in the estimates of approx. 8 % per single unit increase on the 5-
point Likert scale rating of message construal in the participants’ thought listings. This 
relationship is as hypothesized, as lower numbers here equal a higher psychological 
distance.  
Similarly, participants with a more abstract construal level reported higher 
estimates of the percentage of people that are eligible to donate blood in the respective 
population (Estimate 3, b = 5.92, SE = 2.57, 95% BCa CI [0.85, 10.98]). The more 
abstract participants’ construal was, the higher they estimated the availability of blood 
donors. This relationship is confirming the hypothesis, as it resembles that people with 
more abstract construal level deem the availability of blood donors higher and therefore 
the problem of blood shortage as psychologically more distant to them personally. For 
those two models, the bias corrected bootstrap CIs of these effects were different from 
zero, but they only support the hypothesis partially (H6c). For the two remaining 
estimates, the relationship was not significant. Again, relative to more concrete thought 
listings, participants with more abstract thought listings reported higher estimates of the 
percentage of individuals that will need a blood transfusion at least once throughout 
their life, b = −6.09, SE = 3.86, 95% BCa CI [1.54, −13.71] (Estimate 2), and a slightly 
lower percentage of the respective population that donates blood regularly, b = −0.34, 
SE = 1.88, 95% BCa CI [−4.05, 3.38] (Estimate 4). The sex of the participants had only 
a marginal effect on the first estimate (cp. Figure 18, Appendix 10.1). 
The mediation effect was non-significant for all factors in all models  
(cp. Table 21, Appendix 10.1). Direct effects could only be witnessed for the factor 
country (cp. Figure 18, Appendix 10.1) on two occasions. They showed, contrary to the 
hypothesis, that participants from a more collectivistic society (Germany) estimate the 
number of hospital treatments that include a blood transfusion higher than participants 
from more an individualistic society (U.S.; Estimate 1). Similarly, participants from 
Germany also rated the number of people who donate blood on a regular basis (Estimate 
4) lower than participants from the U.S. Finally, supportive of the hypothesized 
direction was the association showing that participants from Germany, as more 
collectivistic society, estimated the percentage of people eligible to donate blood higher 
than participants from the U.S. as prototypical individualistic society (Estimate 3). 
                                                
34 The negative coefficient is due to the reverse worded item. It can be interpreted that people 
estimated more hospital procedures to include blood transfusions. 
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Overall, the hypothesis that message construal affects psychological distance estimates 
cannot be supported.  
7.3 Discussion 
The construal level mind-set refers to the construction effort of making a mental 
image of the subjective reality. The aim of the presented study was to a) test the 
contribution of mood, cultural, and individual differences as factors that influence 
construal level mind-set and b) test the influence of the construal level mind-set during 
exposure to a persuasive blood donation message on post-exposure attitudes and social 
judgment concerning a public health issue. As in the first study, I adopted a situated 
cognition perspective that assumes that attitudes and social judgments are based on the 
mental representations people have of a thing and that come to mind in the moment of 
judgment (Schwarz, 2009). From this perspective, the overall question was not to what 
extent the message or previous attitudes influence judgments, but how situational, 
individual, and cultural factors can explain the mental construal of a mediated message 
and how consequent attitudes and judgments change as a result of these representations.  
7.3.1 Implications for the factors of message construal. 
By and large, the central findings are consistent with the hypothesized model  
(cp. Figure 13). The data demonstrated a positive influence of participants’ mood on 
their mental representation of the health message (H1b). This adds further empirical 
support to the mood-as-information approach (Schwarz, 1990) and mood-as-general-
knowledge model (Bless, 2001), assuming that positive mood leads individuals to 
process information more abstract. Specifically, the present study adds to this line of 
research an application within a media effects paradigm, adding an uncontrolled target 
media influence. In the present case, this was a text based persuasive message, that 
itself probably exerted an influence on the construal. Nonetheless, the manipulation of 
participants’ mood still yielded a significant impact on the construal of the message.  
Furthermore, I assumed, in agreement with cultural comparisons by Hofstede 
(2001) and assumptions lend by research on self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) 
and holistic/analytical thinking style (Nisbett et al., 2001), that the German sample 
would show more abstract construal of the blood donation message than participants 
from the United States of America based on their differences on the collectivism-
individualism spectrum. According to this theorizing, collectivistic cultures tend to 
focus stronger on context and higher-order influences. In contrast, individual cultures 
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concentrate less on the associations between context and actions or objects, and 
attribute much behavior to lower-order influences (i.e., dispositionism) rather than 
higher-order circumstances. These conceptual foci would influence the way participants 
construe new information. Mean differences between the two samples were in the 
hypothesized direction. Corresponding with previous findings, the culture considered 
more collectivistic (Germany) does in fact display slightly more abstract message 
construal than the culture that is generally considered more individualistic (U.S.). The 
main effect of the country on the level of construal in participants’ mental 
representations was also supported by a trend in the data (cp. Figure 15). Support for 
Hypothesis 3 (the main effect of the country) was partially detected for the desirability 
and idealism sub-dimensions of message construal.  
Although the differences between the countries were small, they support my 
earlier claim (cp. Section 4.3) that cross-cultural comparisons need to integrate research 
of finer, less extreme cultural opposites. Extreme differences are monopolizing the 
research literature, for example comparisons between the U.S. and Japan, as they 
promise strong differences in self-construal and collectivism (Hofstede, 2001; 
Miyamoto, Knoepfler, Ishii, & Ji, 2013). But partially contradicting evidence to the 
notion that collectivism leads to holistic processing, whereas individualism to more 
analytic processing (Marquez & Ellwanger, 2014) would possibly gain new insights 
when considering less extreme cultural differences.  
The study at hand adds to this literature in two critical ways: (1) It compares less 
extreme cultures on the collectivism/individualism spectrum against each other and (2) 
it utilizes construal level as framework for the differences in cognitive style. 
Explanations for the lack of statistical support for the cultural difference hypotheses can 
also be found. For example, the U.S. campus used for recruiting has a rather diverse 
portfolio of international students and ethnicities. This might be especially relevant, as a 
central underlying assumption for a cross-cultural comparison is a homogeneous 
cultural background within the two country samples. From domestic students on this 
campus, 18 % identified as Asian and 23 % were international students. Among the 
international students, China and India were by far the most common countries of 
citizenship, followed directly by South Korea and Taiwan.35 Although these university 
wide statistics possibly are not distributed evenly across all disciplines, the convenience 
                                                
35 Numbers based on the 2014 statistics published by the school, retrieved on September 24th, 
2015 http://about.usc.edu/facts/. 
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sample from the U.S. might not be fully representative of a traditional, individualistic 
U.S. culture.  
Finally, the individual differences as conceptualized by Action Identification 
Theory had no impact on the construal level in participants’ thought listings, contrary to 
my hypothesis. Yet, it was associated with the cultural background of the participants. 
As expected, participants from Germany, whom I conceptualized with more abstract 
self-construal and holistic thinking style, showed more abstract action identification 
compared to participants from the United States. In Section 4.3 on cultural differences, I 
have argued that cultural differences cannot be seen as the sum of individual difference. 
However, since no support for the initial hypothesis was found, the possibility could be 
explored. The array of culturally embedded differences (self-construal and holistic 
versus analytical thinking style) was not measured, but it could be argued that these 
differences could in fact present as a difference in abstract or concrete action 
identification. This was assessed in the data, but it showed that there was no influence 
of the country on overall message construal through the action identification level.36 
This null finding suggests that, in fact, action identification and message construal are 
conceptually independent, with the former seemingly only applicable to actions and 
behaviors. In contrast, construal level with the definition that I adopted here, assumes 
that all things—actions, inanimate and animate objects, events or ideas—can be 
construed abstractly or concretely. Looking at the individual dimensions of message 
construal, this notion is further supported, because the two countries specifically differ 
in terms of their desirability and idealism, but not on the self-regulatory focus 
dimension. Also, the self-regulatory focus dimension was conceptually based on Action 
Identification Theory and thus they should have correlated, but the two concepts had no 
association (r = −.20, p > .05). As a result, further research should pay attention to these 
dimensions, in particular, to see if they are actually part of the construal construct. 
Furthermore, the fact that the individual dimensions of message construal hardly 
show any meaningful individual differences between positive and negative mood 
groups and between the countries, but the index of all dimensions does, supports that 
the measurement as a whole captures various aspects of construal level within the 
mental representations.  
                                                
36 (b = 0.01, SE = 0.01, 95% BCa CI [–1.54, 13.71]). 
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7.3.2 Implications of the effects from message construal on attitude and 
judgment. 
The second aim of this study was to test the influence of the construal level 
mind-set during exposure to a persuasive blood donation message on post-exposure 
attitudes and social judgment concerning this public health issue. As argued previously, 
abstract mental representations were expected to relate to more abstract evaluation 
categories like morals, ideologies, and higher-order attitudes (Fujita, Trope, et al., 2006; 
Vallacher & Wegner, 2012) and thus result in more positive attitudes toward blood 
donation. Therefore, I predicted that construal level mind-set would affect attitudes 
about blood donations (H5). The model (cp. Figure 16) strongly supported this 
hypothesis, showing that participants’ attitudes, behavioral intention, and relevance 
increased the more abstractly they construed the message. Most strikingly, pre-exposure 
mood influenced how positive and relevant participants perceived blood donation and 
this was in part due to the message construal level (H5b). The country also influenced 
how positive and relevant participants considered blood donation, and a trend emerged 
from the data suggesting that this could also be in part be attributed to the construal 
level applied (H5d).37 These results contribute significantly to the field of both construal 
level research and media effects. They demonstrate that the phenomena of abstract 
thinking influences the processing of mediated health messages as well as the related 
attitudes.  
As such these findings suggest complementary ways to think about persuasive 
effects in mass media, by more intensely investigating not simply how attitudes and 
mental representations are activated, but kind of mental representations are activated. 
The direct effect of the country on participants’ attitudes was statistically highly 
significant, with the exception of behavioral intentions. Participants from Germany had 
more positive blood donation attitudes, higher behavioral intention to donate blood 
within the next 12 months, and attributed more relevance to blood donation than 
participants from the U.S. As the applied message construal level only in part explains 
these effects, the country differences must also depend on other sample differences. One 
demographic difference between the samples was the age of participants. The German 
subsample was exactly 1.07 years older than the U.S. participants, which was 
considered in the models. Beside the cultural variation that was assumed, the recruited 
campuses in Germany and the U.S. could systematically differ in social background 
                                                
37 The indirect effect of country through message construal missed the significance level of .05 
slightly and included 0 in the confidence interval. 
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variables, particularly, the U.S. campus was a large private university in California, 
suggesting higher socio-economic status than most public universities in Germany. 
Such social differences could be one source of variance between the two country 
samples and could easily be considered in future studies.  
Table 18 shows that only the demand items correlate moderately positive with 
one another. It was also expected the two items pertaining to the participants’ country 
state of blood donors and to the question of availability, would be related. Already a 
missing internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .49) was a hint that the items are possibly 
very different in their perceived difficulty and underlying construct.  
An alternative explanation for the lack of confirmatory findings for the 
hypothesis claiming that abstract construal would lead to more psychological distance 
(H6c) is that the items actually triggered other frames of references for each participant. 
I expected the most likely frame for participants would be the notion of blood shortage 
when reading a blood donation call. In this expected case, the more severe and often 
blood donation shortage occurs, the closer it should appear to the individuals, because it 
is more likely to happen to them. It follows from this logic that if participants estimate 
more people are actually donating blood, the issue is less close to them, because they 
are less likely to experience blood shortage. The reverse would be true for those 
participants who estimate fewer people donate blood on a regular basis. However, the 
questions about how many people donate blood or are eligible to do so could have been 
interpreted using a different frame. That is, the more people are eligible the more likely 
oneself is also eligible. This reference frame would ascertain psychological proximity to 
the issue rather than distance.  
7.3.3 Summary. 
The results of this study give first preliminary insights to the role the applied 
construal level in mediated message processing has on post-exposure attitudes. They 
also demonstrate how situational factors, such as mood, can change attitude and 
judgments in persuasive media, because environmental factors can invoke crucial 
processing differences. Abstract thinking and concrete thinking ultimately emphasize 
different judgment principles. Although mood is just one possible influence and the 
cultural difference assumed in this study is merely theoretical rather than actually a 
measured one, the study significantly contributes to the research on media construal and 
its effects on attitudes. While first of all, the results and the measurement need 
validation, further down the road other possible situational factors could be considered, 
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that are specific to the media use situation (more on this in the General Discussion in 
Chapter 8) 
Finally, traditional media effects research can teach a lot about how fast, deep, 
or easy people process mediated messages, but they have invested little thought into 
how abstract or concrete people construe a message. The present study introduces a new 
way of assessing abstract and concrete mental representations in thought listings, 
overcoming the narrow application of the linguistic category model (Coenen et al., 
2006) as measurement of abstraction in mainly action related thoughts. It furthermore 
extends a dichotomous semantic rating of thought-listings as abstract or concrete (Hong 
& Lee, 2010). Through these innovations, the study contributes methodologically to the 
field by introducing a multidimensional semantic measurement of abstract or concrete 
thinking about mediated messages that works along theoretically defined sub-
dimensions of mental construal. This advances dichotomous coding schemes by 
systematically considering possible manifestations of abstract construal.  
7.4 Limitations 
First of all, possible limitations of this study concern the methodological 
conceptualization. As mentioned previously, the cultural difference was operationalized 
through two country samples. There are numerous possible confounds between these 
countries that could account for the rather small effects found. For example, differences 
in the socioeconomic background between students of the private U.S.-university and 
the public German university can possibly account for variance between the samples in 
terms of their abstract and concrete thinking styles as well as their attitudes towards 
blood donation. Future research should elaborate on these differences by assessing self-
construal and other cross-cultural comparisons could help to establish the limits of the 
cultural influence on message processing. Furthermore, possible concerns exist about 
the used measurements. I introduced a new ad hoc measure for construal level conveyed 
in the thought listings. Further elaboration of the measurement could go two ways: On 
the one hand, validating research could test whether all six dimensions (i.e., valence, 
favorability, ego-centrality, idealism, desirability, and self-regulatory focus) are actually 
central. For example, the present study has given some instances to believe that self-
regulatory focus might be not central in assessing attitudes. On the other hand, an 
extension of this measurement could be achieved including other observable 
manifestations of abstract or concrete construal that can be detected in open thought 
listings. 
  
143 
 
In addition, the measurement of probability as psychological distance also 
consisted of ad hoc items. The affordance to estimate general percentages of people or 
people in their own country must have been rather high, leaving the items open to 
measurement error. As discussed before, the items proofed furthermore unfit because 
they had at least two very opposing interpretations. It remains open whether 
psychological distance, including temporal, local, social, and hypothetical distance, can 
actually be theorized to latent constructs like ideas and issues, rather than events, people, 
and manifest objects.  
Throughout the presented, study power is a likely problem, especially to validate 
indirect effects. Yet, given the new measurements and the uncommon design that 
included not just a manipulation message but also a target message, an a priori power 
analysis was not practical. Lastly, the use of a student sample is a potential limitation 
and calls the already small effects and trends displayed in this study into question on the 
population level. Especially given the interest in cultural differences of the students, it 
needs to be critically noted that this study mostly assessed an urban academic class. %
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8 General Discussion and Outlook 
8.1 Summary of Empirical Findings 
The present research project was designed to investigate the effects of situated 
construal of mediated health messages on health-related attitudes and knowledge 
formation. It was hypothesized that the abstract or concrete construal of the mediated 
health information would affect the mental representation of the issues and with that the 
resulting attitudes and behavioral intentions. Three factors were singled out, which were 
expected to influence how the media user processes new information: Situated factors 
such as mood or construal level mind-set directly, individual propensity for either 
abstract or concrete construal, and cultural differences. Two experiments were 
conducted along testing different determinants and messages.  
The hypothesized effect of message construal was demonstrated in only one of 
the two studies. The second study showed that mood did affect message construal of a 
simple, persuasive blood donation appeal in the predicted way, so that a more positive 
mood led people to a more abstract mental representation and a negative mood to less 
abstract representations respectively. This construal change did impact the attitudes 
towards blood donation mostly as projected. Abstract mental construal was related to 
more positive attitudes and concrete construal was related to less positive attitudes. In 
this study, the theoretically established mechanism of message construal partially 
mediated the effect of mood on attitude outcomes.  
The first study only produced marginally significant effects in a correlational 
model, signaling that the proposed influence of message construal was reversed to the 
expected relationship. The abstract construal of a 15-minute long documentary about 
organ donation led to less positive attitudes about organ donation, compared to a more 
concrete message construal. Importantly, this study did branch out to connect mental 
construal to other aspects of the specific case of mediated health messages and opened 
up some interesting new research areas.  
A construct of interest was the media user’s naïve judgment of the media content 
as abstract or concrete and how this relates to the theoretically guided assessment of 
abstraction in mental representations. A small correlation was found between the 
message construal and the naïve judgment, lending some clues as to what message 
components actually lead to abstract or concrete construal. A second aspect was the 
narratively of the medium and the narrative experience of the users. Typically, health 
information is often not presented in a factual manner, but is narrative in nature (e.g., in 
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documentaries that follow patients and doctors, or fictional or non-fictional narrations 
of individual health histories). As would be expected, the general assumption that 
stronger narrative involvement has a positive effect on the attitudes about the health 
issue was supported by the first study. Abstract construal scores as well as higher 
subjective ratings of abstractness were negatively related to involvement, suggesting 
that the influence of construal level on evaluations and attitudes is subordinate to its 
possible influence on involvement. The narrativity of the first target message compared 
to the non-narrative target message was an important structural difference between the 
two studies. Only in the non-narrative study trends were found confirming the posed 
positive influence of abstract thinking on attitudes.  
8.2 Advancements and Pitfalls in the Measurement of Construal Level 
The measurement of message construal was advanced in the second study, 
because it used a theoretically deduced scoring method to categorize the thoughts 
gathered by the thought-listing technique. In the first study, the domain specificity of 
construal was problematic for the measurement of construal. Many existing instruments 
do well in identifying abstraction of objects (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Amit et al., 2009) 
or actions (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Freitas et al., 2004; A. E. Clark & Semin, 2008), 
yet none seem to go beyond. Many published studies skip the step of measuring 
construal level as mediating variable all together; relying on previous work to claim that 
their underlying process is a shift of construal level. Those studies concentrate on 
manipulating factors that are known to change construal level and measure their 
outcomes of interest (e.g., Eyal et al., 2008; Ellithorpe et al., 2015). Of course, it is not 
always practical to measure construal. But to substantiate the influence construal level 
differences can have in a media setting, a control of the construal level that actually 
occurred, would help to judge the magnitude of effects and possible confounds. 
Therefore, one particular goal was to measure the mental abstraction of the target health 
messages and assesses it as mediating factor in the predicted relationships. It was 
assumed that the exposure to health messages would result in more positive attitudes, 
when they were construed with an abstract construal level mind-set compared to a 
concrete construal level mind-set.  
Both studies conducted made use of the thought-listing technique (Cacioppo, 
von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997). The first study used the most promising existing instrument 
that assesses sentences based on the LCM, but it actually turned out to be very limited 
to the measurement of action abstraction (cp. the discussion of Study 1, Section 6.3). As 
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a result, the open thought listings in Study 2 were analyzed with a newly developed 
coding scheme, which infers six dimension of abstract thought (i.e., valence, 
favorability, desirability, ego-centrality, idealism, self-regulatory focus). It concentrates 
on well-established cognitive manifestations of abstract and concrete construal. After 
this first implementation, the measurement definitely needs further testing of its 
construct validity as well as of its convergent validity. Compared to the linguistic 
coding scheme it offers more room for interpretation, because the six dimensions have 
less defined coding rules. Yet, the dimensions allow to cover much more semantic 
expressions of abstract or concrete thinking. Also, although the dimensions were 
theoretically derived their construct validity has to be further explored.  
In the last consequence the usefulness of open thought listings, as approximation 
of abstract or concrete construal, should be discussed. While this technique is a post-hoc 
technique (as are self-reports or implicit measurements), which only measures the 
mental representation displayed after media consumption, the technique allows to 
gather a data basis, which can be assessed through many lenses. For example, different 
coding schemes could be used to relate the level of abstractness with elaboration 
measures or valence (Cacioppo et al., 1997). 
8.3 Construal Level in the Media Use Environment 
Generally speaking, even with their shortcomings the two studies do suggest that 
situated factors seem to have only little influence on the abstract or concrete construal 
of mediated health information—this could be good news for media producers. 
Likewise, a particular trait influence on construal also seems to be negligible. 
Limitations of the individual studies’ causal inference and alternative hypotheses are 
discussed at the end of the individual studies (cp. Sections 6.3 and 7.3). It stands to 
argue their place in media and communication research.  
8.3.1 Determinants of construal level in the media use environment. 
Construal of information was defined, based on Burgoon et al. (2013), as the 
cognitive process that identifies central and invariant features of a thing or attitude 
object (Ledgerwood, Trope, et al., 2010). This definition was chosen, because it 
particularly does not refer to the domain of the attitude object (i.e., action identification 
or object abstraction). Two situational factors of construal level were operationalized as 
experimental manipulations. A procedural-priming task and a mood manipulation were 
used to influence the message construal.  
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The first priming task used actions and their abstraction to induce a construal 
level mind-set. This could have affected construal as a whole, but would mainly exert 
an effect on actions. Procedural-priming tasks might oppose to the idea to achieve a 
domain unspecific construal level change, because they have to train the thinking style 
using examples. In the case of the first study, people had examples of actions to train a 
more abstract or more concrete construal. Mood as situational factor or distance primes 
might work better in inducing a general thinking style. Mood is general information to 
the individual that does not only target actions, people, or objects. Most importantly, 
based on the mood-and-general-knowledge model I postulated that positive affect 
facilitates the adoption of a more abstract mental construal while negative affect 
facilitates the adoption of a more concrete mental construal (Bless & Fiedler, 1995). 
And in fact, comparing Studies 1 and 2, mood did seem to work much better as 
manipulation.  
I have initially argued that other situational factors, like conversations with 
friends or previous media use could facilitate a cognitive tuning of abstract or concrete 
construal. What other situational factors or message factors could be relevant? Pre-
exposure mood was investigated in the second study and experimentally distinguished 
from a target message, to mimic an extraneous factor. The second study produced 
evidence that mood might work particularly well, because it does not target a specific 
cognitive abstraction, like some procedural priming tasks. Mood works as impulse to 
functionally tune cognitions (Bless & Fiedler, 1995). So the question remains how the 
tuning assumption and the priming paradigm can be relevant in media effects research 
in the future. Additionally, the theorizing about congruency between cognitive and 
message construal are considered.  
Tuning assumption. In media effects research the question can be extended, 
asking which factors could facilitate a functional shift of the construal level toward 
more abstract or concrete representation. Of course, first up would be the fact that the 
target message itself can be the mood-inducing source. Secondly, the media use 
situation is inspected, because not only mood could require a functional shift of 
construal level, so can technical affordances. 
Present developments in entertainment theory are congruent to the cognitive 
tuning assumption (Bless & Fiedler, 1995; Bless, 2001). In the cause of theorizing, why 
people do enjoy sad movies (sad film paradox, Oliver, 1993), it was repeatedly 
suggested that sad movies do induce an eudaimonically fulfilling experience, triggering 
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thinking about one’s life, ruminating, “the search for meaning” (Vorderer & Reinecke, 
2015), and meaningful existence (Oliver & Raney, 2011). These imply goal- and 
meaning-oriented thoughts and thus fit the definitions of abstract thinking. Integrating 
eudaimonia as abstract construal mind-set could possibly lead to a more systematic 
evaluation of the effects, potentials, and possibly processes triggered by an 
entertainment experience that is not purely hedonic. The different dimensions that also 
inspired the multidimensional measurement, I presented in Study 2, could be used to 
actually conceptualize how the media users weigh idealism, desirability, favorability, 
valence, and how they view themselves in relation to the topic.  
Study 1 also informs this proposed theoretical relationship, in contrasting 
possible processes and effects linked to rather hedonic entertainment. First, the abstract 
construal level mind-set did not relate to more positive attitudes, contrary to my 
proposition. It did, however, relate to less narrative involvement. Secondly, the 
theorizing of narrative involvement was a combination of constructs (e.g., identification, 
transportation) that evolved out of a traditionally hedonic entertainment theory. In Study 
1, these processes were clearly associated with a concrete construal level mind-set. As 
in the discussion for Study 1 noted (cp. Section 6.3), a concrete construal level mind-set 
is also known to foster more vividness of events and persons portrayed, which can 
enhance involvement. Concrete construal has been theorized also as perceiving things 
as psychologically closer to the self, a mind-set that possibly eases constructing mental 
models of, for example, narrative worlds (Green, Brock, & Kaufman, 2004).  
Yet, from this study alone it remains unclear what is cause and what is effect. 
From a tuning perspective it would be reasonable to expect that narrative involvement 
actually causes a more concrete construal level mind-set. Narrative involvement should 
make, for example, the characters and people of a media message more accessible and, 
as some theorists claim, set the audience’s self into the narrative, moving their self as 
reference point closer to events and characters (Segal, 1995; Green & Brock, 2002). 
This would qualify as shifting the psychological distance and thereby the construal level 
(Trope et al., 2007).  
The synthesis of construal level mind-sets with entertainment theory thus could 
be a new area of research that is open to explore. Investigations to this end are of course 
complicated by the complexity of the entertainment situation, which is much better 
defined by a parallelism of eudaimonic and hedonic experiences (Bartsch, Vorderer, 
Mangold, & Viehoff, 2008), than as a clearly distinguishable process. It is here, were 
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the situational factors outside the medium itself could come into play again. Possible 
combinations of situational tuning and the media’s presentation could interact. Hence, a 
congruency assumption could be explored. An abstract construal level mind-set should 
make the processing of abstract media portrayal more fluent compared to a concrete 
presentation. 
Besides the entertainment process the media use situation is of interest. New 
research suggests the new-media environment could be one factor. Kazakova et al. 
(2015) showed that individuals adopted a more concrete action identification when 
multitasking. Through the wide dispersion of mobile devices the use of second screens 
during tradition media exposure is just one form of media multitasking currently 
discussed among the scientific community (Brasel & Gips, 2011; Voorveld & 
Viswanathan, 2015). From the standpoint of the cognitive tuning assumption inherent to 
Action Identification Theory (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) this fits all theoretical 
expectations (cp. Section 3.1). Media multitasking signifies a more complex situation 
than simply watching television, because one media source concurrently disrupts the 
other media source. Per definition, this should at least lead to a more concrete action 
identification (Vallacher & Wegner, 2012). Combining this theorizing and the first 
empirical steps from the presented studies, which investigated the influence abstract or 
concrete construal have on the related attitudes, it would suggest that media 
multitasking also has the potential to influence how persuasive media affect attitudes 
and behavioral intentions, because it can alter how people construe mediated 
information.  
Priming. Especially in media and communication research, the medium and the 
message itself are in the spotlight as influencing factors and can potentially bear many 
priming cues. From the theoretical literature reviewed for this research semantic 
priming emerged as one possible cue affecting message construal. Secondly, linguistic 
cues are likely relevant as well.  
Semantic cues. Semantic priming of psychological distance is the central 
methodology in Construal Level Theory. Distance primes have been successful in the 
past to achieve abstract or concrete examples of objects (Liberman et al., 2002; Förster 
et al., 2004), and actions alike (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Liberman, Trope, McCrea, et 
al., 2007), but also used to achieve more abstract (or concrete) evaluations (Eyal et al., 
2004; Fujita et al., 2008). Based on the work within the Construal Level Theory 
framework (cp. Section 3.2), also goal emphasis and result-oriented information should 
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structurally achieve more abstract mental representation of an action or event compared 
to information that detail action specifics (e.g., Liberman et al., 2002; Sagristano et al., 
2002; Nussbaum et al., 2003; S. L. Clark & Freitas, 2012). Basically, inserting a 
distance marker on any of the four psychological distance dimensions is domain-neutral. 
Therefore, it could have a stronger ability to affect construal in general, rather than just 
the construal of actions. For persuasive communication there has been evidence of 
congruency effects with distance primes (Fujita et al., 2008). For distant attitude objects, 
persuasive messages including abstract message cues were more effective than if 
message cue and psychological distance to the attitude object were mismatched.  
For media messages this implies how attitudes and mind-sets could be 
intentionally steered by using a certain language. Applications have been mainly 
investigated and discussed in consumer research (Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992; 
Fiedler, 2007; Kim, Meng, & Li, 2008; Tsai & McGill, 2011). But especially distance 
primes could be useful in integrating psychological theory with the long-standing 
tradition of news values research (“Nachrichtenwerttheorie”, Lippmann, 1922; Schulz, 
1976). News values (i.e., what makes a news actually news worthy) are perceived very 
differently across cultures, but are also conceptualized very distinctly between the so-
called Western cultures. In Germany, news value research has had a long and eventful 
tradition of theory development. In the past decade, the effect of news values on the 
audience’s side has been modeled with help from cognitive psychology. It has been 
established that for the users, news values like proximity are indicators of relevance, 
influencing attention distribution and recall of the news (Eilders, 1997). Particularly, 
since Lippmann (1922) proximity has been part of the theorizing in most Western 
theories of news values. It has taken the form of cultural, personal, political, geographic, 
or economic proximity (Eilders, 2006). However, Construal Level Theory (Trope & 
Liberman, 2012) could give valuable insights into how the mental representations is 
affected by such distance primes. While the summary of news value theory would 
suggest that more proximity does facilitate more attention and more central processing 
(Eilders, 2006), Construal Level Theory would add the dimension of abstract and 
concrete construal. Proximity would be expected to show links to more concrete, 
pragmatic processing and mental representation. It would be interesting to assess the 
mental representations for possible biases on the suggested dimensions of abstract and 
concrete thinking in Study 2 (i.e., valence, favorability, desirability, idealism, ego-
centrality, and self-regulatory focus). Another example that also functions as news 
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value is novelty. Novelty frames have been discussed in Construal Level Theory to lead 
to broader mental categorization and more abstract action identification (Förster et al., 
2009, Studies 4a/b and 5a/b).  
Similarly, gain or loss framing of messages was indirectly related to more 
abstract construal. First, stressing aspects like desirability versus feasibility in a 
message should highlight abstract versus concrete information about an attitude object, 
based on the Construal Level Theory (Trope et al., 2007). Initial results on processing 
of gain and loss frames also show the same pattern of congruency effects, as distance 
primes do (Nan, 2007). Thus, gain and loss frames also represent abstract and concrete 
message cues and if the situational construal level mind-set is matched, they are 
processed with more ease. 
Finally, pictures are a more concrete communication medium than words. A 
whole series of experiments showed people to use pictures to communicate with 
proximal others and words for distant others, mirroring the congruency effects 
discussed above. Convergent evidence exists for various dimensions of psychological 
distance (Amit et al., 2009). The match between medium and the distance to the choice 
option is reportedly more effective in influencing preferences of people. Using the 
choice of a restaurant, researchers showed participants the picture of ingredients for a 
recipe versus written recipe instructions and manipulated the distance to choice options 
(local vs. distant chef) (Amit et al., 2013). Participants in this experiment preferred 
matching conditions (local chef and picture of recipe; distant chef and written recipe 
instruction) to the mismatching conditions. This is another example of a congruency 
effect. It might be worth some more exploration, particularly since visual media38 have 
more range than the traditional text media combined (i.e., daily newspapers, journals, 
books) (Engel & Mai, 2015). 
Linguistic cues. Fiedler and Mata (2014) discuss a whole variety of lexical 
priming effects, how they call linguistic cues. The linguistic category model suggests 
categories of abstract and concrete language that can be used to measure mental 
construal (Semin & Fiedler, 1988). Additionally, utilized in tailored messages, those 
linguistic categories have the potential to cause abstract mental construal. Abstract 
linguistics use more adjectives and state verbs (i.e., promise, hate, agree), which allow 
the speaker to convey more high-level information. For example, one study tested the 
influence of linguistic categories on the perceived truth of a statement. A series of 
                                                
38 Excluding the internet. 
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experiments revealed that concrete language use lead participants to judge statements to 
be true versus not true when abstract language was used (i.e., linguistic concreteness 
effect, Hansen & Wänke, 2010). It was shown in two follow-up experiments that the 
linguistic concreteness effect was specifically pronounced for the readers who were in a 
concrete construal level mind-set (vs. abstract mind-set).  
Congruency effects. The congruency perspective can be found in many of the 
reviewed literature as underlying assumption. It holds the view that if mind-set and 
message or object presentation match (e.g., abstract construal level mind-set presented 
with an abstract target message) cognitive processing happens with ease (Bar-Anan et 
al., 2006; Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope, & Algom, 2007; Amit et al., 2009). In 
comparison, if an abstract mind-set is mismatched with concrete message cues 
processing is disturbed. Beyond that, seminal evidence also suggests that the persuasive 
appeal of the message is likely to benefit from a match between construal level mind-set 
and media presentation (Amit et al., 2013). Again, it has to be noted that these effects 
have been mainly investigated using non-narrative messages. This questions the 
environmental validity of the situated construal level effects in the typical media 
environment.  
8.3.2 Narrativity: Nuisance or factor? 
In social psychological and basic construal level research, narrative messages 
are not typically considered. Yet, otherwise in media and communication studies 
narrative messages are of particular importance and are, in fact, the most realistic and 
valid example of media persuasion. Study 1 integrates the narrative persuasion 
framework and the construal level perspective. It yielded interesting results that 
contrasted the posed relationship between construal level and attitudes. Instead of an 
abstract construal level, here a more concrete construal level seemed to relate to more 
positive attitudes. Narrative persuasion likely benefits from a more concrete construal, 
because, as in the first study, more concrete message construal lead to more narrative 
involvement and that in turn is known to result in more positive attitudes. In comparison, 
Study 2 found that for a non-narrative text that concrete construal about a public health 
topic lead to less positive effects.  
To the attentive reader this should strike as a contradiction to the assumption 
made above. I argued that eudaimonic and hedonic entertainment experiences are 
possibly treated as general information about the situation’s cognitive affordance and 
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result in a functional tuning of the individual’s cognition (cp. Section 8.3.1). It followed 
that an eudaimonic entertainment experience possibly exerts an abstract thinking style.  
These contradicting predictions illustrate the complexity of the entertainment 
situation. What if the construal level, to actually be transported into a narrative (Green, 
2004), has to be rather concrete in order to vividly imagine the narrative world and 
characters, but the experience of hedonic or eudaimonic pleasure might exert an 
independent effect on abstract or concrete thinking? Possible pre-exposure 
manipulations or narrative manipulations would affect the narrative involvement, but 
the effect the narrative has on attitude outcomes would be independent and mainly be 
influenced by the eudaimonic or hedonic pleasure derived from the narrative. Therefore, 
the narrative experience affects whether evaluative associations are drawn with abstract 
constructs (i.e., moral and normative ideas) or concrete constructs (i.e., individual costs 
and pragmatic concerns). For persuasion research, this opens up interesting prospects 
that should allow for research in the future.  
8.3.3 Cultivation of beliefs. 
For the research of cultivation effects (Gerbner et al., 2002), Construal Level 
Theory is a possible addition to further systemize contradicting results. Ellithorpe et al. 
(2015) found in two experiments that a first-order cultivation effect (fact-based 
judgments) was only detected under concrete construal, but not for abstract construal. 
Furthermore, in an experiment with a control group the authors found that concrete 
construal seemed to be a default mind-set of participants. This underlines the trend 
found in Study 1, when the concrete construal manipulation did not significantly change 
the mind-set compared to a control group (cp. results in Section 6.2.2). I have argued 
that the experimental situation as such might be perceived as new and uncommon, and 
thus a more concrete mind-set would be adopted (Vallacher & Wegner, 2012). It has to 
be considered, too, that a concrete construal level mind-set would be functional for first-
order cultivation judgments, particularly on instances of aggression and violence (a 
favorite topic of cultivation research). Statistically, the participants of these experiments 
would not have first-hand experience with violence and aggression to use as exemplars 
for the required first-order judgments (Gerbner & Gross, 1976). Hence, a reliance on 
mediated information would seem appropriate (Shrum, 2008). An abstract construal 
level mind-set would probably lead individuals to put these judgments into perspective 
and possible elicit thoughts about what they know to be true about the world overall, 
because abstract construals are associated with more general value judgments (Fujita et 
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al., 2008). From such an abstract perspective, the relevance of media exemplars of, for 
example, violence in the media could be reduced. Ellithorpe et al. (2015) argue that an 
abstract construal level could reduce the relevance of heuristic cues when making first-
order judgments.  
Furthermore, the construal level perspective is informative for the study of 
cultivation effects, because of the systematic role of psychological distance the theory 
has derived. The initial theorizing of the Construal Level Theory suggested that a mind-
set change could actually help individuals to process information that are proximal and 
distant (Liberman & Trope, 2008). Additionally, narrative persuasion research has 
discussed psychological distance as factor for cultivation effects and attitude change. 
For instance, Bilandzic (2006) suggests the possibilities of an experiential and a 
mediated closeness to the narrative content for the media user. Particularly, in 
judgments about events that are psychologically distant to the media user (e.g., 
temporally in historic dramas, hypothetically in science fiction, or locally in exotic 
location in movies) mediated information is often the only source of information 
(Bilandzic, 2006; Ellithorpe et al., 2015). It is expected that this causes media-biased 
judgments of reality. Psychological distance ignores how the closeness is established, 
through media or experience. This could help to actually distinguish between the 
determinants of attitude change as (a) personal (issue) relevance or (b) transported 
media use (as the experience to transcend psychological distance into a narrative world). 
It might be helpful for basic theory development that wants to entangle the role of 
mediated proximity from personal relevance.  
8.4 Future Directions for Research of Construal Level in Media and 
Communication Studies 
Media’s single most fascinating prospect is that it disengages people from their 
current and immediate situation. Under these circumstances, the proposed superiority of 
the situation (Schwarz, 2012) might fade in the background. While individual 
hypotheses might actually be of value for the study of individual media effects (i.e., 
cognitive tuning assumption), others might be less suited. Cognitive construal level 
mind-sets are just one instance that is easily changed by media messages. Much of 
social psychology’s research needs to be reevaluated from a media research perspective. 
The tightly controlled experimental situation and target objects or messages are not 
transferable to an ecologically valid media use situations.  
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However, the perspective of abstract and concrete thinking styles and their 
effects on attitudes and behaviors taken here should still animate future research in 
media and communication research. A myriad of media inherent features are imaginable, 
that affect the construal level. Previous research and partial results from the present 
research allow assuming that there is a sizable influence of abstract and concrete 
representation of health information on the attitudes and behavioral intentions. I have 
discussed the theoretical implications that can be drawn from the findings and the 
theorizing presented. The theorizing on manifold media use and effect phenomena 
could profit from an exploration along the lines of Construal Level Theory.  
One possible application is in mediated messages advocating social change and 
entertainment education. A eudaimonic entertainment experience could make media 
users more prone to consider the issue in the “bigger picture” and evaluate calls for 
action or behavioral change according to their idealism and desirability, drawing their 
attention away from personal and social costs. 
Distance primes are interesting in the area of environmental communication. 
Here, often the messages are fact-based and not narrative in their format. This is 
important, because as I have discussed, for narrative formats the causal chains might be 
rather different compared to fact-based information. However, for most of the Western 
world the consequences of climate change (as they are, at the time of writing, discussed 
at the 21st United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris, France) 
are distant on more than on level of the psychological distance construct discussed in 
this work (i.e., locally, temporally, hypothetically).39 Here, messages could utilize the 
knowledge from Construal Level Theory (Trope et al., 2007) to try to shift construal 
level to a more concrete level. A concrete construal level might foster problem solving 
(Förster et al., 2004) and pragmatism (Kivetz & Tyler, 2007) when considering climate 
change messages.  
Health communication, on the other side, has different matters to persuade the 
public about. Some health concerns are rather concrete and common enough to have a 
certain proximity (e.g., cancer, the flu). Other health matters are uncommon (e.g., organ 
donations) or only confined to late life stages (e.g., Alzheimer’s) and are therefore 
distant to a majority of individuals. To utilize the merits of Construal Level Theory, it 
seems crucial to assess the cause the message should educate and inform about 
elaborately. The research at hand looked specifically at health causes where individual 
                                                
39 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was held in Paris from 
November, 30th to December 11th, 2015.  
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health decisions have consequences for public health. For these messages, individual 
media users should be made aware that their decisions have implications beyond their 
personal health. Research on more individual health concerns has discussed the 
advantages of gain and loss framing repeatedly (Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987). If 
initial empirical evidence holds that gain frames induce more abstract construal, 
whereas loss frames induce more concrete construal (Nan, 2007), the prospect of these 
theoretical lines combined could help reevaluate some of the contradicting evidence 
about gain and loss framing. The effects of gain and loss frames seem to be dependent 
on the kind of behavior that is targeted in the persuasive messages.  
Likewise, moral messages and immoral perpetrators are a typical topic in both 
media entertainment and news. Theories on the individual moral domain salience and 
the scrutiny of moral messages in the media (Tamborini, 2011) are presently 
questioning how people make moral judgments. The salience of moral domains is one 
issue that could be further explained with the help of Construal Level Theory. Lester 
and Weber (2015) found that the situational cognitive construal level influenced how 
harsh people judge moral violations on the different domains. The authors predict that 
an abstract construal makes idealism and morality more relevant as basis for a judgment, 
whereas concrete construals are more sensitive to context factors. The study by Lester 
and Weber (2015) supports a majority of findings from the Construal Level Theory 
framework adding the interesting aspect that the link between construal level and moral 
judgment remained stable across different moral domains (cp. Section 3.3.2). The 
overarching critique that I have issued before, however, applies here as well. Their 
study used a design, where individuals judge a film synopsis and not actual media or 
entertainment content. A more ecologically valid assumption would be: The extent of 
narrative involvement relates to the adopted construal level, because based on the 
results from Study 1, a more concrete construal level mind-set would help participants 
to ‘get into’ the story or, as Liberman and Trope (2008) would put it, help traverse the 
psychological distance between the self and the narrative world. One of the 
entertainment processes that actually enhance narrative involvement is identification 
(Cohen, 2001) or empathy (Zillmann, 2006a). From this logic, it could be derived that 
the more media users identify with the characters or are empathetic, the more they get 
involved with the story. This could result in a more concrete construal level mind-set at 
the time of media consumption. In the case of media use, the immoral conduct is not 
acted out by the media user, but a character stands in as perpetrator. Particularly, anti-
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heroes and complex characters have moral flaws, which need to be justified by the 
audience in order to justify their admiration and liking of these characters. Moral 
justification is eased when considering circumstance and environmental factors, usually 
associated with concrete construal levels.  
Finally, tailoring language on the lexical level is a very subtle way to influence 
the message construal (cp. Section 8.3.1). Methodologically, these findings also bear 
potential that is worth considering. Questionnaire language could, according to the 
construal level theorizing, affect whether the individuals draw more abstract or more 
concrete associations. One example of tasks that are prone to the influence of construal 
levels is recall tasks. Free recall is highly dependent on the construal level at the time of 
recall, and evidence suggests this is independent of the time since the information was 
established (Kyung, Menon, & Trope, 2010).  
In the introduction I referenced stereotypes and exemplars as specific examples 
of abstract and concrete categories, which have been considered in media and 
communication research. The presented work introduces the concept of an abstract (vs. 
concrete) thinking style to the area of media psychology, that offer a more general 
approach to mental representations, but with subliminal evaluative biases. For the 
processing of the health dossier on vaccination that I mentioned in the introduction, the 
presented work substantiates how a circumstantial mood or construal level mind-set, 
can affect the consequent knowledge and attitudes. Participants, who construe such a 
dossier more abstractly, likely remember abstract and primary information better. With 
abstract construal especially the desirability and ideological evaluation of the suggested 
information are activated. However, differences in favorability and valence associated 
with the mental representation of the message were also results of the construal level 
mind-set change. It was shown that the predicted effects of Construal Level Theory, 
only appear for factual information, but that they might be essentially different if the 
audience was to be persuaded by a narrative format. With the open questions and 
possible theoretical and methodological paths that could be taken, the study leaves 
much research to be done.  
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10 Appendices 
10.1 Study 2 Additional Analysis 
Table 21 
Indirect Effects of Factors on Estimates Through Construal and Model Specifics 
     Consequent 
Antecedent 
 
b SE 
BCa 95% CI 
[LL,UL] 
  
 (Estimate 1) 
 
Mood Condition  1.16 0.88 −0.16 3.22 
 
Country  0.93 0.78 −0.10 3.17 
 
Individual Difference (BIF)  0.06 0.09 −0.06 0.31 
 Model  R2 = .07, F(5,160) = 2.28, p < .05 
    
  
 (Estimate 2) 
 
Mood Condition  0.91 0.74 −0.21 2.64 
 
Country  0.73 0.70 −0.11 2.80 
 
Individual Difference (BIF)  0.05 0.08 −0.04 0.28 
 Model  R2 = .05, F(5,160) = 1.82, p > .05 
    
  
 (Estimate 3) 
 
Mood Condition  0.89 0.72 0.00 0.15 
 
Country  0.71 0.55 −0.05 2.26 
 
Individual Difference (BIF)  0.05 0.06 −0.05 0.22 
 Model  R2 = .07, F(5,159) = 2.98, p < .05 
    
  
 (Estimate 4) 
 
Mood Condition  −0.05 0.28 −0.69 0.52 
 
Country  −0.04 0.25 −0.79 0.31 
  Individual Difference (BIF)  −0.00 0.02 –0.08 0.03 
 Model  R2 = .05, F(5,159) = 1.80, p > .05 
Note. Estimate 1 “What percentage of treatments in hospitals incorporates blood transfusions?”,  
Estimate 2 “What percentage of individuals will need a blood transfusion at least once throughout their 
life?”, Estimate 3 “What percentage of the U.S. [German] population is eligible to donate blood?”, 
Estimate 4 “What percentage of the U.S. [German] population donates blood on a regular basis?”.
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Figure 18 
Ordinary least square path models for the influence of mood condition, country, and 
individual action identification on estimates of blood donation related events through 
construal level mind-set. Panel 1: n = 166, F(5,160) = 2.28, p < .05, R2 = .07; Panel 2:  
n = 166, F(5,160) = 1.82, p > .05, R2 = .05; Panel 3: n = 165, F(5,159) = 3.52, p < .05,  
R2 = .10; Panel 4: n = 165, F(5,160) = 1.79, p > .05, R2 = .05; †p < .10; *p < .05,  
**p < .01. 
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10.2 Study 1 Material German Originals 
10.2.1 Informed consent form  
 
Information zur Teilnahme an den Studien am Lehrstuhl MKW III 
Seminarerhebung 
 
Informationen 
Liebe Teilnehmerin, lieber Teilnehmer, 
Vielen Dank für Ihr Interesse, an dieser Studie teilzunehmen. Bitte lesen Sie diese Informationen 
aufmerksam und bestätigen Sie dies. 
Die Inhalte der Studie, die wir als Teil unseres Seminars durchführen erfolgt freiwillig und ist mit keinen 
Risiken verbunden. Insbesondere werden den Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmern keine körperlichen oder 
seelischen Schäden zugefügt. Es steht Ihnen jedoch jederzeit frei, Ihre Teilnahme an der Studie 
zurückzuziehen oder abzubrechen. 
 
Die Daten dieser Studie werden in vollständig anonymisierter Form erfasst. Nach Beendigung der Studie 
können Sie weitere Informationen über die Hintergründe und Ziele der Studie sowie den 
Verwendungszweck der Daten erhalten. In einigen Fällen können die weiterführenden Informationen zur 
Studie erst nach Abschluss der Erhebung gegeben werden.  
 
Für die Teilnahme an der Verlosung von 10 Amazon.de-Gutscheinen und den Wunsch weiterführende 
Informationen zu erhalten, tragen Sie sich bitte mit Ihrer E-Mailadresse ein. 
 
Bitte behandeln Sie die Details hinsichtlich der Inhalte und des Verlaufs der Studie vertraulich und 
geben Sie diese besonders nicht an andere potentielle Teilnehmer weiter. Es ist wichtig, dass die 
Teilnehmer kein Vorwissen über die Studie haben, damit die Ergebnisse nicht verfälscht werden.  
 
 
Einverständniserklärung 
Wenn Sie: 
 
• Die Informationen zur Studie oben gelesen haben. 
• Sie die Möglichkeit hatten, Fragen zu stellen. 
• Zufriedenstellende Antworten erhalten haben. 
• Verstanden haben, dass Sie die Freiheit haben, die Studie jederzeit 
abzubrechen, ohne die Angabe von Gründen. 
 
Unterzeichnen Sie bitte hier, um deutlich zu machen, dass Sie einverstanden sind an dieser 
Studie teilzunehmen.  
 
 
Bitte unterschreiben:  ____________________________  
Datum:    __________________ 
 
Name in Druckbuchstaben: ______________________ 
 
E-Mail Adresse: ______________________________für weiterführende Informationen 
 
O ja, ich möchte an der Verlosung teilnehmen (bitte ankreuzen, wenn zutreffend) 
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10.2.2 Questionnaire 1  
Questionnaire 1 was part of the abstract, concrete, and control 1 conditions. 
 
Herzlich Willkommen.40 
 
Wie funktionieren die Fragebögen? 
In den meisten Fällen geben wir Ihnen Aussagen vor, die Sie dann auf einer Skala als zutreffend oder 
unzutreffend einschätzen. Einmal angenommen, die zu beurteilende Aussage lautet „Ich versuche immer, 
meine Aufgaben gewissenhaft zu erfüllen.“ und Sie finden, dass diese Aussage eher auf Sie zutrifft, dann 
markieren Sie bitte die entsprechende Position auf der Antwortskala mit einem Kreuz wie folgt:  
 
Ihre Antwortmöglichkeiten reichen meist von 1 „trifft/stimme ganz und gar nicht zu“ bis hin zu 6 
„trifft/stimme voll und ganz zu“. Vereinzelt erwarten wir auch offene Antworten von Ihnen. 
Ansonsten erwarten Sie ein paar Aufgaben, die wir Ihnen an der jeweiligen Stelle erklären. 
 
Viel Spaß! 
                                                
40 The Welcome Page was also used for the control 2 condition. 
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Fragebogen)1)
 
Jeder Mensch verknüpft unterschiedliche Dinge mit einem Wort. Der eine 
assoziiert mit einem Baum den Wald, ein anderer sieht in einem Baum ein 
Gewächs. Im folgenden Fragebogen werden Ihnen für jede Tätigkeit zwei 
Alternative vorgeschlagen. Bitte entscheiden Sie sich intuitiv für die Alternative, 
die Ihnen am meisten zusagt. 
 
(a) Eine Liste schreiben 
! Etwas organisieren 
! Etwas aufschreiben 
(b) Lesen 
! Einzelnen Zeilen folgen 
! Wissen aneignen 
(c) Wäsche waschen 
! Gerüche aus der Wäsche bekommen 
! Wäsche in die Waschmaschine 
stecken 
(d) Den Raum ausmessen 
! Auf die Renovierung vorbereiten 
! Einen Zollstock verwenden 
(e) Schüttelfrost haben 
! einen heißen Tee kochen 
! krank fühlen 
(f) Einen Organspendeausweis ausfüllen 
! Menschen helfen 
! den Namen eintragen 
(g) Die Blumen versorgen 
! Blumen wässern 
! den Raum schön ausgestalten 
(h) Die Türe verschließen 
! Den Schlüssel im Schloss drehen 
! Das Haus sichern 
 
 
(i) Wählen 
! Die Wahl beeinflussen 
 ! Eine Stimme abgeben 
(j) Zähne putzen 
! Die Bürste im Mund bewegen 
 ! Karies verhindern 
(k) Jemanden begrüßen 
! Hallo sagen 
 ! Freundlich sein 
(l) Einer Versuchung widerstehen 
! „Nein“ sagen 
 ! Courage haben 
(m) Mit dem Auto reisen 
! Der Karte folgen 
 ! Die Landschaft sehen 
(n) Mit einem Kind sprechen 
! Dem Kind etwas beibringen 
 ! Einfach Wörter benutzen 
 
 
Bitte machen Sie nun mit 
Aufgabe 1 weiter.
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Control condition – Task 1. 
Aufgabe)1)
 
Bitte setzen Sie nun die Kopfhörer auf und starten Sie den Film. 
Drücken Sie dafür die Playtaste oder die Leertaste. 
 
Abstract condition – Task 1. 
)
Aufgabe)1))
 
Für jede Entscheidung im Leben gibt es einen Grund. Man kann meist sogar einer 
Entscheidung ein übergeordnetes Ziel unterstellen. Heute nehmen Sie als Student/-in an 
einem Experiment teil. Warum? Vielleicht gehört es zu einer Kursvoraussetzung, 
vielleicht wurden Sie von einem/-r freundlichen Kommilitonen/-in dazu überredet. 
Warum lassen Sie sich überreden? Vielleicht weil Sie heute eine gute Tat vollbringen 
wollten. Warum wollten Sie heute eine gute Tat vollbringen? Vielleicht ist Ihnen 
gestern ebenfalls geholfen worden. 
Die Forschung zeigt, dass eine solche Assoziationskette Menschen hilft, sich Ihre 
eigenen Ziele zu verdeutlichen.  
 
So erledigen Sie die Aufgabe: 
In der folgenden Aufgabe sollen Sie ergründen warum Sie tun was Sie tun. Wir testen 
diese Aufgabe hier in diesem Rahmen für eine spätere Verwendung in einer Studie zum 
Thema Lebenszufriedenheit.  
Für dieses Gedankenexperiment denken Sie bitte über folgenden Zustand nach: „Mental 
ausgeglichen sein“ und stellen Sie sich die Fragen: „Warum sollte ich mental 
ausgeglichen sein?“. Schreiben Sie uns Ihre Antwort in das nächste Kästchen, z.B. 
„um meine Work-Life-Balance zu sichern“, und stellen Sie sich wieder die Frage 
„Warum möchte ich meine Work-Life-Balance sichern?“. Nehmen wir an Sie schreiben 
die Antwort „um ein glücklicheres Privatleben zu haben“ auf, dann würde Ihre folgende 
Frage lauten „Warum möchte ich ein glücklicheres Privatleben haben?“. Bitte 
vervollständigen Sie in dieser Art die Aufgabe zu drei unterschiedlichen Tätigkeiten 
und füllen Sie alle freien Kästchen aus.  
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Concrete condition – Task 1. 
 
Aufgabe(1(
 
Für alles im Leben haben wir einen Ablauf, dem wir folgen. Unser Verhalten ist vom 
übergeordneten Ziel bis zur einzelnen Handlung verknüpft. Zum Beispiel suchen Sie 
womöglich wie jede/-r Student/-in nach einer Balance von Privatleben und 
Verpflichtungen. Wie kann man das schaffen? Den Überblick zu behalten, kann helfen. 
Aber wie kann man das schaffen? Indem man diszipliniert das Studium organisiert. 
Aber wie kann man das Studium organisieren? Indem man sich an Studienpläne hält. 
Wie kann man den Studienplan schaffen? Indem man konsequent die Anforderungen 
der Kurse erfüllt. Wie kann man die erfüllen? Indem man Aufgaben zeitnah erledigt 
usw. 
Es gibt Forschung, die zeigt, dass solche Gedankenübungen dabei helfen, Lebensziele 
in konkrete Handlungen zu übersetzen.  
 
So erledigen Sie die Aufgabe: 
Die folgende Übung soll Ihre Aufmerksamkeit darauf richten, wie Sie Dinge tun. Wir 
testen diese Aufgabe hier in diesem Rahmen für eine spätere Verwendung in einer 
Studie zum Thema Lebenszufriedenheit.  
Für dieses Gedankenexperiment denken Sie bitte über folgenden Zustand nach: „Mental 
ausgeglichen sein“ und stellen Sie sich die Frage: „Wie kann ich mental ausgeglichen 
sein?“. Schreiben Sie uns Ihre Antwort in das nächste Kästchen, z.B. „Regelmäßig 
joggen gehen“, und stellen Sie sich wieder die Frage „Wie kann ich regelmäßig joggen 
gehen?“. Nehmen wir wieder an Sie schreiben die Antwort „indem ich mir Zeit 
nehme“ auf, dann würde Ihre folgende Frage lauten „Wie kann ich mir die Zeit 
nehmen?“. Bitte vervollständigen Sie in dieser Art die Aufgabe zu drei 
unterschiedlichen Tätigkeiten und füllen Sie alle freien 
Kästchen aus. 
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Concrete and abstract condition – Task 2. 
 
Aufgabe(2(
 
Bitte setzen Sie nun die Kopfhörer auf und starten Sie den Film. 
Drücken Sie dafür die Playtaste oder die Leertaste. 
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Aufgabe(2a(
 
Bitte notieren Sie auf den dafür vorgesehenen Linien, die ersten fünf Dinge, die 
Ihnen im Bezug auf das bisher gesehene Video in den Sinn kommen.  
 
Bitte formulieren Sie ganze Sätze, einzelne Wörter oder 
Wortgruppen sind nicht gültig. 
 
(1) ________________________________________________________________ 
 
(2) ________________________________________________________________ 
 
(3) ________________________________________________________________ 
 
(4) ________________________________________________________________ 
 
(5) ________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Sie können nun das Video wieder starten. Drücken Sie dafür die Playtaste oder die 
Leertaste. 
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Aufgabe(2b(
 
Bitte notieren Sie nun erneut auf den dafür vorgesehenen Linien, die ersten fünf 
Dinge, die Ihnen im Bezug auf das Video in den Sinn kommen.  
 
Bitte formulieren Sie ganze Sätze, einzelne Wörter oder 
Wortgruppen sind nicht gültig. 
 
(6) ________________________________________________________________ 
 
(7) ________________________________________________________________ 
 
(8) ________________________________________________________________ 
 
(9) ________________________________________________________________ 
 
(10) ________________________________________________________________ 
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10.2.3 Questionnaire 2 
Questionnaire 2 was part of the abstract, concrete, and control 1 conditions. 
 Fragebogen(2(
In diesem Fragebogen haben wir weitere Aussagen, für die Sie Ihre Zustimmung 
oder Ablehnung ausdrücken können. Wir interessieren uns jetzt für Ihre 
Einschätzung des Films und wie Sie sich während des Sehens gefühlt haben. 
 
trifft ganz 
und gar 
nicht zu 
trifft über-
wiegend 
nicht zu 
trifft eher 
nicht zu 
trifft eher zu trifft über-
wiegend zu 
trifft voll 
und ganz zu 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
In der Dokumentation wurden viele 
interessante Einzelheiten zum Thema 
genannt. 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die Dokumentation zog sich hin.  ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die Dokumentation hat mich emotional 
aufgewühlt. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die Dokumentation behandelte das 
Thema sehr oberflächlich.  ! ! ! ! ! ! 
In der Dokumentation kamen viele 
konkrete Beispiele vor. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die Dokumentation war logisch 
aufgebaut. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich konnte den Ereignissen in der 
Dokumentation gut folgen. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Kreuzen Sie bitte das Feld rechts außen 
an. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Während der Dokumentation wollte ich 
wissen wie sich die Ereignisse weiter 
entwickeln würden. 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
Während der Sendung verlor ich jedes 
Zeitgefühl. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die Dokumentation gab eher einen groben 
Überblick über das Thema. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die Dokumentation hat mich zum 
nachdenken angeregt. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die Dokumentation hat das Thema sehr 
konkret behandelt. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich war mental ganz in die Erzählungen 
versunken während ich die 
Dokumentation ansah. 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die Dokumentation hat das Leben aller 
Menschen repräsentiert, die auf ein Organ 
warten. 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich habe mich um manche der Charaktere 
gesorgt. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die Dokumentation hat das besprochene 
Thema sehr abstrakt beschrieben. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 wenig 
detailreich     
sehr 
detailreich 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Die visuelle Darstellung war ... ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die inhaltliche Darstellung war ... ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die Darstellung der Figuren war … ! ! ! ! ! ! 
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10.2.4 Questionnaire 3 
Questionnaire 3 was part of the abstract, concrete, control 1, and control 2 
conditions. 
Fragebogen(3(
 
In diesem Fragebogen würden wir gerne Ihre Einstellung zum Thema Organspende 
erfahren. Jeder Mensch hat durch seinen persönlichen Lebenslauf eigene Erfahrungen 
mit verschiedenen Gesundheitsthemen gehabt. Ganz selbstverständlich ist jede Meinung 
daher individuell.  
1) In der folgenden Fragentabelle finden Sie eine Reihe von Aussagen zum Thema 
Organspende. Lesen Sie jede Aussage aufmerksam bevor Sie eine 
Antwortentscheidung treffen. Machen Sie dann bitte deutlich, inwiefern die 
einzelne Aussage auf Sie persönlich zutrifft oder ob die einzelne Aussage Ihrer 
Meinung nach zutrifft. 
trifft ganz 
und gar 
nicht zu 
trifft über-
wiegend 
nicht zu 
trifft eher 
nicht zu 
trifft eher zu trifft über-
wiegend zu 
trifft voll 
und ganz zu 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ich halte Organspenden von hirntoten 
Menschen für akzeptabel. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die Entnahme von Organen degradiert 
den hirntoten Menschen meines Erachtens 
zum Ersatzteillager. 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die Entnahme von Organen bei Hirntoten 
empfinde ich als Leichenschändung.  ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Die Organentnahme verletzt meiner 
Meinung nach das Recht des Sterbenden 
auf ein würdiges Sterben.  
! ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich habe vor, demnächst einen 
Organspendeausweis auszufüllen.  
!  Ich besitze bereits einen 
Organspendeausweis. 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich werde mir weitere Informationen zum 
Thema beschaffen. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Bitte kreuzen Sie das Feld ganz links an. ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich werde in Zukunft meine Meinung zur 
Organspende meinen Angehörigen 
mitteilen, so dass sie im Falle meines 
Hirntodes eine Entscheidung in meinem 
Sinne treffen können. 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich würde es akzeptieren, wenn nach 
meinem Hirntod eine Organspende 
entnommen wird, auch wenn ich keinen 
Organspendeausweis ausgefüllt habe. 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich lehne es ab, nach meinem Hirntod als 
Organspender verwendet zu werden.  ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Ich werde in Zukunft meine Verwandten 
und Bekannten dazu bewegen, einen 
Organspendeausweis auszufüllen. 
! ! ! ! ! ! 
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Fragebogen(3(
 
2) Als nächstes lesen Sie einige Informationen zu Organspende und Hirntod. Bitte 
bewerten Sie die Informationen als richtig oder falsch. 
Hirntod.... richtig falsch 
Ist endgültig ! ! 
Muss von zwei unabhängigen Ärzten festgestellt werden ! ! 
Heißt auch der/die Patient/in atmet noch selbstständig. ! ! 
Ist ein neuzeitliches Konzept. ! ! 
Organspenden sind verpflichtend in Deutschland. ! ! 
Nach einer Organspende...   
Hat der/die Patient/in eine normale Lebenserwartung. ! ! 
Sind Medikamente nötig, damit das neue Organ nicht abgestoßen wird. ! ! 
Ist das Immunsystem des/der Patient/in gestärkt. ! ! 
3) Sie sind nun gebeten einige Einschätzungen vorzunehmen. Bitte treffen Sie diese 
Einschätzungen ganz frei nach Bauchgefühl. 
 
Jasmin hat gerade einen Organspendeausweis ausgefüllt, wie nah oder fern fühlen sich gerade 
zu ihr? 
 
 
 
 
 
Sonja weigert sich den Organspendeausweis ihrer schwerkranken Mutter anzuerkennen, wie 
nah oder fern fühlen sich gerade zu ihr? 
 
 
 
 
 
Für wie wahrscheinlich halten Sie es, dass Sie selbst einmal ein Spenderorgan benötigen? 
 
 
 
 
 
Conrad ist junger Assistenzarzt und benötigt ein Spenderorgan für einen seiner Patienten. Der 
Patient steht auf Platz 5 der Warteliste. Wie lange, schätzen Sie, muss Conrad und sein Patient 
auf das Organ warten? 
 
______ Tage 
 
Bitte schätzen Sie ohne weitere Informationen ein, wie weit entfernt das Krankenhaus ist, in 
dem Conrad arbeitet.  
 
 
 
 
  
Sehr 
Nah    
  Sehr 
Fern 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
  
Sehr 
Nah    
  Sehr 
Fern 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
  
Sehr 
Unwahr- 
scheinlich    
  Sehr 
Wahr-
scheinlich 
  -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
  
Sehr 
Nah    
  Sehr 
Fern 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
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Fragebogen(3(
(
4) Bitte machen Sie einige kurze Angaben zu Ihrer Person. 
Haben Sie im privaten Umfeld Erfahrungen mit Organspenden gehabt? 
! ja    ! Ich möchte darauf nicht antworten. 
! nein 
 
Bitte geben Sie Ihr Alter in Jahren an: ___ Jahre 
 
Bitte signalisieren Sie Ihr Geschlecht:  
! männlich  
! weiblich     ! Ich möchte darauf nicht antworten. 
 
Wenn Sie unserem Erhebungsteam noch anonym einen Tipp geben oder einfach 
nur etwas loswerden möchten, können Sie das hier tun. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme! 
Bitte schließen Sie die Mappe und legen Sie Ihre 
Einverständniserklärung oben auf. 
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10.2.5 Debriefing Study 1 
Information zum Experiment: Bedeutung des Construal Level bei der 
Verarbeitung von Medienbotschaften 
 
Sehr geehrte/r TeilnehmerIn,  
 
Sie haben im Zeitraum vom 29.10.2012 - 27.11.2012 an einer Studie der Universität 
Mannheim, Seminar für Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft teilgenommen, in 
der Sie entweder einen Film über das Thema Organspende oder HIV präsentiert 
bekamen und hierzu einen Fragebogen bearbeiten sollten, oder nur eben genannte 
Fragebogen beantworteten. Vielen Dank noch einmal an dieser Stelle für Ihre 
Teilnahme! Zudem haben Sie Ihre E-Mail-Adresse hinterlassen, um über die 
wissenschaftliche Fundierung dieser Studie informiert zu werden. 
 
Zunächst einmal muss aufgeklärt werden, dass wir Ihnen vor Ort absichtlich falsche 
Informationen über die Studie gegeben haben, um die Ergebnisse nicht zu verfälschen. 
Es handelte sich bei diesem Experiment nicht um verschiedene, zusammenhangslose 
Fragebögen, sondern um eine große, thematisch einheitliche Untersuchung.  
 
Unser Experiment ging der Frage nach, ob sich durch eine vorherige 
Beeinflussung des sog. Construal Levels die spätere Wahrnehmung eines Themas 
(Organspende; HIV) verändert.  
Bei dem eben erwähnten 'Construal Level' handelt es sich um Folgendes:  
Wenn wir über etwas nachdenken, entstehen mentale Konstrukte. Diese mentalen 
Konstrukte beziehen sich dabei auf die mentale Rekonstruktion aufgenommener 
Informationen. Durch eine Reihe von situativen Einflüssen ist diese Rekonstruktion 
entweder abstrakt oder detailreich. 
 
Ein Beispiel zum Thema 'Umziehen':  
Dieses Beispiel kann rekonstruiert werden als  
'einen neuen Lebensabschnitt beginnen' = abstraktes Verständnis, hohe zeitliche Distanz 
! High Construal Level 
oder als 'Kisten packen' = detailliertes, konkretes Verständnis, geringe zeitliche Distanz 
 ! Low Construal Level. 
 
Wir haben nun versucht Sie und die weiteren Versuchspersonen im ersten Teil des 
Fragebogens auf ein 'High, oder Low Construal Level' anzuregen. Daraufhin haben wir 
manchen von Ihnen eine Dokumentation gezeigt. Während und nach der 
Dokumentation wurden Sie aufgefordert, einige Gedanken zur Dokumentation 
aufzuschreiben. Diese Antworten werden linguistisch kodiert, um Ihren angewandten 
Abstraktionsgrad erfassen zu können. Im zweiten Teil des Fragebogens wurde dann 
durch Kontrollfragen getestet wie Sie den Film wahrgenommen haben und ihre 
Einstellung zum Gesundheitsthema erhoben. 
 
Da wir unsere Experiment-Phase erst vor kurzem abgeschlossen haben, sind die Daten 
noch nicht ausgewertet. Unsere Vermutung ist allerdings, dass das anfängliche 
Construal Level einer Versuchsperson auf den Film angewandt wird und wir hoffen auf 
daraus resultierende Unterschiede zwischen den Einstellungen zum jeweiligen 
Gesundheitsthema (die Dokumentation wird entweder mental abstrakt oder einfach 
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rekonstruiert und beeinflusst so die konkrete Meinungsbildung bzw. Einstellung zu der 
Thematik). 
 
Falls Sie noch weiteres Interesse zum Thema Construal Level Theory haben und sich 
gerne zusätzlich informieren möchten, finden Sie Antworten in folgender Literatur: 
 
Trope, Y., Libermann, N. Constral Level Theory. in: Lange, Paul A.M. van, 
Handbook of theories of social psychology (S 118-135) 
 
Verlosung und Teilnahmebestätigungen 
 
Die folgenden TeilnehmerInnen wurden durch Losverfahren ermittelt und haben einen 
5€-Amazon-Gutschein gewonnen: 
 
1. Felix Hanser 
2. Katrin Weiser 
3. Laura Altenkämpfer 
4. Susanne Karl 
5. Venukah Srikanthan 
6. Marek Müller 
7. Nicole Prieto Rodriguez 
8. Carolin Render 
9. Julia Fempel 
10. Demona Dollinger 
11. Anna Halstenbach 
12. Sebastian Blank 
13. Anica Edinger 
 
Teilnehmer, die sich für eine Teilnahmebescheinigung zwecks VPN Stunden 
eingeschrieben haben, können diese ab jetzt abholen. 
 
Die Gutscheine und Teilnahmebestätigung sind bis zum 13.12.12 im Haus Oberrhein 
(wo das Experiment stattfand) von Mo - Do 10:30 Uhr bis 12:30 Uhr, 6. Stock bei Frau 
Karen Kent abzuholen. Bitte bringen Sie Ihren Studierendenausweis oder einen anderen 
Ausweis mit. 
 
Wir danken Ihnen noch einmal herzlich für Ihre Teilnahme und verbleiben mit 
freundlichen Grüßen, 
Das Seminar: Quantitative Methodeneinübung – Das psychologische Experiment 
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10.3 Study 2 
10.3.1 United States 
 
Study 2 – English Onlinequestionnaire 
Projekt-
ID 
139577    
URL der 
Umfrage 
http://ww2.unipark.de/uc/vorderer_Universit__t_Mannheim/37fc/  
Datum 
(GMT) 
02-04-2014 
09:47:17 
   
1 Welcome Page (PGID 736732) 
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University of Southern California
(Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, Sabine Reich, M.A., sabine.reich@usc.edu)
Informed Consent for Non-Medical Research 
Cognitive and affective reactions to mediated messages 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by (Sabine Reich, visiting Ph.D. student at the
Annenberg School of Communication and Journalism, PI Michael Cody, Ph.D.) at the University of
Southern California. Your participation is voluntary. You should read the information below, and ask questions
about anything you do not understand, before deciding whether to participate. Please take as much time as
you need to read the consent form. You may also decide to discuss participation with your family or friends. If
you decide to participate, you press the continue button below.
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The online study has several unrelated parts to it. The purpose of this study is to measure a variety of
psychological reactions to media messages. In all cases we are interested in your immediate reactions to
those media stimuli.  There are no right or wrong answers.
 
STUDY PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to watch a short video clip and/or read a short
message. You will be asked to imply your feelings and thoughts in both writing and on numerical scales. This
is an experimental study so that you will be randomly assigned to the media message by the computer.
 
The participation will vary between 20 to 40 minutes. The complete study will be answered online.
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
There are no social, physiological, financial, or legal risks associated with this study. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
All parts of the study seek to measure cognitive and emotional reactions to media messages. It is a basic
media psychological study that should help to clarify processing of mediated messages for further
investigations on how public health information can be improved.
PAYMENT/COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
Participants from the Annenberg School of Communication and Journalism can receive course credit (if
eligible).  You will not be paid for participating in this research study.
CONFIDENTIALITY
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We will keep your records for this study confidential as far as permitted by law. However, if we are required to
do so by law, we will disclose confidential information about you. The members of the research team and the
University of Southern California’s Human Subjects Protection Program (HSPP) may access the data.The
HSPP reviews and monitors research studies to protect the rights and welfare of research subjects.
The data will be stored on the survey server and can be accessed only by the research team (password
protected).  It is later downloaded to a university computer to analyze (password protected). Written
answers may be released separately from the data set to trained coders.  Identifying information will
only be collected from participants receiving course credit. The personal data will be kept separate
from the answers.
The data will be kept for at least two years after study completion in late 2014.
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
Your participation is voluntary. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which
you are otherwise entitled. You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without
penalty. You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this
research study. 
ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATION
If you are participating for course credit alternative studies may be available to you (subject to availability).
INVESTIGATOR’S CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Sabine Reich, M.A.
(responsible CO-PI) at sabine.reich@usc.edu or 213 284 2061 or Michael Cody, cody@usc.edu.
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT – IRB CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about your rights as a research participant or the research in
general and are unable to contact the research team, or if you want to talk to someone independent of the
research team, please contact the University Park Institutional Review Board (UPIRB), 3720 South Flower
Street #301, Los Angeles, CA  90089-0702, (213) 821-5272 or upirb@usc.edu
 
Consent
I have read the information provided above.  I have been given a chance to ask questions.  My questions
have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. 
 
Press continue below.
  
10.3—4 
 
 
2 
 
 
DCL Disposition (PGID 736742) 
Making a list (q_1370524 - Typ 111) 
DCL1 v_89 int DCL1 engl  
  1 Writing things down  
  2 Getting organized  
     
Reading (q_1370525 - Typ 111) 
DCL2 v_90 int DCL2 engl  
  1 Following lines of print  
  2 Gaining knowledge  
     
Joining the Army (q_1370526 - Typ 111) 
DCL3 v_92 int DCL 3 engl  
  1 Signing up  
  2 Helping the Nation's defense  
      
Washing clothes (q_1370527 - Typ 111) 
DCL4 v_91 int DCL 4 engl  
  1 Putting cloths into the machine  
  2 Removing odors from cloths  
      
Picking an apple (q_1370528 - Typ 111) 
DCL5 v_93 int DCL5 engl  
  1 Pulling an apple off a branch  
  2 Getting something to eat  
     
Chopping down a tree (q_1370529 - Typ 111) 
DCL6 v_94 int DCL6 engl  
  1 Wielding an axe  
  2 Getting firewood  
      
Measuring a room for carpeting (q_1370530 - Typ 111) 
DCL7 dupl1_v_95 int DCL7 engl  
  1 Using a yardstick  
  2 Getting ready to remodel  
      
     
Cleaning the house (q_1370531 - Typ 111) 
DCL8 v_96 int DCL8 engl  
  1 Vaccuming the floor  
  2 Showing one's cleanliness  
      
     
Painting a room (q_1370532 - Typ 111) 
DCL9 dupl1_v_97 int DCL9 engl  
  1 Applying brush strokes  
  2 Making the room look fresh  
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Paying the rent (q_1370533 - Typ 111) 
DCL10 dupl1_v_98 int DCL10 engl  
  1 Writing a check  
  2 Maintaining a place to live  
      
     
Caring for houseplants (q_1370534 - Typ 111) 
DCL11 v_99 int DCL11 engl  
  1 Watering plants  
  2 Making the room look nice  
      
     
Locking a door (q_1370535 - Typ 111) 
DCL12 v_100 int DCL12 engl  
  1 Putting a key in the lock  
  2 Securing the house  
      
     
Voting (q_1370536 - Typ 111) 
DCL13 v_101 int DCL13 engl  
  1 Marking a ballot  
  2 Influencing the election  
      
     
Climbing a tree (q_1370537 - Typ 111) 
DCL14 dupl1_v_102 int DCL14 engl  
  1 Holding on to branches  
  2 Getting a good view  
      
     
Filling out a personality test (q_1370538 - Typ 111) 
DCL15 v_28 int DCL15 engl  
  1 Answering questions  
  2 Revealing what you're like  
      
     
Toothbrushing (q_1370539 - Typ 111) 
DCL16 v_29 int DCL16 engl  
  1 Moving a brush around in one's mouth  
  2 Preventing tooth decay  
      
     
Taking a test (q_1370540 - Typ 111) 
DCL17 v_30 int DCL17 engl  
  1 Answering questions  
  2 Showing one's knowledge  
      
  
10.3—6 
     
Greeting someone (q_1370541 - Typ 111) 
DCL18 v_31 int DCL18 engl  
  1 Saying hello  
  2 Showing friendliness  
      
     
Resisting temptation (q_1370542 - Typ 111) 
DCL19 v_32 int DCL19 engl  
  1 Saying "no"  
  2 Showing moral courage  
      
     
Eating (q_1370543 - Typ 111) 
DCL20 v_33 int DCL20 engl  
  1 Chewing and swallowing  
  2 Getting nutrition  
      
     
Growing a garden (q_1370544 - Typ 111) 
DCL21 v_34 int DCL21 engl  
  1 Planting seeds  
  2 Getting fresh vegetable  
      
     
Traveling by car (q_1370545 - Typ 111) 
DCL22 v_35 int DCL22 engl  
  1 Following a map  
  2 Seeing the countryside  
      
     
Having a cavity filled (q_1370546 - Typ 111) 
DCL23 v_36 int DCL23 engl  
  1 Going to the dentist  
  2 Protecting your teeth  
      
     
Talking to a child (q_1370547 - Typ 111) 
DCL24 v_37 int DCL24 engl  
  1 Using simple words  
  2 Teaching a child something  
      
     
Pushing a doorbell (q_1370548 - Typ 111) 
DCL25 v_39 int DCL25 engl  
  1 Moving a finger  
  2 Seeing if someone's home  
3.1 Movie a (PGID 736744) - Positive 
  
10.3—7 
 
3.1.1 Eval1 (PGID 736745) 
     
What feelings are you experiencing right now? (q_1370550 - Typ 311) 
v_148  int negative feelings  
 eval1A 1 not at all  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7    
  8    
  9 very much  
v_149  int positive feelings  
 eval2A 1 not at all  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7    
  8    
  9 very much  
3.2 Movie b (PGID 736746) - Negative Movie 
 
3.2.1 Eval 2 (PGID 736747) 
  
10.3—8 
     
What feelings are you experiencing right now? (q_1370552 - Typ 311) 
v_150  int negative feelings  
 eval1B 1 not at all  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7    
  8    
  9 very much  
v_151  int positive feelings  
 eval2B 1 not at all  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7    
  8    
  9 very much  
      
4 Text (PGID 736733) 
 The following information is distributed by leading blood donation 
organization. Please read carefully. 
 
 
Donate Blood! 
 
Everyday patients in the US need blood transfusions. Blood cannot be manufactured; it can 
only come from volunteer donors. Blood is needed for emergency operations following 
accidents as well as for cancer patients or patients with cell defects. The demand for blood 
transfusions is usually higher than the supply. Only a tenth of the eligible US population 
donates blood. Donating blood is easy, safe, and takes approx. 35 minutes for most donors. 
Donors receive a free mini physical to check body temperature, blood pressure, pulse and 
hemoglobin levels. After giving blood, donors are provided with a light snack and drinks. 
With 15 minutes of relaxation, food and drink, a donor can continue with their everyday 
activities. 
 
Think about donating blood and check if you are eligible with your local Red Cross office. 
  
10.3—9 
One pint of blood can save up to three lives. 
5 TLInstruction (PGID 736734) 
Your next task is to write down everything you remember thinking about while you were 
reading the blood donation message. 
You have 5 minutes for the task. 
 
The next page contains the form we have prepared for your use to record your thoughts and 
ideas. Simply write down the first thought you had in the first box, the second in the second 
box, etc. Please put only one idea or thought in a box. We have deliberately provided more 
space than we think people will need, to ensure that everyone would have plenty of room. So 
don't worry if you don't use all the provided boxes. 
Please try to write complete sentences for this task, but don't be worried about spelling or 
grammatical details. 
 
Please be completely honest. Your responses will be anonymous. 
6 Thoughts (PGID 736735) 
     
While reading the message, I remember thinking: (q_1350378 - Typ 142) 
v_1 v_1 blob Thoughts 1  
      
     
While reading the message, I remember thinking: (q_1350382 - Typ 142) 
v_2 v_2 blob Thoughts 2  
      
     
While reading the message, I remember thinking: (q_1350383 - Typ 142) 
v_3 v_3 blob Thoughts 3  
      
     
While reading the message, I remember thinking: (q_1350384 - Typ 142) 
v_4 v_4 blob Thoughts 4  
      
     
While reading the message, I remember thinking: (q_1361560 - Typ 142) 
v_6 v_6 blob Thoughts 5  
      
     
While reading the message, I remember thinking: (q_1361561 - Typ 142) 
v_7 v_7 blob Thoughts 6  
      
     
While reading the message, I remember thinking: (q_1361562 - Typ 142) 
v_8 v_8 blob Thoughts 7  
      
     
While reading the message, I remember thinking: (q_1361563 - Typ 142) 
v_9 v_9 blob Thoughts 8  
      
     
While reading the message, I remember thinking: (q_1361564 - Typ 142) 
  
10.3—10 
v_10 v_10 blob Thoughts 9  
      
     
While reading the message, I remember thinking: (q_1361565 - Typ 142) 
v_11 v_11 blob Thoughts 10  
      
7 Estimates (PGID 736736) 
     
The following questions ask you to estimate the occurrence of medical events in 
percents. (q_1370471 - Typ 144) 
v_118 v_118 varchar What percentage of treatments in 
hospitals incorporates blood 
transfusions? 
 
v_119 v_119 varchar What percentage of treatments in 
hospitals incorporates blood 
transfusions? 
 
v_120 v_120 varchar What percentage of individuals will need 
a blood transfusion at least once 
throughout their life? 
 
v_121 v_121 varchar What percentage of the US population is 
eligible to donate blood? 
 
v_122 v_122 varchar What percentage of the US population 
donates blood on a regular basis? 
 
  
  
8 Attitude Measures (PGID 736748) 
     
Below you'll see statements relating to blood donation. We are interested in your level of 
agreement or disagreement with these matters. Keep in mind, your personal answers 
are not judged, rather we are interested in the general trend of all study participants. 
(q_1370553 - Typ 311) 
v_152 v_152 int I think blood donation does not 
contribute to others’ well-being. 
 
  1 disagree strongly  
  2 disagree moderately  
  3 disagree slightly  
  4 undecided  
  5 agree slightly  
  6 agree moderately  
  7 agree strongly  
v_153 v_153 int I think donating blood is an ethical 
behavior. 
 
  1 disagree strongly  
  2 disagree moderately  
  3 disagree slightly  
  4 undecided  
  5 agree slightly  
  6 agree moderately  
  7 agree strongly  
  
10.3—11 
v_154 v_154 int I think participating in blood donation is 
beneficial to other people in the society. 
 
  1 disagree strongly  
  2 disagree moderately  
  3 disagree slightly  
  4 undecided  
  5 agree slightly  
  6 agree moderately  
  7 agree strongly  
v_155 v_155 int I dislike seeing blood.  
  1 disagree strongly  
  2 disagree moderately  
  3 disagree slightly  
  4 undecided  
  5 agree slightly  
  6 agree moderately  
  7 agree strongly  
v_156 v_156 int I feel nervous about blood donation.  
  1 disagree strongly  
  2 disagree moderately  
  3 disagree slightly  
  4 undecided  
  5 agree slightly  
  6 agree moderately  
  7 agree strongly  
v_157 v_157 int I fear contracting an infection from 
donating blood. 
 
  1 disagree strongly  
  2 disagree moderately  
  3 disagree slightly  
  4 undecided  
  5 agree slightly  
  6 agree moderately  
  7 agree strongly  
v_158 v_158 int I fear bruised and sore arms from 
donating blood. 
 
  1 disagree strongly  
  2 disagree moderately  
  3 disagree slightly  
  4 undecided  
  5 agree slightly  
  6 agree moderately  
  7 agree strongly  
v_159 v_159 int I have a fear of needels.  
  1 disagree strongly  
  2 disagree moderately  
  3 disagree slightly  
  4 undecided  
  5 agree slightly  
  6 agree moderately  
  
10.3—12 
  7 agree strongly  
v_160 v_160 int I fear that an illness will be detected 
during donating blood. 
 
  1 disagree strongly  
  2 disagree moderately  
  3 disagree slightly  
  4 undecided  
  5 agree slightly  
  6 agree moderately  
  7 agree strongly  
v_161 v_161 int I don’t have enough time to donate 
blood. 
 
  1 disagree strongly  
  2 disagree moderately  
  3 disagree slightly  
  4 undecided  
  5 agree slightly  
  6 agree moderately  
  7 agree strongly  
v_162 v_162 int I fear donating blood will reduce my 
vitality and immunity. 
 
  1 disagree strongly  
  2 disagree moderately  
  3 disagree slightly  
  4 undecided  
  5 agree slightly  
  6 agree moderately  
  7 agree strongly  
v_163 v_163 int I haven’t given blood donation a lot of 
thought. 
 
  1 disagree strongly  
  2 disagree moderately  
  3 disagree slightly  
  4 undecided  
  5 agree slightly  
  6 agree moderately  
  7 agree strongly  
     
9 Control Variables (PGID 736739) 
     
We are interested in the relevance of blood donation in your life. (q_1364995 - Typ 311) 
v_95 v_95 int How relevant is blood donation to you 
personally? 
 
  1 highly irrelevant  
  2 moderately irrelevant  
  3 slightly irrelevant  
  4 undecided  
  5 slightly relevant  
  6 moderately relevant  
  7 highly relevant  
  
10.3—13 
     
The following items ask you to indicate how likely you are to act on blood donation in 
the next year. (q_1364996 - Typ 311) 
v_97 v_97 int How likely are you to donate blood 
within the next 12 months? 
 
 beh1 1 absolutely not  
  2 very unlikely  
  3 possibly not  
  4 unsure  
  5 probably  
  6 very likely  
  7 definitely  
  8 I know I am not eligible within the next 
12 months. 
 
v_98 v_98 int How likely are you to check if you are 
eligible to donate blood with the next 12 
months? 
 
 beh2 1 absolutely not  
  2 very unlikely  
  3 possibly not  
  4 unsure  
  5 probably  
  6 very likely  
  7 definitely  
  8 I know I am not eligible within the next 
12 months. 
 
     
Are you... (q_1369574 - Typ 112) 
v_102 v_102 int Blood Donors  
  1 a regular blood donor? (at least two 
times in the past 12 months?) 
 
  2 not a regular blood donor?  
     
10 SocDemo (PGID 736740) 
     
Eventually, please give me some information on your social characteristics:What sex do 
you most identify with? (q_1361587 - Typ 112) 
v_23 v_40 int Sex  
  1 male  
  2 female  
  3 transgender  
  4 none of the above  
     
What year were you born? (q_1361588 - Typ 141) 
v_24 v_41 varchar (mit 
Typencheck: 
Ganzzahl) 
Age  
      
     
What is the highest level of education you have completed? (q_1361589 - Typ 131) 
  
10.3—14 
v_25 v_47 int Education  
  1 high school graduate  
  2 trade/technical/vocational training  
  3 Bachelor  
  4 Master  
  5 PhD  
      
     
You have answered all questions. Thank you for your participation. By clicking continue you 
will now be forwarded to a seperate questionnaire, where all students receiving credit for 
participating have to sign up. 
 
Thank You! 
 
  
10.3—15 
10.3.2  Germany 
Study 2 – German Onlinequestionnaire 
Projekt-ID 142739    
URL der 
Umfrage 
http://ww2.unipark.de/uc/vorderer_Universit__t_Mannheim/eb42/  
Datum 
(GMT) 
05-04-2014 
09:55:48 
   
1 Welcome Page (PGID 756879) 
  
10.3—16 
 
 
Universität Mannheim 
Sabine Reich, M.A. 
 
Einwilligung zur Forschungsteilnahme 
 
Kognitive und affektive Wirkung von medienübermittelten Informationen 
Sie sind eingeladen, an einer kurzen Untersuchung im Rahmen eines Promotionsprojektes an 
der Universität Mannheim teilzunehmen. Ihre Teilnahme ist freiwillig. Bitte lesen Sie die 
Informationen unten aufmerksam durch. Bei Fragen wenden Sie sich bitte an Sabine Reich 
(s.reich@uni-mannheim.de). Sollten Sie für die Teilnahme einwilligen, klicken Sie unten bitte 
auf das Feld “Weiter”.  
 
Ziel der Studie 
Diese Onlinestudie hat zwei Teile. In beiden Teilstudien möchte ich psychologische 
Reaktionen auf einen Medientext untersuchen. Sie werden einen Text und ein Video im 
Verlauf der Studie ansehen. Für einzelne Teilnehmer können teile der Medienangebote 
emotional aufreibend sein. In jedem Fall ist Ihre direkte Reaktion auf die Information gefragt. 
Es gibt deshalb auch keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.  
 
Form der Befragung 
Sollten Sie an der Studie teilnehmen, werden Sie einen kurzen Film und/oder einen kurzen 
Text lesen. Im Anschluss sind Sie jeweils dazu angehalten, Ihre Eindrücke auf numerischen 
Skalen und in freier Textform zu schildern. Es handelt sich um eine experimentelle Studie 
und alle Teilnehmer werden zufällig den Medienprodukten zugeteilt. Keine der Gruppen hat 
einen Vorteil gegenüber den anderen. 
 
Die Teilnahme dauert im Schnitt 20 bis 30 Minuten.  
 
Gefahren und Risiken 
Mit der Teilnahme gehen keine sozialen, physiologischen, finanziellen oder legalen Risiken 
einher.  
 
Vertraulichkeit Ihrer Angaben 
Ich werde die Angaben und Daten dieser Studien vertraulich behandeln. Die Daten werden 
auf einem Server gesichert, der nur dem wissenschaftlichen Team des Lehrstuhls von       
Prof. Dr. Vorderer, Institut für Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Universität 
Mannheim zugänglich ist. Offene Antworten werden anonymisiert eventuell an geschulte 
Kodierer weitergeleitet. Die Daten werden mindestens zwei Jahre nach der Erhebung 
gespeichert. 
 
Ablehnung oder Abbruch der Teilnahme 
Ihre Teilnahme ist freiwillig. Die Ablehnung oder der Abbruch der Teilnahme gereicht 
niemanden zum Nachteil.   
 
Zustimmung 
 
Möchten Sie an der Studie teilnehmen unter den oben genannten Bedingungen klicken Sie 
bitte auf das “Weiter”-Feld. 
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2 DCL Disposition (PGID 756897) 
     
Eine Liste machen (q_1403523 - Typ 111) 
DCL1  int DCL1  
  1 Etwas aufschreiben  
  2 Organisieren  
     
Lesen (q_1403524 - Typ 111) 
DCL2  int DCL2  
  1 Gedruckten Zeilen folgen  
  2 Wissen aneignen  
     
Sich bei der Bundeswehr bewerben (q_1403525 - Typ 111) 
DCL3  int DCL 3  
  1 Anmeldung ausfüllen  
  2 Unterstützung der nationalen 
Verteidigung 
 
     
Wäsche waschen (q_1403526 - Typ 111) 
DCL4  int DCL 4  
  1 Kleidung in die Waschmaschine packen  
  2 Gerüche aus der Kleidung entfernen  
     
Einen Apfel pflücken (q_1403527 - Typ 111) 
DCL5  int DCL5  
  1 Einen Apfel vom Zweig ziehen  
  2 Etwas zu essen bekommen  
     
Einen Baum fällen (q_1403528 - Typ 111) 
DCL6  int DCL6  
  1 Eine Axt schwingen  
  2 Feuerholz machen  
     
Einen Raum ausmessen (q_1403529 - Typ 111) 
DCL7  int DCL7  
  1 Einen Zollstock benutzen  
  2 Eine Renovierung vorbereiten  
     
Das Haus putzen (q_1403530 - Typ 111) 
DCL8  int DCL8  
  1 Staub saugen  
  2 Die eigene Sauberkeit vorzeigen  
     
Einen Raum malern (q_1403531 - Typ 111) 
DCL9  int DCL9  
  1 Eine Farbrolle auf der Wand abrollen  
  2 Einen Raum neu gestalten  
     
     
  
10.3—18 
Die Miete bezahlen (q_1403532 - Typ 111) 
DCL10  int DCL10  
  1 Einen Überweisung ausfüllen  
  2 Eine Wohnung unterhalten  
     
Sich um Zimmerpflanzen kümmern (q_1403533 - Typ 111) 
DCL11  int DCL11  
  1 Blumen gießen  
  2 Den Raum gemütlich machen  
     
Die Haustür abschließen (q_1403534 - Typ 111) 
DCL12  int DCL12  
  1 Einen Schlüssel ins Schloss stecken  
  2 Das Haus/Wohnung sichern  
     
Wählen gehen (q_1403535 - Typ 111) 
DCL13  int DCL13  
  1 Den Stimmzettel ausfüllen  
  2 Eine Wahl beeinflussen  
     
Auf einen Baum klettern (q_1403536 - Typ 111) 
DCL14  int DCL14  
  1 Sich an Zweigen festhalten  
  2 Eine gute Aussicht bekommen  
     
Einen Persönlichkeitstest ausfüllen (q_1403537 - Typ 111) 
DCL15  int DCL15  
  1 Fragen beantworten  
  2 Zeigen wie man ist  
     
Zähne putzen (q_1403538 - Typ 111) 
DCL16  int DCL16  
  1 Die Zahnbürste im Mund bewegen  
  2 Karies verhindern  
      
     
Eine Prüfung schreiben (q_1403539 - Typ 111) 
DCL17  int DCL17  
  1 Fragen beantworten  
  2 Das eigene Wissen beweisen  
     
Jemanden grüßen (q_1403540 - Typ 111) 
DCL18  int DCL18  
  1 Hallo sagen  
  2 Freundlich sein  
     
Einer Versuchung widerstehen (q_1403541 - Typ 111) 
DCL19  int DCL19  
  1 "Nein" sagen  
  2 Moralisch handeln  
  
10.3—19 
     
Essen (q_1403542 - Typ 111) 
DCL20  int DCL20  
  1 Kauen und schlucken  
  2 Nährstoffe aufnehmen  
     
Eine Gemüsegarten anlegen (q_1403543 - Typ 111) 
DCL21  int DCL21  
  1 Samen sähen  
  2 Frisches Gemüse bekommen  
     
Mit dem Auto reisen (q_1403544 - Typ 111) 
DCL22  int DCL22  
  1 Der Karte folgen  
  2 Die Landschaft sehen  
      
     
Eine Zahnfüllung bekommen (q_1403545 - Typ 111) 
DCL23  int DCL23  
  1 Zum Zahnarzt gehen  
  2 Die eigenen Zähne schützen  
     
Mit einem Kind sprechen (q_1403546 - Typ 111) 
DCL24  int DCL24  
  1 Einfache Wörter nutzen  
  2 Einem Kind etwas beibringen  
     
An einer Tür klingeln (q_1403547 - Typ 111) 
DCL25  int DCL25  
  1 Den Finger benutzen  
  2 Sehen, ob jemand zu Hause ist  
     
3.1 Movie a (PGID 756882) 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1 Eval1 (PGID 756883) 
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Welche Gefühle erfahren Sie jetzt im Moment? (q_1370550 - Typ 311) 
v_148  int Negative Gefühle  
 eval1A 1 überhaupt nicht  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 sehr stark  
v_149  int Positive Gefühle  
 eval2A 1 überhaupt nicht  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 sehr stark  
3.2 Movie b (PGID 756884) 
 
3.2.1 Eval 2 (PGID 756885) 
     
Welche Gefühle erfahren Sie jetzt im Moment? (q_1403555 - Typ 311) 
v_191  int Negative Gefühle  
 eval1B 1 überhaupt nicht  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 sehr stark  
v_192  int Positive Gefühle  
 eval2B 1 überhaupt nicht  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 sehr stark  
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4 Text (PGID 756886) 
 Das folgende Informationsmaterial wird durch Bluttransfusionszentren 
verteilt. Bitte Lesen Sie diese Information aufmerksam.  
  
 
Spenden Sie Blut!  
Jeden Tag benötigen Patientinnen und Patienten in Deutschland Bluttransfusionen. Blut kann 
nicht künstlich hergestellt werden; es kann nur von Spender(inne)n gewonnen werden. In der 
medizinischen Versorgung wird Blut sowohl für die Behandlung von Unfallpatient(inn)en 
benötigt, als auch für Krebspatient(inn)en oder Patient(inn)en mit Krankheiten der inneren 
Organe. D Blutbedarf übersteigt dabei häufig die Vorräte. Nur etwa vier Prozent der 
Bundesbürger(inn)en spenden regelmäßig Blut. Blut spenden ist einfach, sicher und dauert für 
die meisten Spender(inn)en nicht mehr als 60 Minuten. Vor der Blutentnahme sprechen 
Spender(inn)en mit einem/-r Arzt/Ärztin. Dabei werden wichtige Funktionen wie 
Körpertemperatur, Blutdruck, Puls und der Gehalt an rotem Blutfarbstoff (Hämoglobin) 
untersucht, die auch der frühen Diagnose von Krankheiten dienen. Die eigentliche Blutspende 
dauert nur etwa zehn Minuten. Im Anschlu an die Blutentnahme erhalten Spender(inn)en einen 
kleinen Imbiss und können sich für einige Minuten ausruhen. Nach dieser kurzen 
Entspannungsphase können sie den restlichen Tag wie gewohnt fortführen.  
Bitte denken Sie über eine Blutspende nach und erkundigen Sie sich bei Ihrer lokalen Blutbank, 
ob Sie die erforderlichen Voraussetzungen erfüllen. Bereits 500 ml Blut können bis zu drei 
Leben retten.  
 
5 TLInstruction (PGID 756887) 
In der nächsten Aufgabe bitte ich Sie, alle Gedanken aufzuschreiben, die Sie während des 
Lesens der Information zur Blutspende auf der vorherigen Seite hatten, soweit Sie sich erinnern 
können. Nehmen Sie sich etwa 5 Minuten Zeit dazu.  
Auf der nächsten Seite finden Sie eine Vorlage dafür. Schreiben Sie den ersten Gedanken, den 
Sie hatten einfach in die erste freie Box, den zweiten in die zweite freie Box usw. Bitte 
schreiben Sie pro Box einen Gedanken auf. Ich habe absichtlich mehr Platz vorbereitet, als die 
meisten Teilnehmer benötigen werden, damit alle genügend Platz für Ihre Gedanken haben. 
Machen Sie sich also keine Gedanken, wenn Sie nicht alle Boxen benötigen.  
Bitte versuchen Sie, in ganzen Sätzen zu antworten, aber machen Sie sich keine Sorgen wegen 
grammatikalischer Details oder korrekter Schreibweise. Bitte sein Sie bei Ihren Gedanken offen 
und ehrlich. All Ihre Antworten sind anonym.  
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6 Thoughts (PGID 756888) 
     
Während dem Lesen habe ich gedacht... (q_1350378 - Typ 142) 
v_1 v_1 blob Thoughts 1  
     
Während dem Lesen habe ich gedacht... (q_1350382 - Typ 142) 
v_2 v_2 blob Thoughts 2  
     
Während dem Lesen habe ich gedacht... (q_1350383 - Typ 142) 
v_3 v_3 blob Thoughts 3  
      
Während dem Lesen habe ich gedacht... (q_1350384 - Typ 142) 
v_4 v_4 blob Thoughts 4  
     
Während dem Lesen habe ich gedacht... (q_1361560 - Typ 142) 
v_6 v_6 blob Thoughts 5  
     
Während dem Lesen habe ich gedacht... (q_1361561 - Typ 142) 
v_7 v_7 blob Thoughts 6  
     
Während dem Lesen habe ich gedacht... (q_1361562 - Typ 142) 
v_8 v_8 blob Thoughts 7  
      
Während dem Lesen habe ich gedacht... (q_1361563 - Typ 142) 
v_9 v_9 blob Thoughts 8  
     
Während dem Lesen habe ich gedacht... (q_1361564 - Typ 142) 
v_10 v_10 blob Thoughts 9  
      
Während dem Lesen habe ich gedacht... (q_1361565 - Typ 142) 
v_11 v_11 blob Thoughts 10  
     
7 Estimates (PGID 756889) 
     
In der folgenden Aufgabe bitte ich Sie, einmal das Auftreten verschiedener medizinischer 
Fälle einzuschätzen.  (q_1370471 - Typ 144) 
v_118 v_118 varchar Welcher Prozentsatz der in den 
deutschen Krankenhäusern 
stattfindenden Gesundheitsversorgung 
beinhaltet eine Art der Bluttransfusion? 
 
v_119 v_119 varchar Welcher Prozentsatz von Patienten in 
Deutschland erfährt Komplikationen 
durch fehlende Bluttransfusionen? 
 
v_120 v_120 varchar Welcher Prozentsatz der deutschen 
Bevölkerung wird mindestens einmal im 
Laufe seines Lebens eine 
Bluttransfusion benötigen? 
 
v_121 v_121 varchar Welcher Anteil der deutschen 
Bevölkerung erfüllt die 
Voraussetzungen, um Blut zu spenden? 
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v_122 v_122 varchar Welcher Anteil der deutschen 
Bevölkerung spendet regelmäßig Blut? 
 
      
8 Attitude Measures (PGID 756890) 
     
In der folgenden Tabelle finden Sie Aussagen zum Thema Blutspenden. Ich interessiere 
mich dafür, inwiefern Sie den einzelnen Aussagen zustimmen oder die Aussagen 
ablehnen. Bitte behalten Sie dabei im Kopf: es geht hier nicht darum, persönliche 
Aussagen zu bewerten, die Studie ist vielmehr am allgemeinen Trend unter allen 
Teilnehmer/-innen interessiert. (q_1370553 - Typ 311) 
v_152 v_152 int Ich denke, Blutspenden tragen nicht zum 
Wohlbefinden anderer Menschen bei. 
 
  1 stimme überhaupt nicht zu  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 stimme voll und ganz zu  
v_153 v_153 int Ich denke, Blut zu spenden ist ein 
ethisches Verhalten. 
 
  1 stimme überhaupt nicht zu  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 stimme voll und ganz zu  
v_154 v_154 int Ich denke, an Blutspenden 
teilzunehmen, ist hilfreich für andere 
Menschen in der Gesellschaft. 
 
  1 stimme überhaupt nicht zu  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 stimme voll und ganz zu  
v_155 v_155 int Ich kann kein Blut sehen.  
  1 stimme überhaupt nicht zu  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 stimme voll und ganz zu  
v_156 v_156 int Ich werde nervös, wenn ich an 
Blutspenden denke. 
 
  1 stimme überhaupt nicht zu  
  2    
  
10.3—24 
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 stimme voll und ganz zu  
v_157 v_157 int Ich habe Angst davor, mich beim 
Blutspenden mit einer 
Infektionskrankheit anzustecken. 
 
  1 stimme überhaupt nicht zu  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 stimme voll und ganz zu  
v_158 v_158 int Ich habe Angst davor, beim Blutspenden 
Blutergüsse und schmerzende Arme zu 
bekommen. 
 
  1 stimme überhaupt nicht zu  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 stimme voll und ganz zu  
v_159 v_159 int Ich habe Angst vor Nadeln.  
  1 stimme überhaupt nicht zu  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 stimme voll und ganz zu  
v_160 v_160 int Ich habe Angst, dass durch eine 
Blutspende eine Krankheit entdeckt 
wird. 
 
  1 stimme überhaupt nicht zu  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 stimme voll und ganz zu  
v_161 v_161 int Ich habe nicht genügend Zeit für eine 
Blutspende. 
 
  1 stimme überhaupt nicht zu  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  
10.3—25 
  5    
  6    
  7 stimme voll und ganz zu  
v_162 v_162 int Ich habe Angst, dass mein 
Immunsystem und meine Vitalität durch 
eine Blutspende leiden. 
 
  1 stimme überhaupt nicht zu  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 stimme voll und ganz zu  
v_163 v_163 int Ich habe noch nicht viel über 
Blutspenden nachgedacht. 
 
  1 stimme überhaupt nicht zu  
  2    
  3    
  4    
  5    
  6    
  7 stimme voll und ganz zu  
      
9 Control Variables (PGID 756893) 
     
Nun interessiert mich noch die Relevanz des Blutspendens für Sie persönlich. (q_1364995 
- Typ 311) 
v_95 v_95 int Wie relevant ist für Sie persönlich, Blut 
zu spenden? 
 
 rel1 1 völlig irrelevant  
  2 eher irrelevant  
  3 mäßig irrelevant  
  4 unentschieden  
  5 mäßig relevant  
  6 eher relevant  
  7 hoch relevant  
     
In den folgenden Aufgaben bitte ich Sie, anzudeuten, wie wahrscheinlich es ist, dass Sie im 
nächsten Jahr folgende Dinge tun: (q_1364996 - Typ 311) 
v_97 v_97 int Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass Sie in 
den kommenden 12 Monaten Blut 
spenden? 
 
 beh1 1 keinesfalls wahrscheinlich  
  2 sehr unwahrscheinlich  
  3 eher unwahrscheinlich  
  4 unsicher  
  5 eher wahrscheinlich  
  6 sehr wahrscheinlich  
  7 sicher  
  
10.3—26 
  8 Ich weiß, dass ich in den nächsten zwölf 
Monaten kein Blut spenden darf. 
 
v_98 v_98 int Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass Sie sich 
in den kommenden 12 Monaten 
erkundigen, ob Sie die Voraussetzungen 
zur Blutspende erfüllen? 
 
 beh2 1 keinesfalls wahrscheinlich  
  2 sehr unwahrscheinlich  
  3 eher unwahrscheinlich  
  4 unsicher  
  5 eher wahrscheinlich  
  6 sehr wahrscheinlich  
  7 sicher  
  8 Ich weiß, dass ich in den nächsten zwölf 
Monaten kein Blut spenden darf. 
 
     
Sind Sie.... (q_1369574 - Typ 112) 
v_102 v_102 int Blood Donors  
 Donors 1 ein/e regelmäßige/r BlutspenderIn? 
(mindestens zweimal in den letzten 12 
Monaten) ? 
 
  2 kein/e regelmäßige/r BlutspenderIn?  
     
10 SocDemo (PGID 756894) 
     
Zum Schluss geben Sie uns bitte noch einige Informationen zu Ihrer Person:Mit welchem 
Geschlecht identifizieren Sie sich am meisten? (q_1361587 - Typ 112) 
v_23 v_40 int Sex  
  1 männlich  
  2 weiblich  
  3 transsexuell  
  4 keins der oben genannten / möchte nicht 
antworten 
 
      
In welchem Jahr wurden Sie geboren? (q_1361588 - Typ 141) 
v_24 v_41 varchar (mit 
Typencheck: 
Ganzzahl) 
Age  
     
Welchen höchsten allgemeinbildenden Schulabschluss haben Sie? (q_1361589 - Typ 131) 
v_25 v_47 int Education  
  1 keinen Abschluss an einer 
allgemeinbildenden Schule 
 
  2 Hauptschulabschluss  
  3 Mittlere Reife  
  4 Abschluss der Polytechnischen 
Oberschule in der 8. oder 9. Klasse in 
der DDR 
 
  5 Abschluss der Polytechnischen 
Oberschule der 10. Klasse in der DDR 
 
  
10.3—27 
  6 Fachhochschulreife, Fachoberschule  
  7 Allgemeine oder fachgebundene 
Hochschulreife/Abitur 
 
     
Welchen höchsten beruflichen Abschluss streben Sie an? (q_1515329 - Typ 131) 
v_193 v_193 int Education 2  
  1 Beruflich-betriebliche Ausbildung 
(Lehre) 
 
  2 Beruflich-schulische Ausbildung  
  3 Ausbildungsabschluss an einer Fach-, 
Meister-, Technikerschule, Berufs- oder 
Fachakademie 
 
  4 Bachelor an einer 
Hochschule/Universität 
 
  5 Fachhochschulabschluss (z.B. Diplom, 
Master) 
 
  6 Universitätsabschluss (z.B. Diplom, 
Magister, Staatsexamen, Master) 
 
  7 Promotion  
  8 einen anderen beruflichen Abschluss  
     
Sie haben es fast geschafft. 
Wenn Sie nun "Weiter" klicken, werden Sie auf eine separate Seite geleitet auf der ich Ihre E-
Mail Adressen abfrage sowie ihrer Rekrutierer. Sie werden dann in drei b vier Wochen 
nocheinmal einige abschließende Infos zum Ziel der Studie erhalten. 
Ihre Angaben auf der nächsten Seite sind dabei nicht mit Ihren Antworten, die Sie bisher 
gegeben habe in Verbindung zu bringen. Ihre Angaben bleiben wie versprochen anonym. 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme.  
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